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Date 22/3/72

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H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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FILE No. NE Q 25/2 ✓ (Part )

TITLE: DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION OF UNITED KINGDOM IN IRAQ.

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308

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Regist. B.S.	1-7	6/7 ✓	Mr Pannas <del>18</del>	(60) 17/8		Regist. S.L.E.	(70)	7/10
<del>Mr. Speaker</del>	<del>19/7</del>		Regist. V.B.	(40) 24/8		Regist. Mr. Weyatt.	(71)	12/10
Regist. B.S.	(38+39)	12/7	Type	✓		Regist. Col. Griffiths	(72)	14/10
Regist. P.D.D.	P.D.D.	14/7	Regist. V.B.	(62) 25/8		Regist. Mr. Coltman	Mini	15/10
Regist. B.S.	(31)	19/7	Regist. V.B.	(63) 21/8		Mr. Dutt		28/10
Regist. B.S.	(45)	20/7	Regist. V.B.	(63) (68) 22/8		Regist. Mr. Coltman	MIN	4.11.
Regist. Lt. Col. Griffiths	(7)	✓	Regist. V.B.	(69)		Mr. Kay	(71)	5/11
Mr. Shaw		✓	Regist. S.L.E.	(69)		Regist. V.B.	(71+73)	10/11
Mr. Barker		✓	P.U.S.D.	(69)				11/11
Mr. Evans		24/7	Regist. V.B.	(69)	6/10			11/11
Regist. V.B.	(55) (57)	30/7	Regist. V.B.	(70)	7/10			
R		1/8						

FCO 17/55



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
①

Mr Parsons

AS 5h

EXPULSION OF AIR ATTACHE AND FIRST SECRETARY AT HM EMBASSY, BAGHDAD  
BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT

1. News Department have just told me that the BBC have picked up a report from Baghdad Radio quoting the INA to the effect that our Air Attaché at Baghdad, Wing Comdr Hugh Harrison, and the Embassy's First Secretary, Mr George Rolleston, have been declared persona non grata and given 24 hours to leave Iraq.
2. No report is yet available from the Embassy. Century House have received confirmation of the request to leave.
3. News Department are taking the line that we have received no report from the Ambassador, and that we have no comment. They may have to vary this line during the afternoon.
4. No doubt we shall have to consider what, if any, retaliatory action we should take in the light of any details in the Iraqi complaint, and of the Ambassador's report.




S L Egerton  
Near Eastern Department

5 July 1971

Copies to:

Mr Evans  
Mr Brian Smith  
News Department  
Mr Thomas, Personnel Operations Dept





FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 051123Z

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TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 778 OF 051115Z.

1. I WAS SUMMONED AN HOUR AGO BY THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL AND HANDED A NOTE DECLARING MY AIR ATTACHE, WING COMMANDER HARRISON (WHO IS ACTING DEFENCE ATTACHE SINCE COLONEL SHARPE'S DEPARTURE) AND FIRST SECRETARY ROLLESTON PNG, AND REQUIRING BOTH TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WITHIN 24 HOURS. NO REASON WAS GIVEN IN THE NOTE. I WAS SIMPLY TOLD IT WAS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
2. I INSISTED ON SEEING THE UNDER-SECRETARY (WHO IS IN CHARGE SINCE SHAIKHLI LEFT FOR CAIRO THIS MORNING) AND TOLD HIM WITHOUT REGARD FOR DIPLOMATIC NICETIES WHAT I THOUGHT ABOUT IT, REFUSING TO LEAVE HIS OFFICE UNTIL HE HAD TRIED TO CONTACT SUCCESSIVELY SADDAM HUSSAIN, AMMASH AND THE MINISTERS OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR, TO SECURE AT LEAST AN EXTENSION OF THE BARBAROUS 24 HOURS. ALL WERE OUT.
3. NI'MA SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT MORE HE COULD DO. I SAID THAT SOME OF THESE GENERALS MUST BE AVAILABLE SOME TIME IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY, AND HE HAD BETTER GO ON TRYING BOTH TO SECURE AN EXTENSION AND TO OBTAIN ME AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH ALL OR ANY OF THEM. IF I HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING FROM HIM BY TONIGHT I WOULD CONTACT HIM AT 9AM TOMORROW TO FIND OUT WHAT HE HAD DONE. THE ANSWER WILL PROBABLY BE NOTHING.
4. I SHALL REPORT SEPARATELY ONCE WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHAT CONCEIVABLE REASONS THE IRAQIS MAY HAVE FOR THIS IRRATIONAL ORDER.
5. IF THERE IS ANYTHING INPARTICULAR YOU WISH ME TO SAY TO NI'MA PLEASE LET ME KNOW BY TONIGHT. I HAVE SAID A GOOD DEAL.

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

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DEFENCE D

PERS OPS D

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

NNNN

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See -p pa 89/7



ANN  
BBC B

*Heard  
BBC*

REGISTRY No. 10
- 9 JUL 1971
NEQ 25/2

*pu 9/7*

(30)

B12 THIRD BRITISH DIPLOMAT LEAVES IRAQ (WITH B63 6 DAY)

(BAGHDAD RADIO) RODERICK CLUBE, FIRST SECRETARY AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD, LEFT FOR BEIRUT AT 08.00 (ED: LOCAL) TODAY FOLLOWING THE DECISION TO DECLARE HIM PERSONA NON GRATA IN IRAQ.

END BBC MON 1025 7/7 JMA (KY) TVN



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(NED)

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FM F C O 051335Z

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TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO. 805 OF 5 JULY.

①  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 778: HARRISON AND ROLLESTON.

1. THE BBC HAVE PICKED UP A REPORT FROM BAGHDAD RADIO (QUOTING THE IRAQ NEWS AGENCY) TO THE EFFECT THAT HARRISON AND ROLLESTON HAVE BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA AND GIVEN 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO LEAVE IRAQ. NEWS DEPARTMENT EXPECT TO RECEIVE ENQUIRIES AS A RESULT.

2. WE SHALL SHORTLY BE HOLDING AN INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MEETING TO CONSIDER:

(A) ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HARRISON'S AND ROLLESTON'S DEPARTURE;

(B) THE LINE TO TAKE IN ANSWER TO PRESS ENQUIRIES;

(C) WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PROTEST AND, IF SO, IN WHAT TERMS;

(D) WHETHER WE OUGHT TO RETALIATE.

3. WE SHALL NEED TO SUBMIT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINISTERS. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE REPORT PROMISED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND FOR ANY ADVICE YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE ON THE FOUR SUBJECTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE BY 1700Z IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

See -16.

FILES

NED

PERS OPS D

PUSD

NEWS D

MR PARSONS

MR LE QUESNE

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pa 8/9/7



NEQ 25/2

3

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 051520Z

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 806 OF 5 JULY INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO,  
BEIRUT, AMMAN, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (RESY), TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND  
UKMIS (NY).

①  
YOUR TEL NO 778 OF 5 JULY (NOW REPEATED TO OTHER ADDRESSEES);  
THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS INTEREST. IN ANSWER TO ENQUIRIES,  
NEWS DEPARTMENT IS SAYING THE FOLLOWING:

ON THE RECORD. WE HAVE RECEIVED A REPORT ABOUT THIS MATTER FROM  
HM AMBASSADOR. WE ARE CONSIDERING HIS REPORT.

UNATTRIBUTABLY. IT IS TRUE THAT THE TWO DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN  
DECLARED PNG AND HAVE BEEN GIVEN 24 HOURS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.  
HM AMBASSADOR WILL BE REPORTING FURTHER AFTER HE HAS MADE  
FURTHER ENQUIRIES (NO REASON HAS YET BEEN GIVEN FOR THE EXPULSIONS).  
HM AMBASSADOR IS ALSO SEEKING AN EXTENSION OF THE 24- HOUR  
PERIOD.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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per 8/7

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1. F C O 051555Z

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TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 807 OF 5 JULY.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 778 AND MY TELEGRAM NO 805:  
HARRISON AND ROLLESTON

1. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS STRONGLY FOR AN EXTENSION. WE HAVE ALREADY DONE SO TO KHALAF. IF NO EXTENSION HAS BEEN GRANTED BY THE TIME YOU SPEAK TO NI'MA, YOU SHOULD PURSUE THE SUBJECT WITH HIM. YOU SHOULD ALSO PRESS HIM TO GIVE YOU REASONS FOR THE EXPULSION.

2. WE SHALL NOT DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT PROTESTING OR RETALIATION UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR FURTHER REPORT. WE SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND ABOUT THE LINE WHICH NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE NOW TAKING IN ANSWER TO ENQUIRIES. -/3.

3. THE EVENING STANDARD CARRIES A REPORT ON ITS BACK PAGE ABOUT THE EXPULSION. DATELINED BAGHDAD, THE REPORT QUOTES AND OFFICIAL OF THE QUOTE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE UNQUOTE AS HAVING SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN PROVED THAT THE DIPLOMATS WERE LINKED TO A QUOTE SPY AND INTRIGUE NETWORK INSIDE IRAQ UNQUOTE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

*No extension was granted. See subsequent tel.*

*pa 8/7*

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MR PARSONS  
MR LE QUESNE

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
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FM BAGHDAD 051615Z

SECRET



TO FLASH F C O TELNO 782 OF 5/7

MY TELNO 778 : HARRISON AND ROLLESTON .

THE POSSIBILITY WHICH WE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THAT THESE EXPULSIONS WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO INSIGNIFICANT PAST 'CONTRAVENTIONS' COMMITTED BY THE OFFICERS CONCERNED CAN , I THINK , BE RULED OUT NOW THAT THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS TOLD THE BBC (ACCORDING TO THE LATTER'S LAST NEWS BROADCAST ) THAT THEY ARE PROVED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WITH A SPY-RING PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME.

2. EARLIER THIS MORNING WE HEARD THAT AN ATTEMPTED COUP ON THE PART OF JUNIOR OFFICERS IN RASHID CAMP HAD BEEN SCOTCHED ON 1 JULY. DISCONTENT IN THE ARMY WAS TO BE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF RUMOURED PURGES AND OF THE RECENT DECREE DISMISSING THOSE WITH FOREIGN WIVES. IT MAY HAVE SUITED THE AUTHORITIES TO REPRESENT THIS DISCONTENT AS AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME AND, IN ORDER TO GIVE THIS PLAUSABILITY, TO INCULPATE A FOREIGN POWER .

3. FOR A VARIANT OF THE ABOVE PLEASE CONSULT RITCHIE.

*Done. See  
note attached to  
submission*

4. FOR REPLY TO YOUR TELNO 805 SEE M.I.F.T .

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

NED

PUSD

DEFENCE D

PERSONNEL OPS D

PS

PUS

PS TO MR GODBER

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

SECRET



FLASH  
CYPHER/CAT A  
FM BAGHDAD 051630Z

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TO FLASH F C O TELNO 783 OF 5/7

6

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 JUL 1971
NEQ 25/2
UNDER

YOUR TELNO 805 AND MIPT : HARRISON AND ROLLESTON.

1. FOLLOWING REFERENCES ARE TO PARA 2 OF YOUR TEL  
REPLY.

(A) IF I AM UNABLE TO OBTAIN AN EXTENSION, IT WOULD SEEM  
BEST FOR THEM TO LEAVE BY SAUDI AIRLINES SV 933 TO  
KUWAIT LEAVING HERE 1000Z TOMORROW OR POSSIBLY TO DRIVE TO  
KUWAIT IF CARNET CAN BE OBTAINED IN TIME. THERE IS NO  
LATER FLIGHT OUT MRS HARRISON WILL STAY ON TO PACK UP.  
MY ADMIN SEC. WILL COMPLETE ROLLESTON'S PACKING ETC.

They drove to  
Kuwait, not  
in  
Rolleston's  
car.

(B) IN THE LIGHT OF PARA 1 OF MIPT I SUGGEST FOLLOWING LINE

See 7/11  
and Kuwait  
Telno  
320.

"WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO EXPLANATION. IF THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY  
REPRESENTATIVE WAS SPEAKING ON GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS WHEN  
HE TOLD THE BBC THAT THE OFFICERS CONCERNED WERE PROVED TO HAVE  
BEEN INVOLVED WITH A SPY-RING PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME  
WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT THE ACCUSATION IS OF COURSE TOTALLY  
GROUNDLESS".

The line  
was  
slightly  
changed -  
see Note  
on file  
8/17

(C) IN VIEW OF THE I.N.A, ALLEGATION QUOTED ABOVE, A PROTEST  
ON THE LINES OF THE SUGGESTED DENIAL SEEMS ESSENTIAL.

Done

A WRITTEN COMMUNICATION BY ME WOULD NO DOUBT BE REJECTED BY  
THE M.F.A. PRESUMABLY IT SHOULD BE HANDED TO KHALAF IN LONDON.

Done

(D) AGAIN, BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC ACCUSATION AGAINST HARRISON  
AND ROLLESTON, I SUGGEST KHALAF BE TOLD THAT RETALIATION WILL  
PROBABLY FOLLOW. WE CAN THEN CONSIDER WHETHER TO IMPLEMENT  
THE THREAT AND, IF SO, WHOM TO CHOOSE.

Retaliation made  
on 8/7

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES  
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PS

PUS  
MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS

PS TO MR GODBER

CONFIDENTIAL



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CYPHER/CAT A

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FM F C O 051745Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

DESKBY 06/0445Z

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO. 811 OF 5 JULY INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT.

MY TELNO. 805.

(2)

1. WE ASSUME THAT UNLESS YOU CAN SECURE AN EXTENSION HARRISON AND ROLLESTON WILL TRAVEL BY THE BOAC FLIGHT LEAVING AT 0850 HOURS LOCAL ON TUESDAY 6 JULY. PLEASE CONFIRM TRAVEL PLANS SO THAT WE CAN MEET.

2. IF THEY TRAVEL BY ANOTHER FLIGHT WHICH STAGES OR INVOLVES A CHANGE OF AIRCRAFT AT BEIRUT, WE HOPE HM EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WILL PROVIDE ANY NECESSARY HELP. WE ARE THEREFORE REPEATING TO BEIRUT YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 778.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

NED

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NEWS D

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Arrived via  
Kuwait (see Kuwait  
telno 320)  
R H



FLASH

CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 060646Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 786 OF 6/7 INFO IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO,  
ANKARA, KUWAIT, BEIRUT, MOD(FXA).

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 811: HARRISON AND ROLLESTON.

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IN CASE I FAIL TO SECURE AN EXTENSION OF THE 24 HOURS,  
WE ARE NOW WORKING ON TWO ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF GETTING  
HARRISON AND ROLLESTON OUT OF IRAQ:

A. WE HAVE APPLIED FOR A CARNET FOR ROLLESTON'S CAR.  
IF THIS SUCCEEDS, THEN ROLLESTON (POSSIBLY ACCOMPANIED  
BY HARRISON) MIGHT DRIVE INTO TURKEY AND HOME VIA GREECE  
ETC. IF HARRISON ACCOMPANIED HIM, HE WOULD PROBABLY WISH  
TO FLY HOME FROM ANKARA.

Method  
Not used

B. THE ONE EVENING FLIGHT OUT OF BAGHDAD TODAY IS A UAR  
AIRLINES FLIGHT (MS273) TO CAIRO VIA DAMASCUS.  
WE HAD PREVIOUSLY RULED THIS OUT BECAUSE OF STOP IN SYRIA.  
HOWEVER WE NOW LEARN THAT THIS IS A TECHNICAL STOP ONLY WITH  
NO TRAFFIC RIGHTS. HARRISON AND/OR ROLLESTON WOULD NO  
DOUBT BE ABLE TO PICK UP AN ONWARD FLIGHT TO LONDON FROM  
CAIRO.

Method  
not used

2. GRATEFUL EARLIEST AUTHORISATION IN PRINCIPLE FOR BOTH  
THESE ALTERNATIVES. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT WHICH  
WE ADOPT.

3. PLEASE REPEAT TO CAIRO AND ANKARA ANY ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES	PS TO MR GODBER
NED	PS TO PUS
PUSD	NEWS D
DEFENCE D	MR LE QUESNE
POD	MR PARSONS
SECURITY D	
PRIVATE SECRETARY	

See no 814

pub 8/7



FLASH  
EN CLAIR

FM CAIRO 060825Z

UNCLASSIFIED

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9

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -6 JUL 1971 NEQ 25/2
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TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 799 OF 6 JULY, INFO FLASH BAGHDAD  
IMMEDIATE ANKARA KUWAIT BEIRUT MOD ( FXA )

BAGHDAD TEL NO 786: HARRISON AND ROLLESTON.

1. UAA FLIGHT MS 723 FROM BAGHDAD REACHES HERE AT 070005.  
THE NEXT DIRECT FLIGHTS TO LONDON ARE UNITED ARAB AIRLINES  
MS 779 ETD CAIRO 070000 ETA LONDON 071425 ( WHICH WE WOULD NOT  
NORMALLY RECOMMEND) AND AIR INDIA AI125 ETD CAIRO 071335  
ETA LONDON 071915.
2. ALTERNATIVELY , THEY COULD TAKE AIR FRANCE AF181  
ETD CAIRO 070550 ETA PARIS 070940 OR SAS SK872 ETD CAIRO  
070835 ETA VIENNA 071210 AND COPENHAGEN 071410.
3. ALL TIMES LOCAL.
4. WE WILL MEET AND IF NECESSARY ACCOMMODATE SHOULD  
THEY COME VIA CAIRO.

BEAUMONT

FILES  
NED  
NEWS D  
SECURITY D  
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DEFENCE D  
POD  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

PS TO PUS  
PS TO MR GODBER  
MR LE QUEBNE  
MR PARSONS  
CHIEF CLERK

They travel  
via Kuwait  
Beirut

pa 89/



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
FLASH

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 061130Z

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TO FLASH F C O TELNO 796 OF 6/7 INFO FLASH TO BEIRUT

IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO AMMAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN RESIDENCY TEHRAN  
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK .

⑦

 MY TELEGRAM NO 792 (NOT TO ALL); EXPULSIONS.

1. I WAS SUMMONED AGAIN BY THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL AT 1330  
AND HANDED A FURTHER EXPULSION ORDER , THIS TIME IN RESPECT OF  
FIRST SECRETARY CLUBE . HE HAS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY BY 1400  
HOURS LOCAL (TOMORROW). UNSPECIFIED SECURITY REASONS WERE  
ADDUCED . THERE CAN NOW BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT PARAGRAPH  
3 OF MY TELEGRAM 782 (TO FCO ONLY) APPLIES .

⑤

2. CLUBE AIMS TO TRAVEL BY ME 321 LEAVING 0800 HOURS(LOCAL)  
TOMORROW ARRIVING BEIRUT 0835 LOCAL, THENCE BY BA 775 ARRIVING  
LONDON 1610 HOURS . GRATEFUL IF HE COULD BE MET AT BOTH .

BALFOUR, PAUL

 FILES  
 NED  
 NEWS D  
 SECURITY D  
 PUSD  
 DEFENCE D  
 PCD  
 PCD

 PS  
 PS TO PUS  
 PS TO MR KERSHAW  
 MR LE QUESNE  
 MR PARSONS  
 CHIEF CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

*This was done  
per 49/7*



FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

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FM BAGHDAD 061115Z

CONFIDENTIAL



TO FLASH F C O TELNO 795 OF 6/7

INFO FLASH TO KUWAIT AND CAIRO IMMEDIATE TO ANKARA.

MY TELEGRAM NO 792 : HARRISON AND ROLLESTON.

1. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS , HAVING DECLARED THEMSELVES UNABLE TO TURN BOOKED PASSENGERS OFF THE FLIGHT TO CAIRO THIS EVENING , HAVE NOW CONVEYED TO ME AT 1250 AN ORDER FROM ABOVE THAT HARRISON AND ROLLESTON MUST LEAVE BAGHDAD BY CAR BY 1300. I SAID THIS WAS ABSURD AND IMPOSSIBLE BUT EVENTUALLY AGREED TO DESPATCH THEM BY ROAD TO KUWAIT (NOT TURKEY) LEAVING ABOUT

1530 . THEY SHOULD THEREFORE REACH THE KUWAIT BORDER AT ABOUT 2230 (1930Z) . THEY WILL TRAVEL IN MY DAIMLER AS FAR AS THE BORDER, ESCORTED BY PERRIS MY ADMIN SECRETARY , IN A SECOND CAR, (WHICH , UNLIKE MINE , HAS THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION AND WILL GO ON TO KUWAIT ).

2. (TO KUWAIT) UNLESS YOU FIND IT CONVENIENT TO MEET AT BORDER ,THEY WILL REPORT TO DE COURCY IRELAND. PLEASE ACCOMMODATE AND ARRANGE FIRST AVAILABLE FLIGHT TO LONDON.

BALFOUR PAUL

Per 29/7

FILES

NED

PUSD

DEFENCE D

POD

SECURITY D

NEWS D

P & CD

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

PS TO MR KERSHAW

PS

PS TO PUS

CHIEF CLERK

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

-6 JUL 1971

NEQ 25/2

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 060925Z

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TO FLASH<sup>H</sup> FCO TEL NO 792 OF 6/7 INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO ANKARA  
KUWAIT BEIRUT AND MOD (FXA) (8)

MY TELEGRAM NO 786. HARRISON AND ROLLESTON.

1. THIS MORNING'S PAPERS CARRY FRONT PAGE ITEM WHICH INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING "IN A STATEMENT TO INA, A SPOKESMAN FROM THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSED THAT THERE WAS DECISIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE AIR ATTACHE AND THE FIRST SECRETARY WERE INVOLVED IN AN ESPIONAGE AND PLOTTING NETWORK OPERATING IN IRAQ TO EMPLOY MERCENARIES FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN IRAQ".

2. HAVING HEARD NOTHING FROM NI'MA I TELEPHONED AT 9AM AND WAS TOLD THAT NO EXTENSION COULD BE APPROVED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR TELEGRAM NO 807 I ASKED FOR AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM BOTH TO PURSUE THE EXTENSION AND TO REMONSTRATE ABOUT PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE. I WAS RECEIVED AT 9.30.

3. THERE WAS NO GIVE OVER THE EXTENSION AND NI'MA DENIED THAT ANY COMMUNICATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED ON THE SUBJECT FROM KHALAF. I LODGED A FORMAL DEMAND TO SEE AMMASH OR SADDAM HUSSAIN URGENTLY. NI'MA AND THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, WHO WAS PRESENT, UNDERTOOK TO PUT THIS UP BUT SAID THEY COULD GIVE ME NO ASSURANCE I WOULD BE RECEIVED, LEAST OF ALL TODAY.

4. I SAID IT WAS INTOLERABLE THAT, HAVING BEEN GIVEN NO EXPLANATION BY NI'MA YESTERDAY, I SHOULD HAVE TO LEARN OF THE LUDICROUS ACCUSATION MADE AGAINST MEMBERS OF MY STAFF FROM THE BBC AND THEN FROM IRAQI NEWSPAPERS.

5. UNLESS I RECEIVE CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS IN TIME OR OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SUPERVENE, HARRISON AND ROLLESTON WILL LEAVE AS IN 1 (A) OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. BUT INCASE ONE OR BOTH IS REQUIRED OR DECIDES TO FLY STRAIGHT HOME WE ARE ASKING THE MFA PROVISIONALLY TO OFF-LOAD TWO PASSENGERS FROM MS 273 TO CAIRO (WHICH IS FULLY BOOKED). I WILL OF COURSE TELEGRAPH FINAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ALL CONCERNED.

See -1/11  
for mode  
of travel.

CONFIDENTIAL

16. WE  
pa 129/



CONFIDENTIAL

5 6. WE HEAR THIS MORNING THAT THE GOC KIRKUK AND TWENTY OF HIS OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE AUTHORITIES INTEND THE STORY OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP TO GAIN CREDENCE. I SUSPECT THE EXPULSION OF HARRISON AND ROLLESTON (WHICHEVER OF THE EXPLANATIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 782 IS NEAREST THE MARK) FITS IN ONLY TOO CONVENIENTLY WITH THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT'S GULF POLICY AND ITS DESIRE TO LINK US WITH IRAN AND USE US AS A WHIPPING BOY.

BALFOUR PAUL

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES

N.E.D.

NEWS DEPT

SECURITY DEPT

P.U.S.D.

DEFENCE DEPT

PERS. OPS DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S. TO P.U.S.

P.S. TO MR GODBER

CHIEF CLERK

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL



NEQ 25/2

13

OO ANKARA

RR BAGHDAD

GRS 20

EN CLAIR

FM F C O 061120Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE ANKARA TELEGRAM NUMBER 958 OF 6 JULY INFO BAGHDAD

BAGHDAD

CAIRO? TELNO 799: HARRISON AND ROLLESTON

WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU BAGHDAD TELNO 778 SO THAT YOU KNOW  
THE BACKGROUND.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

19 8/7



15 (A)

FLASH  
EN CLAIR

(XP)

FM F.C.O. 061030Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TEL NO 814 OF 6 JULY INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, ANKARA,  
KUWAIT AND BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 786<sup>8</sup>, PARAGRAPH 2.

WE ARE QUITE CONTENT TO LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE WHICH ROUTE  
IS BEST IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WHEN IT IS DECIDED, WE SHOULD  
BE GLAD IF YOU, OR THE TRANSIT POST, IF ANY, COULD CONFIRM BY  
TELEGRAM THE LONDON ETA, SO THAT WE CAN ARRANGE TO MEET.

2. YOU WILL NO DOUBT IMPRESS ON HARRISON AND ROLLESTON THAT THEY  
SHOULD SAY NOTHING IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS FROM JOURNALISTS ABOUT  
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR LEAVING BAGHDAD.

DOUGLAS-HQME

FILES

PERS OPS D  
NED  
PUSD  
DEFENCE D  
SECURITY D  
PS  
NEWS D  
MR PARSONS  
SIR W LUCE

pa 89/7



NEQ 25/2  
TOP COP (14)

IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER/CAT A

RESTRICTED

(NED)

FM F.C.O. 061325Z

RESTRICTED.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 816 OF 6 JULY INFO CAIRO, BEIRUT, AMMAN, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (R), TEHRAN, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO. 806 OF 5 JULY AND YOUR TELNO. 796 OF 6 JULY.

YOU WILL RECEIVE SEPARATELY (VIA C.O.I.) SPOKESMAN EXTRACT ON EXPULSIONS. IN ADDITION, NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE, AS NECESSARY, MAKING USE OF FOLLOWING MATERIAL UNATTRIBUTABLY:

WERE THE PEOPLE CONCERNED DOING WHAT REPORT SAY THEY WERE DOING? IF AND WHEN WE ARE TOLD WHAT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DOING, WE WILL COMMENT. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN GIVEN ANY REASONS DESPITE STRENUOUS EFFORTS BY HM AMBASSADOR TO OBTAIN THEM. HE IS STILL TRYING. BUT THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT COMMENTING IN ADVANCE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS INDICATING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN IMPROPER ACTIVITIES.

ARE EITHER OF THEM INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS? IT IS NOT OUR PRACTICE TO COMMENT ON SUCH MATTERS.

WHAT IS THE 'FUTURE ACTION' REFERRED TO IN THE ON-THE-RECORD STATEMENT?

ALL OUR OPTIONS ARE OPEN, INCLUDING RETALIATION IN KIND.

WAS MR. PARSONS' DEMARCHE A PROTEST?

NO, IT WAS SIMPLY A TELEPHONE CALL IN WHICH HE STRONGLY DEPRECATED THE SHORT NOTICE GIVEN TO HARRISON AND ROLLESTON. THE POSSIBILITY OF A FORMAL PROTEST SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT.

WILL THE TWO MEN GIVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON ARRIVAL IN BRITAIN?

NO AND DETAILS OF THEIR TRAVEL PLANS WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED. /2.

RESTRICTED

pa 89/7



RESTRICTED

2. THE IRAQ NEWS AGENCY REPORT ABOUT CLUBE ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR THE SPOKESMAN TO BE QUESTIONED AT THE 1230 CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, WE SHALL OF COURSE USE THE ABOVE WHERE APPROPRIATE IN HIS CASE AS WELL.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
PERSONNEL OPS D  
MOD (INT)



NEQ 25/2

15

FLASH  
EN CLAIR

FM FCO 061500Z

TOP COPY

(NED)

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 818 OF 6 JULY INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO BEIRUT  
AMMAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY) TEHRAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TEL NO 792, <sup>(9)</sup> PARA 1.

GIVEN THAT THE INA REPORT OF 5 JULY QUOTES AN INTELLIGENCE SPOKES-  
MAN OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT, THUS GIVING THEIR STORY A MORE OFFICIAL  
BASIS, NEWS DEPARTMENT IS NOW SAYING ON THE RECORD THE FOLLOWING:

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INA HAS CORRECTLY REPORTED AN OFFICIAL  
SPOKESMAN OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT, WE REJECT THESE ACCUSATIONS  
TOTALLY.

2. NEWS DEPARTMENT IS ALSO CONFIRMING ON THE RECORD THAT  
HARRISON AND ROLLESTON HAVE LEFT BAGHDAD, WITHOUT GIVING ITINERARY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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PUSD

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MOD INT

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(16)

CYPHER CAT A

FM KUWAIT 070500Z

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TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 320 OF 7/7/71 INFO FLASH TO BAGHDAD.

BAGHDAD TEL NO 795 FO FCO: HARRISON AND ROLLESTON

1. THE PARTY ARRIVED SAFELY LAST NIGHT. THEY WERE ESCORTED ( AT A DISCREET DISTANCE ) ALL THE WAY TO THE BORDER BY A CAR WITH FOUR IRAQI SECURITY MEN.
2. HARRISON AND ROLLESTON ARE BOOKED ON KUWAIT AIRWAYS FLIGHT KU101 ETA LONDON AIRPORT 1915 LOCAL TIME TODAY(WEDNESDAY). PLEASE MEET AND ACCOMMODATE.
3. PERRIS PLANS TO LEAVE HERE AT ABOUT 1300 TODAY ETA BAGDAD 2200

WILTON

*They arrived and were met.  
pa 8/7*

FILES:

NED

PUSD

DEFENCE DEPT

SECURITY DEPT

NEWS DEPT

P & C D

POD

POD (COL GRIFFITHS)

MR. LE QUESNE

MR. PARSONS

PS TO MR. KERSHAW

PS

PS TO PUS

CHIEF CLERK

&&&&

RESTRICTED



FM H  
CYHER CAT A  
FM KUWAIT 070500Z  
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

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17

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 321 OF 7/7/71.

FOLLOWING FOR RESIDENT CLERK.

M I P T. — (C)

1. ROLLESTON WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TELEPHONE MISS COLES(01-727-9032) BEFORE SHE LEAVES FOR WORK AT 0800 AND INFORM HER OF HIS ETA.
2. HE RECOGNISES IT MAY NOT BE PRACTICABLE FOR HER TO JOIN THE MEETING PARTY. IN THAT CASE COULD SHE BE TOLD WHERE HE WILL BE STAYING.

WILTON

[ADVANCE COPY GIVEN TO R/C FOR ACTION]

*This was done by Resident Clerk*

FILES:  
NED

*pa by*

~~~~~

RESTRICTED



CONFIDENTIAL

18

ASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 070720Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH F C O TELNO 800 OF 7/7

INFO PRIORITY TO KUWAIT , CAIRO , TEHRAN , BEIRUT , WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 818 : EXPULSIONS .

CLUBE LEFT BAGHDAD AS FORECAST IN MY TELNO 792.

2 . THE PRESS TODAY AGAIN QUOTES "AN IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER " TO CONFIRM THAT CLUBE HAS ALSO BEEN EXPELLED, THOUGH ADDING NO DETAILS ABOUT HIS ALLEGED ACTIVITIES BEYOND THOSE ASCRIBED TO HARRISON AND ROLLESTON YESTERDAY. HOWEVER, AL-THAWRA (UNDERLINED) CARRIES A LONG EDITORIAL ON THE LINES THAT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE THREE MEN SHOWS THAT BRITAIN CONTINUES TO PURSUE ITS OLD IMPERIALISTIC METHODS IN THE HOPE OF RESTRICTING THE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ SEMI COLON BUT THE BA'ATH ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONFRONT ANY SABOTAGE FROM ABROAD OR FROM WITHIN.

3. I HAVE STILL BEEN GIVEN NO OFFICIAL EXPLANATION AND DENIED ACCESS TO ANYONE HIGHER THAN UNDERSECRETARY NI'MA . WHEN CHALLENGED YESTERDAY TO SAY WHETHER HE HIMSELF BELIEVED THE LUDICROUS ALLEGATION QUOTED IN PARA 1 OF MY TEL NO 792, ALL HE COULD SAY WAS THAT HIS GOVT MUST HAVE GOOD REASONS FOR THEIR DECISION .

4. IN VIEW OF LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 OF MY TELNO 796, I ASSUME YOU WILL NOT WISH ME TO PRESS TOO HARD



See -25. for answer  
to para 5 overleaf  
15. I SEE  
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5. I SEE NO EVIDENCE IN YOUR TELNO 816 AND CENTROFORMS ACCOUNT THAT THE USEFUL FORMULA QUOTED IN YOUR TELNO 818 WAS IN FACT USED AT YESTERDAYS' PRESS CONFERENCE , PERHAPS A LEGITIMATE WAY OF THROWING DERISION ON THE ALLEGATION IN IN PARA 1 OF MY TELNO 792 WOULD SIMPLY BE TO READ OUT THE TEXT WITHOUT COMMENT .

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES  
N.E.D.

P.U.S.D.

DEFENCE DEPT

PERS OPS DEPT

PERS OPS DEPT (COL GRIFFITH)

SECURITY DEPT

NEWS DEPT

PROT & CONF DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.U.S.

CHIEF CLERK

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

P.S. TO MR KERSHAW

-2-

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FLASH  
CYPHER CAT A

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BAGHDAD 070840Z

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TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 801 OF 7/7.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 805: EXPULSIONS.

1. I DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT DECISIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS EMERGED ON (C) AND (D) OF PARAGRAPH 2. THINGS HAVE MOVED ON A BIT SINCE I SENT COMMENTS IN MY TELEGRAM NO 783. MY VIEWS ARE NOW AS FOLLOWS.

2. I STILL THINK A WRITTEN PROTEST SHOULD BE HANDED TO KHALAF BUT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE FRAMED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENCOURAGE A CLOSER DEFINITION OF THE ACCUSATIONS PUBLICIZED BY INA. (PARAGRAPH 1 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 792.) THEIR ABSURDITY SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, WITH THE RESULT THAT NOBODY HERE BELIEVES THEM. THIS VIEW IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SHOW TRIAL WITH CONFESSIONS BEING STAGED IN DUE COURSE.

3. AS FOR RETALIATION MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT A SERVICE ATTACHE SHOULD BE EXPELLED IN EXCHANGE FOR HARRISON BUT THAT UNLESS THERE IS AN IRAQI FIRST SECRETARY WHOSE REMOVAL WOULD BE WELCOME IN ITSELF, WE SHOULD LEAVE IT AT THAT. MY EX-DEFENCE ATTACHE COLONEL SHARPE AND, IF HE IS AVAILABLE, WING COMMANDER HARRISON HIMSELF COULD HELP IDENTIFY THE MOST SUITABLE ATTACHE FOR EXPULSION.

4. THE AIR ATTACHE DESIGNATE, MAJOR HAMID JAMIL, WAS ON THE POINT OF SETTING-OFF TO LONDON. WE HAD ALREADY ISSUED A VISA A FEW MINUTES BEFORE THE EXPULSIONS WERE CONVEYED TO ME. SINCE HE HAS NOW REQUESTED THE RETURN OF HIS PASSPORT, WE HAVE HANDED IT OVER BUT CANCELLED THE VISA "WITHOUT PREJUDICE", EXPLAINING THAT, IN VIEW OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED, THE MATTER HAS BEEN REFERRED TO LONDON. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. JAMIL IS BELIEVED TO BE HARMLESS AND IF OUR RETALIATION SIMPLY TOOK THE FORM OF REFUSING HIS APPOINTMENT, THE IMPACT WOULD BE NEGLIGIBLE.

BALFOUR PAUL


FILES

NED  
NEWS D  
PUSD  
SECURITY D  
DEFENCE D  
POD  
COL GRIFFITH

P & CD  
PS  
PS TO PUS  
PS TO MR KERSHAW  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS

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NNNNN



TOP COPY

6

This was  
done -  
and rejected.

9

We  
expelled  
3.

Baghdad have not been  
670 to renew visa  
if/when he calls again  
pa 89/7.



19A

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 071000Z

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 802 OF 7/7 INFO JEDDA KUWAIT  
TEHRAN AMMAN AND CAIRO.

I HOPE OPPORTUNITY CAN BE TAKEN OF THE EXPULSION  
OF THREE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF TO KILL THE WIDESPREAD MYTH  
THAT THE BRITISH ARE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE IRAQI BA'ATH.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED  
N AFF. D  
ARABIAN D  
GIPD  
NEWS DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

*Although it would be difficult  
to take action specifically on the  
above points have made some use  
of the suggestion — see Tehran  
telno 498 to FCO at -/37. There are  
difficulties however, eg. Amman  
telno 4 to Baghdad at -/36.*

*pa / 812/7*



FLASH

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20

OPHER CAT A

FM BEIRUT 071120Z

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|                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------|
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TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 295 OF JULY 7 INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

BAGHDAD TEL NO 796. (11)

EXPULSIONS.

1. CLUBE TRANSITTED BEIRUT THIS MORNING,  
WITHOUT INCIDENT AND LEFT FOR LONDON AS PLANNED BY  
FLIGHT BA 775.

EDDEN

FILES:

NED  
NEWS DEPT  
PUSD  
SECURITY DEPT  
DEFENCE DEPT  
PROT & CONF DEPT  
PERS OPS DEPT  
COL GRIFFITH  
PS  
PS TO PUS  
PS TO MR. KERSHAW  
MR. LE QUESNE  
MR. PARSONS  
CHIEF CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

&&&&

pa 8/77



IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 071012Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 804 OF 7/7.

|                                                           |
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1. AMONGST THE SIDE ISSUES ARISING FROM THE EXPULSION OF VARIOUS MEMBERS OF MY STAFF ARE THE FOLLOWING.
2. WITHOUT A DEFENCE ATTACHE OR AN AIR ATTACHE WE CANNOT ADMINISTER THE CURRENT PROGRAMME OF MILITARY TRAINING COURSES, POSSIBLE ARMS SALES ETC.. IF THE TRAINING PROGRAMME IN PARTICULAR IS TO BE CARRIED THROUGH (AND I BELIEVE THIS TO BE IN OUR OWN INTEREST) THE ARRIVAL OF EITHER THE DA (DUE EARLY SEPTEMBER) OR AA (DUE IN NOVEMBER) WILL HAVE TO BE ADVANCED. PERHAPS YOU WOULD CONSIDER WITH MOD WHETHER COLONEL HARROD COULD COME OUT MORE OR LESS STRAIGHT AWAY.
3. AS THINGS STAND, I AM DUE TO VISIT BASRA FROM 10 TO 12 JULY, TO INTRODUCE MY NEW COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR, EXPLORE COMMERCIAL POSSIBILITIES, VISIT BASRA PETROLEUM COMPANY AND (HOPEFULLY) SEE WHAT IS GOING ON AT UMM QASR. THE VISIT HAS ALREADY BEEN POSTPONED ONCE AND THERE IS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR PROCEEDING WITH IT ON THE BUSINESS-AS-USUAL PRINCIPLE. IF, HOWEVER, PROTESTS AND RETALIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR MY DEPUTY AND MYSELF TO BE ABSENT FROM BAGHDAD. GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE.
4. THE INVITATION TO THE IRAQI MINISTER OF EDUCATION (MISS BECKETT'S LETTER OF 24 JUNE TO MACRAE) CAN NOW, I SUGGEST, BE FINALLY SCRUBBED.

BALFOUR PAUL

*James should  
stick to  
plan* - *21/8* } *low level*

*Mr Smith*

FILES:

NED  
DEFENCE DEPT  
PERS OPS DEPT (COL GRIFFITH)  
PERS OPS DEPT  
MR. LE QUESNE  
MR. PARSONS

*Replies being done  
separately  
see 1/34 for replies  
to para 3 and 4  
for by*

*We need  
to reply to  
this on 8/7.  
of 7/7*

CONFIDENTIAL

88888



NNNN

X  
B  
NN  
BBC B

*Neapine*

*11/28/71*

*Mr Smith*

*BS(22)*

B25. BAGHDAD RADIO REPORTS EXPULSION OF THIRD BRITISH DIPLOMAT  
(WITH B 23)

BAGHDAD RADIO, QUOTING THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, HAS NOW REPORTED  
THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRD BRITISH DIPLOMAT. IT NAMES HIM AS  
JAMES RODERICK CLUBE ( WHICH TALLIES WITH THE INITIALS GIVEN IN  
THE FOREIGN OFFICE LIST).

(END) BBC MON 1310 6.7. CMH. KY

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| -7 JUL 1971     |
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G  
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*Handwritten signature*

B63 IRAQ : TWO EXPELLED BRITISH DIPLOMATS LEAVE FOR KUWAIT  
(WITH B25 AND B23)

(BAGHDAD RADIO

) THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS LEARNED THAT THE TWO  
BRITISH DIPLOMATS EXPELLED FROM IRAQ LEFT BAGHDAD BY  
CAR FOR KUWAIT AT DUSK TODAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF YESTERDAY'S  
IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S DECISION DECLARING THEM PERSONAE NOW GRATAE AND  
DEMANDING THEIR DEPARTURE FROM IRAQ WITHIN 24 HOURS. THE TWO  
DIPLOMATS ARE THE AIR ATTACHE OF THE

B63 IRAQ : TWO EXPELLED BRITISH DIPLOMATS LEAVE FOR KUWAIT  
(WITH B25 AND B23)

(BAGHDAD RADIO) THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS LEARNED THAT THE TWO  
BRITISH DIPLOMATS EXPELLED FROM IRAQ LEFT BAGHDAD BY  
CAR FOR KUWAIT AT DUSK TODAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF YESTERDAY'S  
IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S DECISION DECLARING THEM PERSONAE NOW GRATAE AND  
DEMANDING THEIR DEPARTURE FROM IRAQ WITHIN 24 HOURS. THE TWO  
DIPLOMATS ARE THE AIR ATTACHE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN  
BAGHDAD WING COMMANDER HUGH HARRISON AND THE EMBASSY'S FIRST  
SECRETARY GEORGE ROLLESTON.

THE THIRD DIPLOMAT TOLD BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TODAY TO LEAVE  
IRAQ IS RODERICK CLUBE, THE EMBASSY'S FIRST SECRETARY. THE  
RESPITE GIVEN HIM WILL END TOMORROW.

END BBC MON 22.47 VR 6:7 TVN



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NEQ 25/2

IMMEDIATE

PHER/CAT A

FM F C O 071120Z

TOP COPY

(NE)

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 825 OF 7 JULY.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 301 : EXPULSIONS.

1. THANK YOU FOR THIS ADVICE. WE HAVE NOW RECOMMENDED THAT PARSONS SHOULD SUMMON THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN ORDER TO:

A. GIVE HIM A NOTE OR PROTEST ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAVE HANDLED THE AFFAIR: AND

B. TELL HIM THAT THE PRESENCE OF THREE (NAMED) MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE.

THE NOTE OF PROTEST WOULD NOT PRESS THE IRAQIS TO GIVE A FULLER OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FOR THE EXPULSIONS: IT WOULD MERELY REGISTER A STRONG PROTEST AGAINST THE FACT THAT YOU WERE GIVEN NO OFFICIAL EXPLANATION.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THE WAY IN WHICH THE IRAQIS HAVE BEHAVED WARRANTS THE EXPULSION OF THREE MEMBERS OF KHALAT'S STAFF (AT SEVEN DAYS NOTICE). AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNISE THAT IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVOKE COUNTER-RETALIATION FROM THE IRAQIS.

3. WE SHALL OF COURSE TELEGRAPH AS SOON AS WE HAVE TAKEN ANY ACTION.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES  
NED  
PUSD  
DEF D  
POD  
SECURITY D  
NEWS D  
PROT & CONF D  
MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS  
SIR W LUCE

*Action was taken by Ph. Parsons  
on 8/7 - Note was rejected by  
Khalaf.*

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIORITY  
EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 071134Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 805 OF 7/7.

MY TELNO 796. EXPULSIONS.

MRS CLUBE AND MRS HARRISON ARE BOOKED TO TRAVEL TO LONDON  
ON SATURDAY, 10 JULY. THEY WILL FLY BY ME321 TO BEIRUT  
(ETA 0830) AND FROM THERE BY BOAC FLIGHT BA781 (ETA LONDON  
1610).

2. PLEASE INFORM THEIR HUSBANDS AND ARRANGE TO MEET

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

NED  
PUSD  
NEWS D  
SECURITY D  
DEFENCE D  
PERSONNEL OPS D  
POD (COL GRIFFITH)  
PROTOCOL & CONF D  
PRIVATE SECRETARY  
PS TO PUS  
PS TO MR KERSHAW  
MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS  
CHIEF CLERK

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*See notes on advance  
copy below  
per BG/h*



FCO 790/ E 057/07

LKS 078/07

PP FCO

GR 65

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 071134Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 805 OF 7/7.

MY TELNO 796. EXPULSIONS.

MRS CLUBE AND MRS HARRISON ARE BOOKED TO TRAVEL TO LONDON ON SATURDAY, 10 JULY. THEY WILL FLY BY ME321 TO BEIRUT (ETA 0830) AND FROM THERE BY BOAC FLIGHT BA781 (ETA LONDON 1610).

2. PLEASE INFORM THEIR HUSBANDS AND ARRANGE TO MEET

BALFOUR PAUL

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-7 JUL 1971

NEQ 25/2

*Mr Eger  
Mr Griffith - to tie  
up arrangements with the  
M.O.D and P.O.S.D.*

*ADVANCE COPY*

*R.E.  
Hd New Eastern  
77th PUSD*

*1. informed Mr. Clube  
on 8 July  
2. Col. Griffith will inform M.O.D.  
Mr. Long will make arrangements  
for Mrs. Clube.*

*pa 9/7*



NEQ 25/2

25

TOP COPY

(NED)

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT 'A'

FM FCO 071210Z

RESTRICTED.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO.826 OF 7 JULY INFO PRIORITY TO KUWAIT  
CAIRO TEHRAN BEIRUT AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO.800 OF 7 JULY PARA 5.

DECISION THAT WE SHOULD QUOTE TOTALLY REJECT UNQUOTE WAS TAKEN  
AFTER 1230 NEWS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY. NEVERTHELESS MOST NEWS  
AGENCIES, BRITISH NEWSPAPERS AND BBC (INCLUDING ARABIC SERVICE)  
HAVE NOW CARRIED THE REJECTION, WHICH WAS REITERATED AT TODAY'S  
NEWS CONFERENCE.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED

NEWS D

PUSD

PERS OPS D

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26

|                                               |
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| NEQ 25/1                                      |

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FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080620Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 808 OF 8/7.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 825: EXPULSIONS.

1. BEFORE ACTION IS TAKEN ON 1 (B) OF YOUR TELEGRAM  
UNDER REFERENCE I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION  
BE GIVEN TO MIFT (TO RITCHIE).

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

NED  
PUSD  
DEFENCE D  
POD  
SECURITY D  
NEWS D  
P & CD  
MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS  
SIR W LUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

*This was done -  
and decision to expel 3  
days maintained (see 1/31)  
per B9/1*



27

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 8 JUL 1971

Rejected by Mr. K. H. G. G.  
R.E.  
8/7

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents its compliments to the Embassy of Iraq and has the honour to state the following in connection with the action taken by the Government of Iraq in expelling three members of the staff of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad.

In speaking to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad, the Head of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave him no specific reason why the three persons concerned (Mr Clube, Mr Rolleston and Wing Commander Harrison) were being expelled. He merely stated that their expulsion was "a matter of national security". The Foreign and Commonwealth Office strongly protests against the absence of any official explanation for the action taken by the Government of Iraq (the more so because highly coloured accounts of the reasons for the expulsion have been published by the press in Iraq). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also protests strongly against the action of the Government of Iraq in giving the three persons concerned only 24 hours in which to leave the country. This action was inconsistent with the obligations of the Government of Iraq under the Vienna Convention of 1964, as well as with normal standards of diplomatic practice and courtesy.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office most strenuously denies the allegations made in the press in Iraq that the three persons



concerned were involved in a plot to overthrow the "progressive revolutionary regime in Iraq". There is no substance whatever in these charges.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SW1

8 July 1971



~~F~~ouro (28)

X Feeds To

P. U. S. 1)



SH  
EN CLAIR

TOP COPY

29

FM BAGHDAD 081000Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FLASH F C O TELNO 812 OF 8/7



EXPULSIONS.

1. YOUR IMMEDIATE TELNO 825 DESPATCHED AT 11.20Z YESTERDAY, REACHED HERE ONLY THIS MORNING.

2. GRATEFUL IF ANY TELEGRAM OF SUBSTANCE ON THIS SUBJECT, PARTICULARLY TODAY, WHETHER CONSULTING US OR FOR OUR INFORMATION, COULD BE SO HANDLED THAT IT REACHES US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER DESPATCH.

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES:

NED  
COMMS.D.  
DWS

COPY TO:

TELEGRAM EXAMINERS

*Mr. Evans has seen the DWS explanation of the delay - due to DWS schedules.*

*pa 8/7*



NNNN  
BBC B

15 IRAQI PAPER ACCUSES BRITAIN: STILL USING IMPERILIST METHODS  
(WITH B12)

BAGHDAD RADIO, IN ITS PRESS REVIEW THIS MORNING QUOTES AN ARTICLE IN 'AL-THAWRAH' ON THE EXPULSION OF THREE BRITISH DIPLOMATS AFTER IT HAD BEEN PROVED THAT THEY HAD PARTICIPATED IN AN ESPIONAGE AND PLOTTING NETWORK IN IRAQ AIMED AT BUYING WEAK-WILLED PERSONS TO OVERTHROW THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. THE ARTICLE SAID: THE BEHAVIOUR OF THESE OFFICIALS PROVES CATEGORICALLY THAT THE IMPERIALIST STATE, BRITAIN, CONTINUES TO USE OLD IMPERIALIST METHODS. IT ALSO CONTINUES TO INTERFERE IN OUR COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS, RELYING ON ITS SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS AND ON A SMALL GROUP OF DESPERATE AND WEAK-WILLED PERSONS WHO SELL THEIR COUNTRY FOR A PALTRY PRICE IN THE HOPE OF OVERTHROWING THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN THIS STRUGGLING COUNTRY.

MF BBC MON 1116 7/7 JMA

A

B5 IRAQI PAPER 2: TIMES HAVE CHANGED

+IF BRITAIN AND OTHER STATES WITH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY CANNOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THEY USED TO CONDUCT RELATIONS WITH FORMER REGIMES HAVE COMPLETELY CHANGED SINCE THE 17TH JULY REVOLUTION AND THAT IRAQ TODAY IS DIFFERENT FROM THE IRAQ THEY KNEW IN THE PAST, THEY WILL ONLY REAP LOSS AND DISAPPOINTMENT....

+BRITAIN AND ITS KIND AND THE PETTY AGENTS WHO BELIEVE THEY CAN OVERTHROW THE REVOLUTION, UNDERMINE ITS PROGRESS OR CHANGE ITS COURSE, SHOULD REALISE THAT THEIR HOPES ARE BUILT ON SAND. IN THE PAST IMPERIALIST AGENTS AND SUSPECTS USED TO FIND THEIR WAY INTO SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS. THROUGH THEIR PRESENCE THEY INFLUENCED EVENTS AND CARRIED OUT PLANS AND PLOTS. THAT TIME HAS GONE FOR GOOD. THE PARTY WHICH LEADS THE REVOLUTION EXISTS NOT ONLY AT THE HEAD OF THE REGIME BUT IN EVERY CORNER OF SOCIETY.

MF BBC MON 1118 7/7 JMA

B15 IRAQI PAPER 3

+WE ADVISE ALL COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING NORMAL RELATIONS WITH OUR COUNTRY, BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND JOINT INTERESTS, TO ABANDON THE METHODS THEY USED WITH FORMER GOVERNMENTS. GENTLEMEN, THINGS HAVE GREATLY CHANGED. +

END BBC MON 1121 7/7 JMA (KY)



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CYPHER/CAT A

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31

(NE)  
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FM FCO 081205Z

SECRET

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 831 OF 8/7  
MY TELNO 825: EXPULSIONS

1. ACTING ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, PARSONS SPOKE TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AT 11.30 (LOCAL TIME) TODAY.
2. PARSONS PROTESTED AGAINST THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND SPOKE ABOUT THE CHARGES MADE AGAINST THE THREE MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF IN THE TERMS OF THE NOTE WHOSE TEXT IS GIVEN IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PRESENCE IN LONDON OF MAJOR MAHOMMED ISMAIL TAHA (ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE), MR BURHAN NURI (FIRST SECRETARY, ECONOMIC) AND MR QAIS AL-MUKHTAR (CONSUL) WAS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE. HE ASKED KHALAF TO ARRANGE FOR THESE THREE PEOPLE TO LEAVE BY THE END OF THURSDAY 15 JULY. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE END OF THE AFFAIR. IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST, AND WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS LIKEWISE IN THE INTEREST OF THE IRAQIS, THAT WE AND THEY SHOULD RETAIN BUSINESS-LIKE RELATIONS.
3. KHALAF REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE NOTE. HE SAID THAT THE THREE MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF HAD ENGAGED IN QUOTE ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THEIR DUTIES AS FOREIGN DIPLOMATS UNQUOTE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF THE TERMS OF OUR PROTEST AND OF THE DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THREE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF.
4. PARSONS WARNED KHALAF THAT NEWS DEPARTMENT WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE ACTION HE HAD TAKEN AT ITS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY (TEXT TO FOLLOW BY FLASH TELEGRAM).

DOUGLAS-HOME

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*Decided against  
28/8/19/7*

*By 19/7 to consider whether, if not already  
revised, P.C. Dept should at low level telephone  
Iraqi Embassy to ask when card  
might be expected*

*9/17*



SECRET

NEQ 25/2

32

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FLASH

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FM F.C.O. 081205Z

SECRET

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO. 832 OF 8 JULY 1971  
MIPT : EXPULSIONS.

1. TEXT OF NOTE IS AS FOLLOWS :

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND HAS THE HONOUR TO STATE THE FOLLOWING IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN EXPELLING THREE MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD.

IN SPEAKING TO HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD, THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GAVE HIM NO SPECIFIC REASON WHY THE THREE PERSONS CONCERNED ( MR CLUBE, MR ROLLESTON AND WING COMMANDER HARRISON) WERE BEING EXPELLED. HE MERELY STATED THAT THEIR EXPULSION WAS "A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY". THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE STRONGLY PROTESTS AGAINST THE ABSENCE OF ANY OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FOR THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (THE MORE SO BECAUSE HIGHLY COLOURED ACCOUNTS OF THE REASONS FOR THE EXPULSION HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS IN IRAQ). THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ALSO PROTESTS STRONGLY AGAINST THE ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN GIVING THE THREE PERSONS CONCERNED ONLY 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THIS ACTION WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF 1964, AS WELL AS WITH NORMAL STANDARDS OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE AND COURTESY.

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE MOST STRENUOUSLY DENIES THE ALLEGATIONS MADE IN THE PRESS IN IRAQ THAT THE THREE PERSONS CONCERNED WERE INVOLVED IN A PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE "PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN IRAQ". THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE WHATEVER IN THESE CHARGES.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents its compliments to the Embassy of ~~the Republic of~~ Iraq and has the honour to state the following in connection with the action taken by the Government of Iraq in expelling three members of the staff of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad.

In speaking to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad, the Head of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave him no specific reason why the three persons concerned (Mr Clube, Mr Rolleston and Wing Commander Harrison) were being expelled. He merely stated that their expulsion was "a matter of national security". The Foreign and Commonwealth Office strongly protests against the absence of any official explanation for the action taken by the Government of Iraq (the more so because highly coloured accounts of the reasons for the expulsion have been published by the press in Iraq). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also protests strongly against the action of the Government of Iraq in giving the three persons concerned only 24 hours in which to leave the country. This action was inconsistent with the obligations of the Government of Iraq under the Vienna Convention of 1964, as well as with normal standards of diplomatic practice and courtesy.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office most strenuously denies the allegations made in the press in Iraq that the three persons

/ concerned



concerned were involved in a plot to overthrow the "progressive  
revolutionary regime in Iraq". There is no substance whatever  
in these charges.

B

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SW1

8 July 1971



FLASH

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FM FCO 081215Z  
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33

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TEL NO 833 OF 8 JULY INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO,  
BEIRUT, TEHRAN, AMMAN, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS  
NEW YORK.

37

MY TEL NO 831 OF 8 JULY (NOT TO ALL)

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE AT THE 1230 NEWS CONFERENCE TODAY  
ON THE RECORD :

1. MR A D PARSONS , THE ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR OF IRAQ  
AT 1130 THIS MORNING. MR PARSONS PROTESTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE  
ABSENCE OF ANY OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FOR THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE  
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN EXPELLING THREE MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF HM  
AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD.

HE ALSO PROTESTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF IRAQ IN GIVING THE THREE PERSONS ONLY 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO LEAVE  
IRAQ. HE MOST STRENUOUSLY DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS IN  
IRAQ THAT THE THREE PERSONS CONCERNED HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN A PLOT  
TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME IN IRAQ.

MR PARSONS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE PRESENCE OF THREE MEMBERS  
OF HIS STAFF WAS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE. THESE PERSONS ARE MAJOR  
MOHAMMED ISMAIL TAHA (ACTING MILITARY ATTACHE), BURSHAN NURI  
(FIRST SECRETARY) AND QAIS EL MUKHTER (FIRST SECRETARY). HE ASKED  
THAT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THESE THREE PERSONS TO LEAVE  
THE UNITED KINGDOM BY THE END OF THURSDAY 15 JULY. IN RESPONSE  
TO QUESTIONS, THE SPOKESMAN SAID ON THE RECORD THAT A NOTE OF  
PROTEST WAS HANDED TO THE IRAQ AMBASSADOR AND THAT HE REJECTED IT.  
ASKED FOR THE REASON FOR THE EXPULSIONS THE SPOKESMAN SAID  
UNATTRIBUTABLY "YOU KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, SO YOU  
SHOULD DRAW YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS". ASKED FOR IRAQI REACTION BEYOND  
REJECTION OF THE NOTE, SPOKESMAN REFERRED CORRESPONDENTS TO THE  
IRAQ EMBASSY.

2. SPOKESMAN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT HARRISON, ROLLESTON AND CLUBE  
HAD NOW ALL RETURNED TO BRITAIN AND HAD BEEN IN CONTACT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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34

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FM F C O 081550Z

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TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 836 OF 8 JULY.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 804: EXPULSIONS,

1. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WE THINK YOU SHOULD AGAIN POSTPONE YOUR PROJECTED VISIT TO BASRA. WE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL ALLOW YOU TO REARRANGE THE VISIT BEFORE LONG.

2. WE AGREE ABOUT THE INVITATION TO THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION.

3. WE SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT REPLACEMENTS FOR SHARPE AND HARRISON.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES  
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MR PARSONS  
SIR W LUCE

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D E D I P

SECRET

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 838 OF 8 JULY.

26  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 808: EXPULSIONS.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM PARSONS.

WE THOUGHT VERY HARD ABOUT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS BUT, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AS PLANNED. OUR PRINCIPAL REASON WAS THAT, IF WE DID NOT RETALIATE ON AN EQUAL BASIS, THE IRAQIS AND OTHERS, INCLUDING PUBLIC OPINION HERE, MIGHT WELL INTERPRET THIS AS A PUBLIC ADMISSION OF GUILT, I.E., IF WE ONLY EXPELLED ONE IRAQI THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN LOOKED UPON AS A TOKEN GESTURE FOR THE RECORD BUT A SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSION THAT WE WERE IN THE WRONG. WE DECIDED THAT WE COULD NOT RISK THIS.

2. WHEN I SPOKE TO KHALAF, I MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT WE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO END THE GAME AT 15 ALL AND FOR NEITHER SIDE TO CONTINUE SERVING. I EMPHASISED THAT WE WANTED TO CONTINUE IN A BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THAT WE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD FEEL THE SAME. KHALAF IMPLIED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF THIS IF HE WAS ABLE TO COUNTER OUR NEWS DEPARTMENT STATEMENT TODAY WITH AN EQUAL AND OPPOSITE ONE OF HIS OWN.

3. ON THE STRENGTH OF THIS, WE WOULD NOT WISH TO PREVENT THE IRAQI AIR ATTACHE DESIGNATE FROM COMING TO LONDON (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 801). THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR GIVING HIM ANOTHER VISA.

5[SIC] WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 804. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH SHARPE AND HARROD.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES  
HEAD PUSD  
HEAD NED  
MR PARSONS  
PS TO PUS

pal 5/37

SECRET



FCO 784/ E 049/07

LKS 076/07

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GR 230

*M. Egeron.*

*Pe. speak.*

*R.E.*

*7/7*

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O.

P.S.

P.O.S.

*Mr. Le. O'Brien*

*Mr. Parsons*

*Mr. M.E.D.*

*Mr. Deane*

*Col. Griffiths*

*Mr. Rees*

(5)

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 071512Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 804 OF 7/7.

1. AMONGST THE SIDE ISSUES ARISING FROM THE EXPULSION OF VARIOUS MEMBERS OF MY STAFF ARE THE FOLLOWING.

2. WITHOUT A DEFENCE ATTACHE OR AN AIR ATTACHE WE CANNOT ADMINISTER THE CURRENT PROGRAMME OF MILITARY TRAINING COURSES, POSSIBLE ARMS SALES ETC., IF THE TRAINING PROGRAMME IN PARTICULAR IS TO BE CARRIED THROUGH (AND I BELIEVE THIS TO BE IN OUR OWN INTEREST) THE ARRIVAL OF EITHER THE DA (DUE EARLY SEPTEMBER) OR AA (DUE IN NOVEMBER) WILL HAVE TO BE ADVANCED. PERHAPS YOU WOULD CONSIDER WITH MOD WHETHER COLONEL HARROD COULD COME OUT MORE OR LESS STRAIGHT AWAY.

3. AS THINGS STAND, I AM DUE TO VISIT BASRA FROM 10 TO 12 JULY, TO INTRODUCE MY NEW COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR, EXPLORE COMMERCIAL POSSIBILITIES, VISIT BASRA PETROLEUM COMPANY AND (HOPEFULLY) SEE WHAT IS GOING ON AT UMM QASR. THE VISIT HAS ALREADY BEEN POSTPONED ONCE AND THERE IS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR PROCEEDING WITH IT ON THE BUSINESS-AS-USUAL PRINCIPLE. IF, HOWEVER, PROTESTS AND RETALIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR MY DEPUTY AND MYSELF TO BE ABSENT FROM BAGHDAD. GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE.

4. THE INVITATION TO THE IRAQI MINISTER OF EDUCATION (MISS BECKETT'S LETTER OF 24 JUNE TO MACRAE) CAN NOW, I SUGGEST, BE FINALLY SCRUBBED.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

(File)

*3-uk  
in August*

*Yes.*

*1.06*



36

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FM AMMAN 080900Z

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TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 4 DATED 8 JULY INFO TO FCO, KUWAIT.

YOUR TEL NO. 802 OF 7 JULY TO FCO.

A MEMBER OF MY STAFF WAS COMISERATED BY HIS KUWAITI COLLEAGUE YESTERDAY UPON THE EXPULSION OF THE THREE FROM BAGHDAD, BUT WAS THEN NUGGED IN THE RIBS AND TOLD THAT REALLY WE AND THE IRAQIS GOT ON PRETTY WELL, DIDN'T WE. CLEARLY THERE ARE SOME WHO SEE IN RECENT EVENTS YET FURTHER EVIDENCE OF HOW DEEP IRAQ AND PERFIDIOUS ALBION ARE PLAYING IT.

PHILLIPS

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Coming CONF. Mr. Smith  
 Mary Kates  
 Le Spoke.  
 Mr. Egeron.  
 Board TU No 804 R.E.  
 8/7

below to Brigadier Sharpe on the way  
 to the airport last night. His  
 views are as follows: -

- i) The new DA shd. aim to get  
 to Baghdad v. soon after the Revolution.  
 any celebrations (14-17 July);
- ii) Col. Harrod has been back from  
 Washington "briefing for Baghdad" since  
 last November. He is, according to  
 Sharpe, a Guards officer with little know-  
 ledge of or liking for the Arab world;
- iii) If Harrod can't get to Baghdad



before the 3<sup>rd</sup> week in August, as  
Col. Griffith tells us, Brig. Sharpe  
w<sup>d</sup> be prepared to give up a  
fortnight of his 6 wks leave  
or return to help the Ambassador  
out, almost immediately. I said  
this was v. noble but if anything  
befell Sharpe in his "second vicar-  
nation" in Bdad, he stood to  
lose his next appointment as  
Commander of the Abu Dhabi Defence  
Force. However I w<sup>d</sup> pass on his  
offe to you, which I knew you  
much appreciate, as you were seeing Harold  
today.

2. On 83 & tel, I think the Amb. sh<sup>d</sup>. cancel  
his trip to Basra pro tem ~~Regin~~ <sup>Regin</sup>



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FM TEHRAN 081100Z

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37

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 498 OF 8 JULY 1971, INFO BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, AMMAN AND CAIRO.

(19)  
BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 802: EXPULSION OF STAFF

WE ARE ALREADY MAKING THE POINT IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS HERE.

RAMSBOTHAM

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PRIORITY  
EN CLAIR

|                                                           |
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39

FM BAGHDAD 120939Z  
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TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 823 OF 12/7  
INFO ROUTINE TO BEIRUT , CAIRO , KUWAIT, TEHRAN AND ~~TO~~ AMMAN

COPY

33

YOUR TELNO 833 : EXPULSIONS.

1. THE COUNTER EXPULSION OF THE THREE IRAQI DIPLOMATS WAS  
REPORTED FACTUALLY IN THE PRESS ON 9 JULY.

2. THE ONLY DIRECT

EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS BEEN IN AL-THAWRA (UNDERLINED).  
ON THE SAME DAY , IT CARRIED A LONG PIECE ON THE STRENGTH  
OF THE REVOLUTION TO RESIST ALL PLOTS. THIS INCLUDED THE  
FOLLOWING : '' AS TO THE METHODS OF INTERFERENCE IN THE  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE SETTING UP OF ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE  
NETWORKS AND PURCHASING AGENTS AND OTHER KINDS OF OUT-MODED  
IMPERIALISTIC METHODS, .....THE STATES WHICH IN THE PAST  
CARRIED OUT THIESE ACTIVITIES AND NOW ATTEMPT TO CARRY THEM  
OUT, AS IN THE CASE OF BRITAIN THROUGH THE MEMBERS OF ITS  
EMBASSY AT BAGHDAD, MUST REALISE THAT THESE METHODS ARE NOT  
ONLY WORN-OUT AND EXPOSED BUT HAVE BECOME UNSUCCESSFUL AND  
DESPERATE, AND THAT THE PURSUANCE OF SUCH METHODS AND IGNORING THEM  
AND RESORTING TO 'THEATRICAL' ACTIVITIES , SUCH AS THE DEPORTATION  
OF IRAQI DIPLOMATS IN RETALIATION FOR THE DEPORTATION OF THE  
BRITISH DIPLOMATS, STILL SUBJECTS ITS DOERS TO EXPOSURE AND LOSS. ''

3. A FURTHER IRONIC EDITORIAL APPEARED IN AL-THAWRA  
(UNDERLINED) ON 12 JULY ON THE '' MOTH-EATEN LION '' THEME.  
COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG .

FCO PASS SAVING TO AMMAN.

BALFOUR PAUL

pa 8/27

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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
SECRET

Sir Thomas Brimelow

c.c. Mr. Bullard  
Mr. Simons

*Sholen*  
*Enter 12/7/71*  
*Mr. Walden*  
*Could you pl. check at your convenience?*

*JP*  
*12/7/71*



EXPULSION OF IRAQI DIPLOMATS

1. You asked about the implications of our recent expulsion of three Iraqi diplomats for our practice vis-a-vis the Russians.
2. N.E.D. consulted us at an early stage, and were shown copies of speaking notes you have used on similar occasions with the Soviet Embassy.
3. FUSD confirm that our practice when expelling Russians is to say as little as possible about their misdemeanors in order to make it difficult for the Russians to identify the source of our information on the intelligence officers in question. This is fully in keeping with the first sentence of Article 9 of the Vienna Convention (attached). In the case of the British diplomats expelled by the Iraqis, however, the boot can be said to have been rather on the other foot.
4. As regards the short notice given by the Iraqis, the view of Protocol and Conference Department is that we should avoid exact retaliation as the Iraqis' action is at variance with the spirit if not the letter of the Vienna Convention. Our view of our obligations under the Convention is that we should set a reasonable time limit for any offenders to leave the country.

*This is what I do not understand. In what respect is the boot on the other foot? Could you pl. explain why?*

*i.e. there is nothing in the letter.*

G. G. H. Walden  
Eastern European and Soviet Dept.

9 July, 1971.

SECRET



Cutting dated 29 JUL 1971

## Three Iraq diplomats told to leave London

By Our Diplomatic Correspondent

The Iraq Ambassador was called to the Foreign Office yesterday, and told that three members of his staff were no longer acceptable and must leave London by next Thursday. Three British diplomats were expelled from Iraq earlier this week.

Mr A. D. Parsons, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who is responsible for Middle East questions, protested strongly to the Ambassador, Mr Kadhim Khalaf, against the absence of any official explanation for the expulsion of the three Britons.

He also protested against the action of the Iraq Government in giving them only 24 hours' notice to leave, and he strenuously denied allegations in the Iraq press that the men concerned—Wing-Commander Hugh Harrison, the Air Attaché, Mr Rolleston and Mr Clube, both First Secretaries

—had been involved in a plot to overthrow the regime in Iraq.

The three members of the Iraq Embassy who are no longer acceptable are Major Mohammed Ismail Taha, the Assistant Military Attaché, Mr Burshan Nuri and Mr Qais El Mukhtar, both First Secretaries.

Later the Iraq Embassy published a statement that Mr Parsons' protests on "the recall of the three British diplomats involved in activities inconsistent with their diplomatic functions" had been strongly rejected and that Mr Khalaf had refused to receive a written note. The British request for the recall of the three Iraqis was described as "an act of retaliation which cannot be justified."

The British action is indeed clearly an act of retaliation, but just as clearly justified. The notice of one week given to the Iraqi diplomats conforms with the Vienna Convention which prescribes that in such cases "reasonable time" should be allowed.



pa 827



9 JUL 1971

Cutting dated .....19

## U.K. expels 3 Iraqi diplomats

By Our Middle East  
Correspondent

THE British Government yesterday retaliated against expulsion from Baghdad of three British diplomats earlier this week by ordering three men accredited to the Iraqi Embassy in London out of the country.

Mr. Khadim Khalaf, Iraq's Ambassador in London, was summoned to the Foreign Office where he was given a written protest by Mr. Anthony Parsons, Assistant Under-Secretary, who protested strongly against the absence of any official explanation for the action taken by Iraq when it expelled the three British diplomats.

He also protested strongly against Baghdad's action in giving the British diplomats only 24 hours in which to pack their bags. The Iraqis have been given a week's notice.



# 'Tit for tat' on envoys

By MICHAEL FIELDER

BRITAIN yesterday hit back over the expulsion of three diplomats from Iraq.

In a tit-for-tate move Britain ordered three envoys from the Iraq Embassy in London to leave within a week.

Iraq's ambassador, Khadim Khalaf, was summoned to the Foreign Office, where he was handed a written protest over the expulsion of the Britons.

Anthony Parsons, assistant under-secretary for Middle East affairs, complained that the three had been given only 24 hours to quit Iraq.

Mr Parsons also "strenuously denied" allegations that the Britons were involved in a plot to overthrow the regime.

The British diplomats, now back in London, are Hugh Harrison, a defence attache, George Rolleston, a first secretary, and Roderick Clube, a press secretary.



Cutting dated ..... 9 JUL 1977 ..... 19

## Envoys sacked in tit-for-tat 4

By JOHN DICKIE Diplomatic Correspondent

THREE Iraqi diplomats were ordered out of Britain last night in retaliation for the expulsion of three British attaches from Bagdad.

The reprisals were the result of intervention by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home.

The Iraqis were given the diplomatic courtesy of seven days notice to quit instead of the brusque 24-hour expulsion orders delivered by the Iraq Government to the Britons.

But that was the only element of civility in a 15-minute carpeting of Ambassador Khadim Khalaf at the Foreign Office in London.

It ended with the Ambassador refusing to accept the British protest. He stalked out of the room leaving it on the table.

It was made plain that relations between the two countries have been plunged into a deep freeze as a result of the vendetta against the British diplomats with wild accusations of bribery to engineer a coup d'etat in Bagdad.



9 JUL 1971

cutting da

19

# Britain to expel 3 Iraqis

By our Diplomatic  
Correspondent

Britain is expelling three members of the Iraqi Embassy staff in London in retaliation for the abrupt expulsion of three British diplomats from Bagdad earlier this week. The announcement last night from the Foreign Office said that the Ambassador of Iraq, Mr Kadhim Khalaf, had been informed of the decision and that the three embassy officials had been given a week in which to put their affairs in order and leave Britain.

This treatment is in marked contrast to what happened in Bagdad where the three British officials were given 24 hours to pack and leave and the British Ambassador was informed that they were guilty of espionage and plotting to overthrow the regime. No evidence of any kind was produced and the allegations — which were given wide publicity in Iraq — have been denied in the strongest terms by the British Embassy.

The Iraqi Ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office yesterday to receive an official protest from the British Government through Mr A. D. Parsons, the assistant Under-Secretary for Middle East affairs. Mr Parsons protested in particular at the total absence of any official explanation from the Iraqi Government for the expulsion of the three British diplomats who have now returned to Britain.

The Foreign Office is understandably angry at the manner of the Iraqi action, because the Vienna Convention on diplomatic procedure states that "reasonable time" should be allowed for diplomats to make their personal arrangements for departure when they are declared persona non grata.

It is to underline this point that Whitehall is giving the three Iraqi diplomats a week to leave Britain.



Cutting dated **E'9 JUL 1971** ..... 19

## BRITAIN EXPELS IRAQIS IN RETALIATION

By Our Diplomatic  
Correspondent

Britain expelled three Iraqi diplomats yesterday in retaliation for the expulsion of three British diplomats from Baghdad earlier this week.

In an angry meeting at the Foreign Office, Mr Anthony Parsons, Assistant Under-Secretary, protested to Mr Khadim Khalif, the Iraqi Ambassador, at the expulsion of the Britons without official explanation and at 24 hours notice, and strongly denied that the men were connected with a spy ring plotting to overthrow the régime.

Mr Parsons named three Iraqi diplomats as "no longer acceptable" to the British Government and said they must leave within seven days. Later, the Iraq Embassy denounced it as an "act of retaliation which cannot be justified."



*New York*

*D. J.*

VB59 EXPELLED DIPLOMATS: IRAQI AMBASSADOR REJECTS BRITISH PROTEST

(BAGHDAD RADIO) THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON HAS CATEGORICALLY REJECTED A PROTEST BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE BRITISH PROTEST MEMORANDUM ON THE SUBJECT. HE STRESSED THAT THE THREE BRITISH DIPLOMATS WERE EXPELLED FROM IRAQ FOR CARRYING OUT ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR BASIC WORK AND THEIR DIPLOMATIC DUTIES.

|                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY No. 10<br>13 JUL 1971 |
|-----------------------------------------------|

MF BBC MON 8/7 ZA 2133


*pa*  
*147*

B59 REJECTS 2

THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE TODAY SUMMONED AMBASSADOR KAZIM AL-KHALAF AND INFORMED HIM OF BRITAIN'S PROTEST AT THE EXPULSION OF THE THREE BRITISH DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD FOR CARRYING OUT ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTY AND FOR TAKING PART IN AN ESPIONAGE AND PLOTTING RING TO OVERTHROW THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN IRAQ.

MON 8/7 ZA 2134 KY TVN





BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

10 July 1971

25/9

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO  
LONDON SW1

Dear Richard,

#### EXPULSIONS

1. In case this aspect of the expulsion of members of my staff has been lost sight of in the welter of telegrams, it may be worth setting down for the record a brief summary of my interpretation of why they took place. One or two minor points have not in fact been mentioned in the telegrams.
2. Current discontent in the armed forces is three-fold:
- Resentment at the assassination of Tikriti still lingers.
  - The ban on foreign wives - now extended to other ranks and believed to affect quite a number (of all ranks) with Persian wives - has naturally caused further resentment.
  - Purges, of which rumours have been current for some time and which will no doubt be consummated, as is usual, on the occasion of the Revolution's anniversary celebrations next week, are feared by others as well as those affected by a. and b.
3. To silence this discontent arrests were set in motion. The score so far is rumoured to be about 120. Apart from those already reported (the unspecified number in Rashid Camp, and the GOC and others in Kirkuk) groups are said to have been picked-up at Habbaniya, Abu Ghurayyeb and other camps, and to include the commanders of the Republican Guard and of a Para. Regiment, and other key officers.

copy to Gb. Topley  
24/8 1100

(40) A

① D.U.S. Dept 24/8  
(Mr. Ritchie).

② Mr. Smith.  
Encl. 29/8

R.E. 27/7



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4. Since it suits the régime's book on such occasions to put it around that a reactionary coup was in preparation and had been cleverly scotched, the régime quietly and by indirect means did so. And since they seem to think it gives verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing plot-story to inculcate a foreign power, this technique was also followed.

5. Because of Iraq's present consuming interest in the Gulf (if for no other reason) Britain was the most convenient scapegoat. Arrested officers put through the mangle no doubt supplied some convenient names from amongst their acquaintances on my staff.

? 6. There is some speculation that the Russians, during the Novikov visit, may have lent them advice - both on this and on the coincidental despatch of emissaries to Arab Heads of State. If, though this is a rather different point, the Russians are currently seeking ways of pressurising Sadat, it will no doubt help them to be seen putting a few roubles on a different horse. They will also, of course, be happy to see us entangled as grievously as possible with the Iraqis on Gulf issues.

7. If you think posts other than those below will be interested, would you kindly get copies sent to them. We have not time to skin this before the bag shuts.

*You can*  
*glenn*  
H G ~~Balfour~~ Paul

cc Chanceries: AMMAN  
CAIRO  
KUWAIT  
JEDDA  
TEHRAN  
WASHINGTON

}  
} Enough, I think.

R.E.

2277



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|                                                           |
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XPAL/339/1

①

**MR. BYRNE**

**DA. BACHAR**

1. Below is an amended draft telegram. MOD have not been able to make any progress on Willie's health, so I think we should not delay further for something firm. MOD is happy for the telegram to issue.

2. I hope you can agree to leave in mention of Lagos, particularly that Major Greenland held the fort there for quite a long time; this could encourage H H Ambassador not to try to hasten Harrod's departure unduly.

3. MOD have asked, when do we think it safe to put Colonel Harrod's passport to the Iraqi Embassy? You will recall that I asked them to delay doing this until the dust had settled.

R J Griffith  
Ext. MB 1106

12 July 1971

Top copy to RME

Thru one for Mr. Smith

pe 12/7

of 12/7

**END**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Z \_\_\_\_\_ Z

CONFIDENTIAL

13

Z

BAGHDAD

BAGHDAD

Your telex 804. Regarding your Service Attaché, the Ministry of Defense is planning that Colonel Harrod should arrive with you on or about 29 August. Taking all factors into account, in particular your desire to have him as soon as possible, and the possibility that his visa might be withdrawn if he moved too soon, we feel that this plan should be allowed to stand. Also bearing in mind that the Iraqis have made no application for training courses under UKMS for this year and we know that their Embassy in London is in touch with the MOD over other course bids, we and MOD hope that Major Hay will be able to hold the position for the next 5 or 6 weeks. In addition Colonel Harrod tells us that both his wife's parents have died in the last eighteen months and that in his capacity as sole executor he is very involved and hopes to clear everything up before his departure for Baghdad in late

MOD  
 LT COL GRIFFITH  
 ROOM 2218  
 MR PARSONS  
 MR ROSE  
 FILES

MOD  
 DESI  
 MAAL  
 (Metropole 214g)



August if this date can be allowed to stand. We sympathize with him in this.

Regarding Major Hay, the MOD is now looking into the possibility of him being granted additional pay and allowances in the absence of your BA and AA. We have precedents for this in Lagos, where after the Scott affair a Major held the fort alone for 4 or 5 months, though we may need something from you to help with the MOD finance departments. We will let you know if this is necessary. As regards Wing Commander Wills, no firm decisions can be taken at the moment, since he is under doctors' orders. However the Ministry of Defence is aware of your desire to have him as early as possible, and we will be in touch again when the doctors have made their decisions about him. We understand that there is probably nothing seriously wrong with him, and that MOD is very willing to hasten his departure for Baghdad.



## Iraq

## Britain's turn

Is the Iraqi regime preparing to celebrate the third anniversary of the coup which brought it to power with another mass treason trial? This is one possible explanation for the sudden expulsion of three British diplomats from Baghdad. On Monday, the British ambassador, Mr Balfour Paul, was told that his air attaché and one of his first secretaries had 24 hours to leave the country. On Tuesday, the third diplomat, a first secretary dealing with economic affairs, was told to pack his bags. The ambassador has been refused any information about what the three members of his staff are supposed to have done.

The Iraqi news agency has been more forthcoming. It quoted a senior Iraqi intelligence source as alleging that the three diplomats were connected with a network of spies plotting to overthrow the regime. It is known that a number of Iraqis, including some army officers, have recently been arrested. All this smacks of the previous occasions when the regime has decided to take drastic action against its opponents. Up to now, those charged with crimes against the state have been branded as agents of the Israelis, the Iranians or the Americans. Over the past three years 94 of them have been executed as spies or conspirators. If another purge is in progress, it looks as if the British are to be the villains this time.

A Beirut newspaper, *al-Kifah*, which usually supports the Iraqi government, has expressed this idea. On Tuesday it asked why no British spies had been hanged, along with their Israeli and American counterparts. It suggested

the time had come to repair this omission and hinted at "stunning revelations."

The Iraqi regime has a possible motive for trying to implicate Britain just now. Ever since the present ruling group of Baathists seized power on July 17, 1968, it has been put about among the Arabs that its leaders have the support of the British government. This is believed by many Arabs, including the Egyptians, who hold the Iraqi regime in particular contempt. There have recently been renewed signs that the Iraqis, uncomfortably aware of their isolation, are trying to win their way back into favour. So maybe they are now bent on disproving the allegation of British support by being as beastly to the British as to all those other imperialists.



Mr. Epton - we should know by the end of this week whether these guesses are right.

pa S

13/7



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CYPHER CAT A

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TOP COPY

43

FM TEHRAN 151030Z

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
16 JUL 1971

NEQ 25/2

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 515 OF 15 JULY INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD,  
JEDDA, KUWAIT, AMMAN, CAIRO.

MY TELNO 498: <sup>(37)</sup> EXPULSION OF STAFF FROM BAGHDAD.

IF MAY BE OF INTEREST TO YOU TO KNOW THAT THE SHAH IS RELIABLY  
REPORTED TO HAVE REMARKED TO A SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIAL LAST  
WEEK THAT IT WAS NOW QUITE CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH WERE NOT  
SUPPORTING THE BA'ATH REGIME IN IRAQ. THE SHAH EVIDENTLY  
DOES NOT ACCEPT THE THEORY WHICH WAS PUT FORWARD IN THE LOCAL  
PRESS THAT THE EXPULSIONS WERE STAGED IN ORDER TO LEND  
CREDENCE TO BRITISH PROTESTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

RAMSBOTHAM.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
NED  
N AFR D  
ARABIAN D  
GIPD  
NEWS D

Good

pa 4647

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44

PRIORITY  
CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 160915Z

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TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 835 OF 16/7

MY TELNO 823 : EXPULSIONS

RECEIVED  
REGISTRY No. 10  
16 JUL 1971  
NEQ 25h

1. I MET THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE FRENCH RECEPTION ON 14 JULY AND REPEATED THE EXPOSTULATIONS MADE ALREADY ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS TO HIS DEPUTY IN HIS ABSENCE.
2. SHAIKHLI WAS NAUSEATINGLY FRIENDLY AND SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THINGS WITH ME EARLY NEXT WEEK WHEN THE 14-17 JULY REVOLUTIONARY CELEBRATIONS WERE OVER.
3. WHATEVER ELSE IS IN STORE, HIS ATTITUDE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT COUNTER-RETALIATION IS ON THE WAY.
4. IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU PARTICULARLY WANT SAID (OR NOT SAID) TO HIM, PLEASE INSTRUCT EARLY .

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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|------------|-------------------|
| NED        | PERSONNEL OPS D   |
| ARABIAN D  | PUSD              |
| DEFENCE D  | PROTOCOL & CONF D |
| N AFR D    | NEWS D            |
| SECURITY D | MOD (INT)         |

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Dfr rel submitted to Mr. Evans.

For 8/19/71



NEQ 25/2

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM F C O 191705Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 200700Z

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL NO 871 OF 19 JULY

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 835: EXPULSIONS.

1. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT SHAIKHLY'S ATTITUDE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT COUNTER-RETALIATION IS ON THE WAY.
2. WHEN YOU SEE SHAIKHLY, WE SUGGEST THAT YOU MIGHT RE-EMPHASIZE OUR HOPE THAT THE EPISODE IS NOW A THING OF THE PAST AND THAT WE AND THE IRAQIS CAN NOW CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS IN A NORMAL WAY (MY TELEGRAM NO. 831, PARAGRAPH 2).
3. YOU SHOULD NOT OF COURSE BE DRAWN ON THE REASONS WHY WE ASKED THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO ARRANGE FOR THREE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF TO LEAVE LONDON.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED

ARAB DEPT

DEF DEPT

N AFR D

SECURITY DEPT

POD

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P & C D

NEWS DEPT

MOD INTERNAL

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25/3

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

13 July



Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO  
London

*Dear Veronica,*

APPOINTMENT OF ATTACHES

*(4) NEQ 25/6 - below.*

1. If you refer to your file No. NEQ25/6 of last year, you will see that this post had correspondence with Peter Hinchcliffe about the procedure for the appointment of attachés. (It rests with his letter of 11 November.) Briefly, it was about whether or not we sought agrément for the appointment of Iraqi attachés in London.

2. This subject has now cropped up again. The enclosed Notes, which have volleyed to and fro between the MFA and ourselves, explain why. As you will see, they have now made it quite clear that they insist that their consent must be given before a service attaché is appointed, although (consistency not being their prime virtue) they in fact did not answer our notification about the appointment of Major Hay (our present AMA). *entitled to do this.*

3. The question now is whether this demands reciprocity. Especially after the summary treatment handed out to Wing Commander Harrison, we are inclined to think it does. What are the Department's (the Service Adviser, Lt Col R J Griffith's) views?

4. Incidentally, we have not yet received a reply to our Note (dated 10 June) about the appointment of Colonel Harrod to succeed Colonel Jake Sharpe. Presumably, the Iraqi authorities are still brooding on last week's events.....

1. *Enter*

2. *10. Col. Griffith*

*I should be  
grateful for your  
comments*

*25/7*

*Yours ever,*

*Christopher*

A C D S MacRae

(Encs)

CONFIDENTIAL



Note No 344

(25/3)

13

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have taken note of the Ministry's Note No 1453/1453/200 of the 3rd of July about the appointment of service attachés. They have referred this matter to the competent authorities in London in case it may affect the procedure for the appointment of Iraqi attachés to London in future.

As to the appointment of Wing Commander P. B. Mills, the Ministry will of course recall that their Note No 1453/1453/200 of the 1st of June stated that consent had been given in this case.

The Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY

RIYADH

13 July 1971



25/3

10

Translation.

No. 1463/1463/200

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
Protocol Department,

Baghdad, 3 July 1971.

(S) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and, with reference to the Embassy's Note No. 270 of 10 June, 1971, has the honour to inform the Embassy that the Iraqi laws and regulations in force stipulate the <sup>obtaining</sup> obtention of the consent of the Iraqi quarters concerned on the nomination of service attachés.

*will be*  
*will* *★* Such being the case, the appointment of Wing Commander P.B. Walls as Air Attaché requires obtaining such consent according to the regulations in force and usage.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,  
Baghdad.



File

(5)

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to refer to the appointment of a new Defence Attaché to the Iraqi Embassy in London.

(5)

As the Embassy mentioned in their Note No 270 of the 10th of June, Her Britannic Majesty's Government do not request the Iraqi Embassy in London to seek formal agreement for the appointment of Military Attachés to their staff. In fact, they do not even insist on prior notification or the supply of biographical details. Thus, acceptance of the appointment of an Attaché is implicit in the issue of a visa.

The Embassy understand that the Iraqi Government have selected Colonel <sup>6</sup> ~~Abd al Wahid al Muhaidi~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>whom</sup> a visa has already been issued, and that no further formalities are required before he takes up his appointment.

The Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurance of their highest consideration.

British Embassy

BAGHDAD

15 June 1971



5  
Note No 270

(25/3)

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to state that they have taken note of the Ministry's Note No. 1463/1463/200 about the appointment of Wing Commander P B Wills.

They wish to mention however, as Her Britannic Majesty's Government do not request the Iraqi Embassy in London to seek formal agreement for the appointment of military attachés to their staff (and in fact do not even insist on prior notification or the supply of biographical details), so the Embassy submit details such as those contained in their Note No. 154 of the 31st of March to the Ministry for information only and as a matter of courtesy. They assume that no specific consent is needed.

The Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

10 June 1971



Translation.

No. 145/1403/XA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Protector, Afghanistan,  
Kabul, 14/1/57

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Afghanistan, and, with reference to the Embassy's Note No. 154 of 31 March 1956, the honor to state that consent has been given to the proposal of Mr. Commander P.B. Velle of the Embassy.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,  
Kabul.

DA  
AA

they have given us "consent" and we AA disagree  
— not actually what we asked for.....

If DA agrees, we might now put in the name  
This successor is a Note of wish type as  
for now AA & AA.

Asmacker

14/1/57 Paul - Agreed we shall  
put up the name now

3/6

Paul - I wonder whether we are starting a procedure  
by strictly accepting this "consent"? Could this be the first?  
Incidentally, I am sure the name will not be the same as the name in the



Note No 154

25/3

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to inform the Ministry that the British Ministry of Defence have decided to appoint Wing Commander P B Wills as Air Attaché at Her Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad in succession to Wing Commander H Harrison. (Wing Commander Harrison is expected to leave Iraq on transfer in November 1971.)

Wing Commander Wills' personal details and record of service are as follows:-

|                     |                                      |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Name:               | Peter Barnard Wills                  |
| Rank:               | Wing Commander                       |
| Date of Birth:      | 21 May 1922                          |
| Married             |                                      |
| Number of Children: | One                                  |
| 1956-1959           | Officer commanding No 32 Squadron    |
| 1959-1962           | Ministry of Defence (Air)            |
| 1963-1966           | Instructor at College of Air Warfare |
| 1966-1969           | Ministry of Defence (Air)            |
| 1969-               | Control Flying School Staff.         |

The Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

31 March 1971



47  
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27 JUL 1971  
359  
NEQ 2/2

FCO 930/E005/17

LKS NR 140/17

PP F C O

GRS 350A

DESKBY 190830Z

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170700Z

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DESKBY 190830Z

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 833 OF 16/7

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 852 OF 13 JULY.

ADVANCE COPY

07/1/1  
(3)  
Ad A.O.O.  
Lt. Col Griffith E 215  
Ad NED  
Mr Leques  
(File)

1. I MUST STRESS THAT MAJOR HAY IS VERY STRETCHED. THE ONLY REASON THAT APPLICATION HAS BEEN MADE FOR COURSES FOR IRAQIS UNDER UKMTS IS THAT HAY HAS SIMPLY NOT HAD TIME SINCE TAKING OVER THIS PROJECT FROM COL SHARPE TO PREPARE A PROPOSAL FOR THE IRAQIS. IN ANY CASE THE VARIOUS COURSES AND ATTACHMENTS FOR IRAQI OFFICERS WHICH ARE NOW IN THE PIPELINE ARE ALL OUTSIDE THIS SCHEME. ON THESE, THE MOD SHOULD BE WELL AWARE THAT THE STAFF OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON HAVE PROVED QUITE INADEQUATE TO HANDLE THE MANY POINTS THAT REQUIRE CLARIFICATION ABOUT COURSES LET ALONE ACTION OF A CONSEQUENTIAL NATURE. VISITS AND ATTACHMENTS, MUCH OF COL SHARPE'S TIME WAS TAKEN UP



AND ATTACHMENTS, MUCH OF COL SHARPE'S TIME WAS TAKEN UP ON THESE MATTERS AS WAS WG CDR HARRISONS. AS BOTH THESE OFFICERS ARE NOW IN LONDON , I SUGGEST THAT YOU ASK MOD TO OBTAIN THEIR OPINIONS , IF THIS HAS NOT BEEN DONE . PLEASE ALSO SEE OUR TELEGRAM NO . TLJ OF 26 MAY 1971 ADDRESSED TO MODUK , GIVING A SUMMARY OF THE COURSE POSITION AT THAT DATE AND MODUK D/DS6/7/134/1334 OF 27 APRIL 1971 CONCERNING VISITS AND ATTACHMENTS .

2 . AS TO ASSISTANCE FROM CHANCERY OVER INTERVIEWING, SINCE MY SECOND SECRETARY IS ON LEAVE, I AM REDUCED TO ONE CHANCERY OFFICER ONLY, TO WIT MY HEAD OF CHANCERY. AS YOU MAY IMAGINE, HE SCARECELY UNDER-EMPLOYED . MOREOVER HE IS DUE TO GO ON LEAVE WHEN THE SECOND SECRETARY RETURNS.

3. I AM MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE "GOODWILL" ENGENDERED BY ALL THE HARD WORK PUT IN BY SHARPE AND HARRISON SHOULD NOT BE LOST AND THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE NEW ATTACHES SHOULD COME OUT AT AN EARLY DATE TO TAKE UP THE REINS. THE FACT THAT IT WILL TAKE SOME WEEKS FOR THE NEW MAN TO SETTLE IN MAKES IT MORE IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD COME QUICKLY.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN



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REGISTRY No. 10  
27 JUL 1971  
NEQ 25/2

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**PRIORITY**

CYPHER/CAT A

Min Iskelton

FM F C O 211455Z

(XPA 1/359/1)

**CONFIDENTIAL.**

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 881 OF 21 JULY.

YOUR TELNO 838. DEFENCE ATTACHE'.

WE HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR PREDICAMENT WITH THE MOD AND THEY HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH COLONEL HARROD. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE FACTORS AFFECTING YOU AND HARROD, THEY FEEL THAT WITH MAJOR HAY IN BAGHDAD, ALTHOUGH STRETCHED, THE BEST BALANCE WOULD BE FOR HARROD TO BE WITH YOU ON AUGUST 16. OF COURSE THIS DEPENDS ON THERE BEING NO DIFFICULTY BEING MADE ABOUT HIS VISA BY THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON. MOD HAVE CONSULTED SHARPE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES  
POD (COL GRIFFITH)  
NED  
PUSD

COPIES TO  
DMS1 (MAIN BUILDING) MOD  
HAAL (METROPOLE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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page 27



|                                                          |
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PRIORITY

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CYPHER CMT A

FM BAGHDAD 260922Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 874 OF 26/7.

YOUR TELNO 881: DEFENCE ATTACHE. *Below*

1. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAVE NEVER REPLIED TO OUR NOTE OF 10 JUNE INFORMING THEM OF HARROD'S APPOINTMENT AS YOU WILL SEE FROM MACRAE'S LETTER 25/3 OF 13 JULY TO MISS BECKETT, THE IRAQIS INSIST THAT THEIR CONSENT MUST BE GIVEN BEFORE A SERVICE ATTACHE IS APPOINTED. BY PRESSING FOR AN ANSWER TO OUR NOTE ABOUT HARROD WE SHALL IN EFFECT BE ACCEPTING THEIR RULING. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS THOUGHT WISEST TO DO SO, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FIRST FOR A TELEGRAPHIC REPLY TO MACRAE'S ABOVE-MENTIONED LETTER, I.E. DO WE TELL THEM THAT THEIR RULING WILL ENTAIL RECIPROCAL TREATMENT?
2. IF OF COURSE THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON ISSUE HARROD WITH A VISA WITHOUT DELAY WE CAN PERHAPS FORGET OUR NOTE AND ALLOW THE ISSUE IN MACRAE'S LETTER TO BE CONSIDERED AT GREATER LEISURE.
3. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE PROBLEM DOES NOT ARISE IN THE CASE OF OUR AIR ATTACHE DESIGNATE, SINCE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONVEYED TO US THEIR "CONSENT" TO HIS APPOINTMENT TWO MONTHS AGO (SEE ENCLOSURES TO MACRAE'S LETTER) .

BALFOUR PAUL

*Reply sent  
pk  
27/7*

FILES

POD  
NED  
PUSD

COPY TO:

DMS1, MOD

HAAL, METROPOLE BLDG, MOD

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REGISTRY No. 10  
27 JUL 1971

NEQ 25/2

Miss Beckett.

I think that you have  
all the advice I can offer  
at 8 in NE 25/6 at.

However you might like  
to see A.B. 680 of attached Swedish  
file

Regarding reciprocating, this  
is a question for Protocol Dept,  
but MoJ would also have to  
be drawn into the discussion  
as we did in the Nigerian  
affair.

The immediate problem  
is whether Colonel Harrod's  
visa will be issued by the  
Iraqi Embassy in London. The  
application has gone in &  
MoJ has promised to let  
me know when it is issued.  
If there are difficulties, they



hence been told by me that I  
should be told at once. Therefore,  
until we know ~~how~~ how this  
goes we should be careful not  
to "muddy the waters" in Baghdad.

Incidentally, Protocol confirmed  
that what I had told Miss Hutchinson  
was in line with the Vienna  
Convention, and the way we  
play it - this is in the  
1971 file which is out at  
the moment.

*[Signature]*

26/7.

Auto 690



Translation from Al-Thawra of 19 July 1971.

The Wolf and Jacob's Son



Britain (the Great), according to the Economist's logic, is very "innocent" from the espionage and conspiracy network which the revolution has caught by the neck, just as the wolf was innocent from the blood of Jacob's son.

Surely those for whom the Economist speaks have a very strong sense of smelling to distinguish an oil well from something else but with what sense did they discover London's innocence from the conspiracy.

It is not for any reason other than that "the Ambassador did not give any information about what the three members of his Embassy did". And what else?

"The Iraqi Government has an incentive to impel it to entangle (!!) Britain at this specific time."

We frankly tell the Economist and its like and to every ear which wishes to hear "Gone is the time when the Embassy was the "master" of the ruling gentlemen and when it was able to appoint, dismiss and threaten. The people have become their own masters and can decide their fate. The people have loudly said "No" to the Embassy and its spies.

The wrath with which Britain's spy No. 1, Nuri al Said was faced by the people on the 15th of July, 1958, is the best example of the feelings of our people towards the colonisers.

As to the joke of "entangling" Britain in the conspiracy which has been buried, I remember the wellknown documents which spoke of entangling America in the dirty war in the Far East. It appears that the novelty of "entangling" was the "straw of the drowned one" after the scandal which exposed the "diplomats" of the Embassy. It is not unlikely that a London paper will shortly speak of "documents" submitted by the Shah, and the "departments" of conspiracies within and outside the country, inspired Britain to revert to the old tradition" and entangled itself just as a cat is entangled when it stretches out its claws and closes its eyes for fear of the eyes of the people.

Poor is Britain, it was "Great" and has become below "Minor". It had a pair of tongs in which it held the fire, but now it is obliged to hold the fire in its fingers. It abandoned all the months of the year and chose the month of July to record therein an "event" which would restore the authority of the Embassy, but.....

"Poor" is Britain, its luck and that of its "knights" was extremely bad.

"Abu Shaheen"



IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(NE)

NEQ 25/1

52

F C O 271105Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 904 OF 27 JULY.

YOUR TELNO 874: <sup>(49)</sup> DEFENCE ATTACHE.

1. WE ARE STILL CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY AND ARE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO REPLY TO MACRAE'S LETTER OF 13 JULY TO MISS BECKETT. FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST YOU SHOULD NOT (NCT) THEREFORE PRESS FOR A REPLY TO YOUR NOTE ABOUT HARROD. <sup>(46)</sup>

2. IF THE IRAQI EMBASSY ISSUE HARROD WITH A VISA WITHOUT DELAY THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED (YOUR PARAGRAPH 2). THE APPLICATION FOR A VISA WAS SUBMITTED ONLY ON 23 JULY. WE SHALL GIVE THE IRAQIS ANOTHER FEW DAYS BEFORE MAKING ENQUIRIES. WE SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

FILES

NED

POD

PUSD

MR PARSONS

COPY TO:

DMS1(MOD)

HAAL METROPOLE BDG (MOD)

CONFIDENTIAL

pub  
2072



Miss V.E. Bennett,  
New Zealand Dept.

Fco.



With the compliments of

CHANCERY

*Asson Mackay*

23/7  
R.E. 7.1. New Zealand Dept.

19/7  
*[Signature]*

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

1. *Mr. Evans to me*

2. *pa*


*524*

Not a masterpiece  
of prose.

*[Signature]*



Bucknell 368



Bedstone House Lodge,  
Bucknell,  
Shropshire,  
SY7 0BG

53

8:7:71

Dear Sir,

I heard today on the news that some Iraqi Embassy staff have been expelled as reprisal for some number of British Embassy staff expelled after an alleged plot against the Iraqi Nation. I feel that this is the petty sort of reaction one would expect of junior school children or the Russians, not the behaviour of a Nation like ours. Surely it is not prejudicial to our case to simply protest our innocence without reprisal indeed I would feel the reverse is the case.



This is the first time that  
I have felt sufficiently serious  
about anything like this to write.

yours faithfully

D. G. Hibbs B.Sc.



W 533

Reference

H. Evans

Mr. Love.

Re attached letter from a member of the public

about the Hagia Expositions.

2. The letter does not appear to merit, or to call for, more than the simple acknowledgement put out by the Private Office. Unless you see objection I propose simply to put it away

James. &

No further  
action

What do you think? <sup>Hand</sup> 21/7

R.E. 2/7

pub.  
28/7



54



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

20 July, 1971

I am writing on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 8 July concerning expulsion of Iraq Embassy staff.

(P.J.McCormick)  
Private Secretary

D. G. Hibbs, Esq., B.Sc.,  
Bedstone House Lodge,  
Bucknell,  
Shropshire,  
SY7 0BG.

PH



TOP COPY

55

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 270555Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 876 OF 27/7.

MY TELEGRAM NO 874 OF YESTERDAY: HARROD.

WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED A NOTE FROM THE MFA APPROVING THE APPOINTMENT OF HARROD. WHILE THIS ALLOWS US TO SLIDE GRACEFULLY OFF THE HORNS OF THIS PARTICULAR PROCEDURAL DILEMMA, WE SHOULD STILL BE INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS (BY BAG) ON RECIPROCITY OVER THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMANDING AGREEMENT.

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

COPY TO: DMS1 MOD

PERSONNEL OPS D  
NED  
PUSD

HAAL METROPOLE BUILDING MOD

RESTRICTED

pl. enter into  
the ref. (?NED)  
28/7

20/10



Reference

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Stow  
P and C D

|                                                           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY No. 10<br>29 JUL 1971<br>NEQ 25/2 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|

56

p. 11

## APPOINTMENT OF ATTACHES

Flag E

Flag F

1. I should be grateful for your ~~views~~ views on para 3 of Mr MacRae's letter of 13 July (folio 46). Colonel Griffith's views are set out in his minute of 26 July (folio 50).
2. NED's preliminary thinking is that the Iraqi behaviour should not demand reciprocity. This is partly because to demand reciprocity does not appear to be our normal practice; and partly because such a demand would probably harden the Iraqi attitude and render the Iraqis less likely to abandon their present position of insisting that their consent must be given before a Service Attache is appointed.
3. You will see from Baghdad tel no 876 (below) that we are unlikely to have any problems on the question of reciprocity in connection with Colonel Harrod's appointment. Nevertheless, Baghdad have asked for a reply on the general question.

Veronica Beckett

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

27 July 1971

Under article 7 of the Vienna Convention a receiving state may require the names of military naval or air attaches to be submitted beforehand for approval. If any state exercises this right, it is not acting improperly, but in our view its action does not call for reprisals ~~but~~ nor insistence on reciprocal action. This view has been consistently upheld on a number of occasions, most recently, to my knowledge, in the case of Nigeria. The question of our acting reciprocally against Nigeria, who insisted on having the same in advance of our military attaché, was fully discussed at Under Secretary level of not higher, but was decided to adhere to our long-standing practice of not requiring

(agreement)



agreement for movie studies.

C. G. Young

Personal Aut. Dept

2/1/71

Miss Buckner





Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

57

A C D S MacRae Esq  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

NEQ 25/2

Date

29 July 1971

APPOINTMENT OF ATTACHES

1. Thank you for your letter 25/3 of 13 July. We were glad to see from Baghdad telegram No 876 that the Iraqis have approved Colonel Harrod's appointment. We will keep a watchful eye on his visa application. (46)
2. On the general question of reciprocity, the position is as follows. Under Article 7 of the Vienna Convention a receiving state may require the names of Military, Naval or Air Attachés to be submitted beforehand for approval. If any state exercises this right, it is not acting improperly, and in our view its action does not call for reprisals or insistence on reciprocal action. This view has been consistently upheld on a number of occasions, for example in the case of Nigeria (where after Colonel Scott was found persona non grata, his successor was also declared persona non grata within a week of his arrival in Lagos). The question of HMG acting reciprocally against Nigeria, who insisted on having the name in advance of our Military Attaché, was fully discussed at Under Secretary level and it was decided to adhere to our long-standing practice of not requiring agrément for Services Attachés. (55)
3. We think it is right to stick to our well established practice in our dealings with the Iraqis. Furthermore, if our ultimate (though probably unattainable) aim is to encourage the Iraqis to abandon their present insistence that their consent must be given before a Service Attaché is appointed, the practice of reciprocity on our part might cause the Iraqis to persist in their present practice.
4. Colonel Griffith has seen and agreed this letter. So has Richard Evans.

Copy to: Lt Col G E Symes  
MOD (SAAS)

CONFIDENTIAL

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

1  
26/7



0

Fano (58)

XFGR 13)

10 DEF. 147



54

Translation from "Al Nahar" newspaper (Lebanon) of 21.7.1971.

(Received at Translators' Office at 10.15 a.m. on  
31.7.1971)

Detention of 45 Senior Officers in Iraq including the  
Commander of the Air Force Arm and the Commander  
of the Fifth Division, in addition to certain civilians.  
Iraqi Sources Stress that the struggle between the two wings of  
the Government at Baghdad has exploded.  
Saddam Hussein liquidates his opponents under the guise of the  
discovery of an attempt at a coup!

#### Baghdad - Special Despatch.

An open struggle is now taking place between the leaders of  
the Iraqi Government which has exceeded the scope of normal  
accusations and narrow party disputes to reach the stage of  
liquidations on a large scale.

Well-informed Iraqi circles stress that the wing led by  
Saddam al Tikriti, which is the stronger wing of the government,  
has been able to expel a large number of Officers whose loyalty  
to him is doubted by him. He has also detained more than 45  
Officers at "Al Nihaya" Jail accusing them of being "rightists"  
and disloyalty to orders. These circles do not think it unlikely  
that these ~~XXXXXX~~ Officers have been executed.

Iraqi circles report that Air Staff Major-General Hussein  
Hayyawi, Commander of the Air Force Arm, and Samir Aziz al Najin,  
Member of the Regional Command, have been detained. Major-  
General Said Hassan, Commander of the Fifth Division, and Ahmad  
Taha al Anous, have also been placed under detention.

As to the President, Chief Marshal Ahmad Hassan al Bakr, he  
is now playing the role of a 'peacemaker' between the disputant

a/ Since seen alive  
and free.

b/ Was in the  
plane which  
crashed at Jeddah  
but escaped  
alive.



wings and is attempting to prevent the explosion of this dispute which may lead to the end of the existing government.

These circles have elucidated certain aspects of the existing dispute in Iraq by saying that <sup>what</sup> was recently rumored of an attempt at ~~an~~ unsuccessful coup was merely false, and that the man behind this rumor is Salih Madih al Tikriti himself in order that he may be able to carry out a campaign of the liquidations referred to above and exterminate his opponents in the ranks of the Party and to prevent the exposure of his suspected connections. He, therefore, linked between the ~~rumor~~ rumor of an attempt at a coup with certain officials of the British Embassy.

---



CONFIDENTIAL

copied to Ras... British Embassy  
to Ambassador's Staff  
17/8/71 BAGHDAD

60

25/9

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
F C O



6 August 1971

Dear Richard,

BAGHDAD SINCE THE EXPULSIONS

Act. 16/8  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Egerton has seen.  
Miss Beckett

1. You may like to have an account on how we have been getting along in the month which has intervened since the expulsions and counter-expulsions of diplomats.

R.E.  
78

2. Perhaps I should start with myself - if only on Bagehot's grounds that "An ambassador is not just an agent: he is a spectacle". Since the beginning of July I have been steadily denied access to any Minister - Interior, Education, Transport and Foreign Affairs being the 4 for which I have been pressing. I have been particularly anxious to get at Transport in order to convey to him personally (on BAC's request) a detailed proposal for the re-equipment of Iraqi Airways: and to get at Education since the stand-in Minister appears to be doing nothing at all about the ELT Institute due to be opened in 2 months time. As for Foreign Affairs, Shaikhli promised to see me (about expulsions) in mid-July and reneged. It is of course true that Ministers have had other preoccupations. No Ministers have appeared at National Day receptions in the second half of the month. The Farouk restaurant is said to have been supplying meals on wheels to the Palace for groups of top policy-makers at all hours of the day and night.

3. I was told early this week by a friendly Iraqi in a dim-lit garden that I was "out of bounds" - a ban which the British Council Director was told during the month by his social "regulars" extended even to him. On the other hand MFA officials have as usual been lavishing protestations of goodwill; and the Under Secretary even went so far, under sustained pressure, as to secure the rescindment at the last minute of yet another British expulsion. Even more oddly, 2 military contacts congratulated my AMA on our return to favour, quoting as evidence the exchange between President Bakr and myself at his Garden Party on 17 July. (Bakr: "Ah, this is the man who is angry."  
Me: "I certainly am angry" - a rather sparse conversation whose inwardness, if any, quite passed me by!)

4. However, at commercial and other non-ministerial levels, I am glad to say, we don't seem to be noticeably in the dog-house. And there have been one or 2 welcome developments between British business houses and technical departments. I will not itemize here; but unless anything further untoward is concocted in the Palace, the heat seems to be coming off us. And my gloomier prognostications look to have been alarmist.

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127  
18



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5. This brings me to the question of the threatened trials and "stunning revelations" (which Beirut's al-Kifah of 6 July said the Iraqi authorities were preparing). It is of interest that there has been no direct mention of these in local publicity media; and the only evidence that trials are on the way has been the statement of the Iraq Intelligence Service released by INA to the Beirut press. The Daily Telegraph correspondent was given a broad hint by a Director General in the Ministry of Information in mid-July that trials were to be expected, but the silence of ministers and official agencies on the subject suggest that the government is at least keeping its options open. And, as I said in paragraph 5 of my letter 3/18 of 30 July to Mallett in Khartoum, the Iraqi gaffe in the Sudan and the smoke-screen thrown up by them over Nimeiri's "blood bath" to cover their embarrassment must have given them qualms about having a public blood-bath of their own.

6. Even the identity of those arrested in the early part of July remains obscure. (Admittedly our means of establishing their identity have been much reduced!) The authorities here have disclosed neither names nor numbers. The pro-Egyptian Muharrer in Beirut carried on 30 July a list of 21 out of 45 "said to have been arrested". This included the Commander of the Air Force, who has been round and about throughout; and Samir al Najm of the Ba'ath Party's Regional Command, who so far from being arrested was in the luckless aircraft which crashed at Jedda on 21 July (although Samir himself survived, with injuries) - which shows that even the Egyptians have been a bit unsighted. For what it is worth, I attach a copy of Muharrer's list side by side with such names as we have been able to compile ourselves on reasonable authority.

7. Names do little to confirm or rebut the speculations about the "abortive coup" in my letter 25/9 of 10 July (not copied to Beirut). These speculations remain, as far as I am concerned, virtually unchanged. The only new theory to which I am disposed to subscribe is that Saddam Hussein used the occasion to dispose of some actual and potential critics. In this connexion, even if not strictly relevant, the French Chargé tells me on the authority of "an important Ba'athist contact" that Saddam was strongly opposed to whatever the Iraqis were up to in the Sudan. If this is true - and it would accord with his known reluctance to collaborate with Communists - his position ought to have been further strengthened by his being proved right.

8. In view of the way the authorities have been handling their "abortive coup" the most likely outcome would seem to me a fairly low-key trial of a few "ringleaders", and prison sentences rather than executions. (This does not exclude the possibility that one or two have already actually been put to death.) Perhaps we ourselves will be let off, as it were, with a warning - or at worst with a few non-stunning side-swipes.



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9. Meanwhile, visits from the Tunisian Foreign Minister, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and lesser fry from the 2 Yemens have scarcely disturbed the deafening silence that followed the Sudan drama. Half Baghdad has gone off on its summer hols, and the newspapers here are reduced (since most current Middle East lead-stories are taboo), to desperate measures to fill their columns. July, the traditional month for coups and rumours of coups, having passed, August looks like being a month of well-earned lethargy.

*Yours ever*

*Glenn*

H. G. Balfour Paul

ENC

c.c. (without enclosure) to Chanceries at:

AMMAN  
CAIRO  
KUWAIT  
JEDDA  
TEHRAN  
WASHINGTON  
BEIRUT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ARRESTS IN CONNEXION WITH THE ALLEGED IRAQI COUP ATTEMPT OF JULY 1971

Muharrer's List  
(of 29 July)

Embassy's Compilation  
(\* = Also on Muharrer's List)

Officers

1. Brig. Husain Hayyawawi (Comd IAF)
2. Brig. Mohammed Ali Said (Comd 2 Div)
3. Col. Fadhel al-Ani (Comd Taji Camp)
4. Col. Adnan Mohammed Nuri (Comd Para Regt)
5. Capt. Riadh Kaddour
6. Capt. Tarek Hassan (Deputy to 3.)
7. Lt. Kamel al-Hadithi (I.O. Baghdad Garrison)
8. Major Salim Shaker
9. Capt. Karim Shaker
10. Capt. Riadh Nassif
11. Lt. Khalaf al Khafaja
12. Lt. Abdul Aziz al Yasseri
13. Capt. Saleh Hamdani
14. Capt. Ali Obeidi
15. Lt. Kadhem al Nameh
16. Capt. Sadek al Karadi
17. Capt. Nizar Saki
18. Lt. Karim al Douri

Party Leaders

1. Samir al-Najm (Regional Party Comd)
2. Na'im Haddad (Regional Party Comd)
3. Ahmed Taha Azouz (Baghdad Branch)

Note:

Muharrer's No 4. and our B.3. is the brother of Burhan Mohammed Nuri (one of the counter-expellees from London).

A. Definite

- \* 1. Brig. Mohammed Ali Said (Comd 2 Div)
2. Lt.Col. Fahim Jalal (Comd Rashid Air Base)

B. Probable

- \* 3. Col. Adnan Mohammed Nuri (Comd Para Regt)
4. Col. Jabir Abdul Kadir ( Director of Intelligence, Basra)
5. Major Sa'id Wahid al Samarrai (Directorate of Ops. MOD)
6. Col. Mohammed Hussain Mahdawi (DDMT, MOD)
7. Col. Jamil Sabri Bayyati (Directorate of Ops, retd.)
- \* 8. Col. Fadhel Jassem al Ani (Comd Taji Camp)
9. Col. Hadi Khemmas (Retd.)
10. Col. Ali Ihsan Nashat (Retd.)
11. Lt. Ra'ouf Rashid (Party representative HQ 2 Div)

C. Possible

12. Lt. Col. Salim al Sa'adi (Directorate of Ops MOD)
13. Lt. Col. Ghatan Sa'adoun (Retd.)
14. Lt. Col. Abdulla Ali al-Karawi (Staff College Instructor)
15. Lt. Col. Awni Hashim al-Mashadi (Retd.)

D. Definitely not arrested (despite rumours)

- \* 1. Samir al-Najm (Regional Party Comd)
- \* 2. Brig. Husain Hayyawawi (Comd IAF)
3. Brig. Taleb Mohammed Kadhem (Comd 4 Div)
4. Brig. Oman al Hazza (Comd Baghdad Garrison)

C O N F I D E N T I A L



Mrs V.E. Bickett,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
FCO



RECEIVED IN  
U.K. No 10  
71

With the compliments of

CHANCERY

NE & 25/2

Christyler MacRae.

Another round - (even version of  
the events earlier in this month.

from  
31/7

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

Enter-  
Expatriates  
rmb  
4/6



CONFIDENTIAL

61



Near Eastern Department  
**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

His Excellency  
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG  
Baghdad

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 25/2

Date 13 August 1971

BAGHDAD SINCE THE EXPULSIONS

60

1. Thank you for your interesting letter of 6 August about the way in which the Iraqis have behaved, towards yourself and more generally, since the expulsion of three members of your staff.
2. I am glad that you have been able to go on transacting business with senior officials, if not with Ministers. Let us hope that Shaikhli and the others will soon become accessible as well. Khalaf has not asked to see any Minister here since the expulsions took place. If he were now to ask for an appointment, I should be inclined to recommend that the Minister concerned should make an excuse for not granting one. This would not be on the principle of an eye for an eye, but on the grounds that this course would be likely to serve a useful operational purpose; ie to secure renewed access to Iraqi Ministers for you as soon as possible.
3. Let us hope, too, that the threatened trials of those arrested at the beginning of July will continue to be postponed. The longer the delay, the less I think the likelihood of "stunning revelations" about ourselves.

R M Evans

c.c. Chanceries at:

Amman  
Cairo  
Kuwait  
Jedda  
Tehran  
Washington  
Beirut

CONFIDENTIAL

17/8



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

62

D I Lewty Esq  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 25/2

Date 25 August 1971

#### EXPULSIONS

1. According to the Iraq Embassy here, the three diplomats whom we expelled in July have not yet been replaced. It would be useful if we could have advanced warning of any impending replacements. We should therefore be grateful if you would look out for visa applications from any members of the Iraq Foreign Service posted to London who appear to be about to take up the posts vacated by Major Mohammed Ismail Taha, and Messrs Burshan Nuri and Qais Al Mukhter.

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

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
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BAGHDAD 170700Z

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 999 OF 17/9 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
PRIORITY BEIRUT AND CAIRO.



1. AFTER A SMALL AND AMBIGUOUS ADVANCE NOTICE YESTERDAY, TODAY'S BAGHDAD PAPERS ANNOUNCE THAT ONE OF THE AGENTS OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WHOSE OBJECTIVE WAS TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME (SC. IN THE ALLEGED ABORTIVE COUP OF EARLY JULY) IS TO APPEAR TONIGHT AT 1600 GMT ON ALL IRAQI TELEVISION AND BROADCAST TRANSMISSIONS TO MAKE HIS CONFESSION. HE IS TO SPEAK, ACCORDING TO THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, "OF HIS CONNEXIONS WITH THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE, HOW THEY STARTED AND DEVELOPED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH THE BRITISH AIR AND PRESS ATTACHES." THE ANNOUNCEMENT THEN DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE EXPULSION OF HARRISON, CLUBE AND ROLLESTON.

2. WHETHER THIS IS A CURTAIN-RAISER TO THE PROMISED TRIALS OR A SUBSTITUTE FOR THEM REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THERE MAY, OF COURSE, BE TROUBLE OF SOME SORT FOLLOWING THE "STUNNING REVELATIONS", TONIGHT OR MORE PROBABLY TOMORROW MORNING. THE QM IS DUE HERE TONIGHT BUT I DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY NEED TO REROUTE HIM. I AM TAKING MODEST PRECAUTIONS AND WILL REMIND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THOUGH IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO FIND ANYONE IN AUTHORITY ON A FRIDAY) OF OUR ENTITLEMENT TO PROTECTION.

3. QUAINLY ENOUGH, IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THREW A LARGE DINNER PARTY LAST NIGHT FOR MY NEW DEFENCE ATTACHE AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS, THE INVITATIONS BEING ISSUED IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING. DESPITE THE ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE TELEVISED CONFESSIONS THERE WAS NOT THE FAINTEST REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECT IN ANY OF THE CONVERSATIONS I HAD WITH INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER MILITARY HOSTS.

BALFOUR PAUL

[SENT TO DCC]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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N.AFR.D.  
ARAB.D.  
COMIS.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

mb




IMMEDIATE

FM CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 180845Z

UNCLASSIFIED



TOP COPY

64

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1001 OF 18/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
IMMEDIATE TO MODUK AND PRIORITY TO BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

(63)

MY TELEGRAM NO 999: TELEVISED "CONFESSIONS".

1. THE PROGRAMME TOOK PLACE AS FORECAST. THE "AGENT"  
TURNED-OUT TO BE COLONEL FAHIM JALAL, EX-COMMANDER OF  
RASHID AIR BASE, UNDERSTANDABLY HAGGARD BUT LESS UNDERSTANDABLY  
SMILING.

2. TODAY'S ARABIC PRESS (THE ENGLISH DAILY IS NOT PUBLISHED  
ON SATURDAYS) GIVES SPLASH HEADLINES AND FULL TEXT. THE LATTER,  
LIKE THE SOUND TRANSMISSION, CONTAINS REPEATED GAPS WHERE  
NAMES MENTIONED WERE CLUMSILY BLOTTED-OUT "FOR THE SECURITY  
OF ENQUIRIES STILL PROCEEDING".

3. JALAL FIRST DESCRIBES THE MANNER IN WHICH HARRISON AND  
SUBSEQUENTLY ROLLESTON ESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH HIM AND  
THEN SETS-OUT ENQUIRIES PUT TO HIM. (CLUBE IS NOT MENTIONED.)

4. HARRISON'S QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE EXTENT OF SOVIET  
CONTROL OVER THE AIR FORCE (NIL), THE EXTENT OF PARTY CONTROL  
(TOTAL) AND THE ABILITY OF AIR FORCE UNITS TO TAKE PART IN A  
COUP DESPITE PARTY CONTROL (NEGLIGIBLE). HARRISON IS QUOTED  
AS SAYING A COUP LIKE ASS'AD'S IN SYRIA "MUST" TAKE PLACE  
HERE, THE OBJECT BEING TO REPLACE IRAQ'S COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP  
WITH ONE-MAN DICTATORSHIP. THE QUESTIONS PUT BY ROLLESTON  
(INTRODUCED TO HIM BY HARRISON) CONCERNED THE TRAINING OF  
GULF REVOLUTIONARIES IN IRAQ, THE DESPATCH OF ARMS AND  
EXPLOSIVES TO THE GULF AND OMAN FROM BASRA, AND IRAQ'S HOSTILE  
INTENTIONS TOWARDS KUWAIT - ALL OF WHICH JALAL SAID WERE  
OUTSIDE HIS PROVINCE. ROLLESTON IS SAID TO HAVE THEN PROPOSED  
FULL INTELLIGENCE TRAINING FOR JALAL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM  
AND PAYMENTS THROUGH A LONDON BANK.

/5. AT

pl



5. AT THE END OF THE CONFESSIONS, DESCRIBING A FINAL INTERVIEW WITH HARRISON, JALAL SAYS HE ASKED HARRISON WHAT AIR FORCE UNITS WERE GOING TO TAKE PART AND WHEN. HARRISON IS SAID TO HAVE REPLIED THAT HIS ONLY CONCERN WAS THAT THE AIR FORCE SHOULD NOT PARALYSE A COUP MOVEMENT IN FUTURE: AS FOR THE ARMY, THAT WAS SOMEBODY ELSE'S CONCERN.

6. FULL TEXT BY MONDAY'S BAG. I ASSUME IT WILL APPEAR IN TOMORROW'S ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY.

7. COMMENTS IN M I F T. (65)

BALFOUR PAUL

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11 SEP 1971

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## Secret trials in Iraq

*From Mr Kamil Mahmoud*

Sir, Your article on Special Courts and Secret Trials (*The Times*, September 7) went a good way in illustrating the tragedy of justice and violation of human rights at the hands of courts-martial and special tribunals, or what have you, in the Islamic and Arab worlds.

What is regretted, however, is the conspicuous absence of any mention of the country where human and civil rights and justice have been, and still are, most glaringly violated. It is all too well that you refer to the People's Court of Mahdawi as a circus; but what has happened in Iraq since the arrival of the present clique to power is the most horrible of all, Sudan included. Since 1963 the Baathist regime killed in their special torture chambers, and condemned to death in their secret or show trials, thousands of Iraqi citizens, to say nothing of the tens of thousands summarily condemned to long terms of prison.

With their second seizure of power, the Baathists of Iraq embarked on a new and no less atrocious wave of terror. Since 1969 they have been hitting right, left and centre. Hundreds were executed after summary trials. Scores of others were put to death by bestial torture in Qasr Alnehaya, or Palace of the End. A new innovation is to send night squads of the National Security Guard to kidnap or murder political opponents in their own homes at the middle of the night.

I would like to mention in this connexion just one of their victims. He is Dr Abdulrahman Al-Bazzaz, the great Iraqi jurist and former Prime Minister and well-known Arab nationalist of world fame. After several months of ill-treatment and torture at the hands of the ruling authorities of Iraq this man is now seriously ill in a London hospital.

I do hope that enough attention of world public opinion be directed to Iraq, human rights being human rights everywhere.

Yours faithfully,

KAMIL MAHMOUD,  
40 Queen's Gate, SW7.  
September 8.

pmh



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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 1002 OF 18/9 INFO IMMEDIATE MODUR  
PRIORITY BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MIPT

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|                                                           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>REGISTRY No. 10<br>20 SEP 1971<br>NEQ 25/2 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|

1. THE CONFESSIONS ARE FAIRLY UNSENSATIONAL AND THE HEADLINED CONCLUSION THAT BRITAIN WAS PLANNING THE OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME (THEREBY, FOR GOOD MEASURE, THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM BY PARALYSING THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT) SCARCELY FOLLOWS FROM THE STORY PRESENTED. HOWEVER THOUGH THERE IS NO MENTION OF TRIALS, THE INTENDED IMPLICATION IS THAT MORE REVELATIONS WILL FOLLOW, PERHAPS INCULPATING CLUBE. IT IS JUST CONCEIVABLE THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE CONFESSIONS MAY HAVE BEEN TIMED AS A REPOSTE TO KAMAL MAHMOUD'S LETTER IN THE TIMES OF 11 SEPTEMBER.

2. APART FROM THE REGIME'S INTERNAL NEED TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE ABORTIVE COUP STORY OF JULY (SEE MY PREVIOUS REPORTS THEREON) THE INTENTION MAY BE NOT SO MUCH TO EMBARRASS US AS TO IRRITATE ASS'AD, WHOSE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN BUSILY SLANGING THE IRAQIS. WHEN I SPOKE TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY YESTERDAY IN HIS HOUSE, HE IMMEDIATELY ASSURED ME THAT WE COULD COUNT ON COMPLETE PROTECTION AGAINST ANY STREET TROUBLES. NI'MA IS NOT USUALLY SO CONFIDENT ABOUT ANYTHING. THERE HAS NOT IN THE EVENT BEEN ANY SIGN OF TROUBLE SO FAR.

3. THERE IS ALSO A SIDE-SWIPE AT EGYPT WHERE SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES IS SAID, LEAST BY IMPLICATION, TO BE TOTAL.

4. I TAKE IT OUR INTEREST LIES IN IGNORING THE THING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. A DISPLAY OF ANIMUS OR OUTRAGE WOULD ONLY CHALLENGE THEM TO PRODUCE FURTHER "STUNNING REVELATIONS". UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT OTHERWISE, I SHALL SIMPLY SAY TO SUCH OFFICIALS OR MINISTERS AS I MAY MEET, THAT I TRUST THIS IS THE END OF THE LUDICROUS IMPUTATIONS ON MY COUNTRY.

(MY IMMINENT CALL ON THE DG OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS ABOUT HIS AGREEMENT AS AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, WILL PROVIDE A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY). TO OUTSIDE ENQUIRERS I SHALL SIMPLY SAY THAT ANYONE READING THE TEXT OF THE CONFESSIONS CAN DRAW HIS OWN CONCLUSIONS.

BALFOUR PAUL

/SENT TO D C C/

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BBC B

B12 ALLEGED FORMER BRITISH AGENT TO SPEAK OVER BAGHDAD T.V. TONIGHT

(BAGHDAD RADIO) THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY HAS LEARNED THAT A FORMER MILITARY MAN WHO WAS AN AGENT FOR BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND A PLOTTER AGAINST OUR PEOPLE'S 17TH JULY REVOLUTION WILL APPEAR ON BAGHDAD TELEVISION AT 1900 (LOCAL) TODAY. HE WILL SPEAK ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND HOW IT STARTED AND DEVELOPED, INCLUDING HIS MEETINGS WITH THE FORMER BRITISH AIR AND PRESS ATTACHES IN BAGHDAD.

MF BBC MON 17/9 LSE 1042

B12 AGENT 2: OTHERS TURNED TRAITOR


THE AGENT, WHO WILL MAKE HIS CONFESSION TODAY ALSO OVER BAGHDAD AND +SAWT AL-JAMAHIR+ (+VOICE OF THE MASSES+) RADIOS AND ON BAGHDAD, KIRKUK, MOSUL AND BASRA TELEVISION, WAS NOT ALONE IN PLOTTING AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND THE REVOLUTION. THERE WERE OTHERS WITH HIM WHO HAD TURNED TRAITOR. THEIR PRIMARY TARGET WAS TO OVERTHROW THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND DESTROY THE GIGANTIC GAINS MADE BY OUR PEOPLE THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE 17TH JULY REVOLUTION.

MF BBC MON 17/9 LSE 1044

B12 AGENT 3: EXPULSION OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS IN JULY

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ASKED WING COMMANDER HUGH HARRISON, AIR ATTACHE AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD AND EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY RODERICK CLUBE (ED: ON 5TH JULY) TO LEAVE IRAQ BECAUSE THEY HAD ENGAGED ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH DIPLOMATIC DUTIES. AN IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL STATED AT THE TIME THAT IT HAD BEEN DECISIVELY PROVED THAT THE TWO BRITISH DIPLOMATS HAD PARTICIPATED IN A SPY AND PLOTTING RING OPERATING WITHIN IRAQ TO ENLIST WEAK-SOULED PEOPLE IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN THE COUNTRY.

END BBC MON 17/9 LSE 1046 (KY)



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Mr Graws  
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## British diplomat accused of encouraging coup

Baghdad, Sept 17.—A former Iraq Air Force officer asserted today that Wing Commander Hugh Harrison, the former British Air Attaché in Baghdad, wanted to encourage a coup in Iraq similar to that in Syria last November.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fahem Jalal, who commanded the Baghdad air base, is accused of having ties with British intelligence. The official Iraq News Agency (INA) said his confession concerning the Briton was made in a recorded interview due to be broadcast tonight on Iraq radio and television.

Colonel Jalal quote Wing Commander Harrison as having said during one of their meetings that what had happened in Syria under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Hafiz al-Assad (now the Syrian President) on November 13 last year, should take place in Iraq.

The objective of the coup should be "changing the present collective leadership in Iraq with a dictatorship through which it would be possible to liquidate the Palestine case under the Rogers (peace) plan and consequently paralyse commando action".


Wing Commander Harrison was declared *persona non grata*

by the Iraq authorities in July together with a First Secretary at the British Embassy and the press officer. All three were accused of carrying on activities outside the scope of their diplomatic work.

According to INA, Colonel Jalal said that he first met Wing Commander Harrison two years ago but became an active member in the British intelligence only in March this year. The colonel alleged that his job with the British was formalized by the press officer at the British Embassy.

In the interview Colonel Jalal said that Wing Commander Harrison asked about the number of Soviet experts in Iraq and whether they had any active role in piloting Iraq Air Force aircraft. He also wanted to know whether Colonel Jalal would be able to order aircraft at his base to support a coup attempt in the country.—Reuter.

Our Diplomatic Correspondent writes: A Foreign Office spokesman declared yesterday that there was no truth whatever in any of the allegations that had been made against Wing Commander Hugh Harrison.



ph



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SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 1063 OF 21 SEPTEMBER INFO PRIORITY  
BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NO. 1001 AND NO. 1002: CONFESSIONS.

1. ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE NO (NO) FURTHER REVELATIONS  
IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND THAT NOTHING IS SAID ABOUT CLUBE,  
WE AGREE WITH THE LINE YOU PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH IRAQI MINISTERS  
AND OFFICIALS, (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO. 1002). WE THINK HOWEVER,  
THAT YOUR LINE FOR USE WITH OUTSIDERS MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED. WE  
SUGGEST YOU SHOULD SAY THAT ANYONE READING THE TEXT OF THE  
CONFESSIONS MUST SURELY FIND THEM VERY HARD TO CREDIT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

20 September 1971

69  
Enter

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO  
London

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
23 SEP 1971

NEQ 25/2

Dear Veronica,

TELEVISED "CONFESSIONS"

64  
As promised in our telegram No. 1001, the full text, as published in the Baghdad Observer of 19 September, is enclosed (2 copies). The presentation there, on the whole of an inside page, is less striking than that of the Arabic papers. I enclose, for comparison, the front page of the Government newspaper, Al-Jumhuriyah. The allegation that Britain "prepared for" a coup is somewhat stronger than the "British manoeuvrings to stage a coup" headlined in the Baghdad Observer's preamble.

How is life as a Resident  
Clark ?!

Yours, *JWH*  
J W Hutson

Encs

Mr. Guter A 27/9  
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69

# Serious confessions by

## British manoeuvrings to stage a coup in Iraq similar to that in Syria exposed

### IMPLEMENTATION OF ROGERS' PLAN & LIQUIDATION OF COMMANDO MOVEMENT

An air force officer, associated with the British intelligence, revealed over the Baghdad TV screen on Friday evening that the British Air Attache in Baghdad wanted to have carried out in Iraq a coup d'etat similar to that which took place in Syria in November last.

The officer, Flt. Lt-Col. Fahem Jalal, former Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base, made his confessions in a radio and TV interview broadcast over the Baghdad Radio and TV network and the TV stations of Mosul, Basrah and Kirkuk.

The officer said that the Air Attache at the British Embassy, Hugh Harrison, once told him that what happened in Syria under the leadership of Hafeedh al-Assad on November 13, 1970, must also happen in Iraq. Harrison also told him that the purpose of the prospective coup in Iraq was to overthrow Iraq's group leadership replacing it with a dictatorial regime by which the Palestine issue could be liquidated through the Rogers' plan and the commando movement utterly paralysed.

It will be recalled that early in July the Iraqi Foreign Ministry asked each of Harrison, Roderick Clube, First Secretary at the British Embassy and George Rolleston, the British press Attache, to leave Iraq for engaging in activities which lay outside their diplomatic duties. At the time, a spokesman of the Iraqi intelligence said it was conclusively established that the British diplomats were associated with a spy and plotting ring operating inside Iraq to bring about the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.

Flt. Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal gave an account of his relations with the British Air Attache. He said those relations began some two years ago but he was formally and conclusively associated with the British intelligence early in March. He went on to say that he came to be associated with the British intelligence through the British Press Attache who presented him with a form to be filled with all necessary particulars. The Press Attache further told him his remunerations would be paid by the British intelligence to his account at one of the London Banks.

The officer in question further said that the inquiries of the British Air Attache centred mainly on whether there were in Iraq Soviet experts actually piloting war aircraft, number of such experts, the combat capabilities of Iraqi pilots, the extent of the Arab Baath Social'st Party's control


the training and arming of the commandos of Oman in the Arab Gulf. The British Press Attache also wanted immediate information to be communicated to him in the event of any "acts of aggression on Kuwait". The British attache also asked him to arrange for going to Britain for a meeting with intelligence chief and for joining on the latest techniques used by the British intelligence.

The interview subject matter, as broadcast by the Iraqi Broadcasting and TV networks, was marked with gaps resulting from the competent authorities deeming it necessary to blot out some of the names occurring in the confessions in the interest of interrogation.

Following is an account of the interview as directed by St. Mohammed Saed al-Sahhaf, Director General of the State Organisation of Broadcasting and Television:

"Fellow countrymen! The person who is about to appear on the TV screen to make his confessions is one of the agents of imperialism, a spy of the odious British colonialism and one of the plotters on the mighty revolution of our people the progressive nationalist July 17 revolution. This agent was not the only one engaged in the conspiracy against the people and the revolution. With him were other persons who took treason as a way of life and who as such came under the blows of the

"To these despicable plotters, and to the odious imperialists behind them, we say this: This revolution, the great July 17 revolution, enshrined in



Roderick Clube

the heart and conscience of our people, and representing the great hope of the Arabs, will ever remain faithful to its progressive principles and will never disappoint the masses of the people and the broad masses of the Arab nation as a whole which have placed high hopes in it. It will ever remain on the watch for all greedy elements and agents and work assiduously for building a progressive powerful society.

"Fellow countrymen, we now invite you to listen to this recording":

The Director-General of

as other guests often joined aircraft in the conversation. What the British Air Attache wanted to know was the number of Soviet experts serving with us in the Air Force and how deeply they were entrenched. He wanted to make sure they were not directing the air force as he presumed the case was in respect to Egypt. He concentrated on one point: Whether aircraft were piloted by Soviet or Iraqi flyers. That, of course, was beside the point as the aircraft were piloted by Iraqis while the Soviet acted only as trainers. He also dwelt on the question of combat abilities and other relevant matters. Further, he showed concern in the question of the Air Force Command and whether it was under the control of the Soviet experts. I made it clear to him that such assumptions were groundless. We had only one flight safety expert a Soviet

expert while the Commander and staff officers were all Iraqis. After I was transferred from the Air Force Command to the post of Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base, I met him again I noticed that his attention has now shifted to a new subject. The question of Soviet experts became of secondary importance to him, especially as the majority of those experts began to return home replaced by Iraqi officers. He started asking me about the Party's control of the air force and the extent to which that control extended. I told him that the party was in complete control of the air force and that the party was in complete control of the air force and that the party was in complete control of the air force.



Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal seen on TV screen, Friday

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# by a British stooge

the matter with higher party authorities. Without doubt, they will check with the Air Force Command as to whether the order emanated from there. Besides, it was by no means easy to put an armed

number of days later. There I found a number of Englishmen having tea. I joined them and we discussed some subjects of a general character. Later, we went out for a stroll in the garden. The question of the Air Command was in his mind and, starting off the conversation, he said that mention was made of the name of... The British Attache, stating that they had no contacts with the Habbaniya Base, wanted to know whether that person was in control of the command and whether he could prevent Habbaniyah-based planes from taking off to attack any attempt made by ground forces to carry out a coup d'etat.

As a matter of fact I did not agree with him on the subject. This is because ... was a person known to take no risks and could not be expected to carry out such acts. Earlier in the same conversation I told him that the Commander of the Air Force and party officers were easily in control of the Air Force Command. I also remember that mention was made of ... as an officer experienced in the subject. That was the end of the conversation and he told me that the next meeting would have to be made at the latter's residence. He with the British Press Attache described to me how to see him.

Here I must retrace my steps and say that in February or early in March this year I formally joined the British intelligence through the British Press Attache in Baghdad. That took place at the attache's home. The Attache was newly appointed and spoke Arabic. I think he was a graduate of the Shamian Institute, as he told me. He furnished me with a two-page form for filing. The form contained particulars including age, rank, post, marital status, number of children, the post occupied and hobbies.

He referred to ... and said that 'anyone joining us in the intelligence must be paid. We do not wish to make payments to you here in Baghdad lest you be detected. The money will be paid in your name in London. I gave him the address of the bank in London where the payments may be made. He took note of that and the matter of joining the British intelligence was put in final shape.

Now I come back to the British Air Attache directing me to the residence of the Press

dates near coast of the Sultanate of Oman. A search revealed Russian-made mines and explosives. When the skipper was questioned, he said that the consignment originated from Basrah. Accordingly, British quarters in the Sultanate of Oman wanted to be advised of any vessel sailing from Basrah lest it be loaded with explosives.

As regards the above-mentioned two questions, I told him that they were outside my competence. He, however, said: 'Just keep this in mind; if ever you hear of anything on the subject I want you to let me know.'

The third question related to Kuwait. He said: 'I want to know as quickly as possible of any military moves or military aggression on Kuwait'. I replied that I may or may not know of matters related to the subject. If anything of this sort came to my knowledge I would let you know.

As regards the North, he made little mention except saying that he visited the North with his fiancée for one week and stayed as the guest of a journalist serving in ... newspaper. He stayed with him for two or three days.

At another meeting with the Press Attache, he told me that I should take a month's leave to go to Britain, taking with me, as a camouflage, my family and children, ostensibly on a restful holiday. He would then join me in London. When I wanted to know why, he said: 'We want you to get acquainted with the chief in London and at the same time join a course on the latest techniques employed by the British intelligence'.

My guess was that they were uneasy about rendezvous made at homes and they might have in mind training me on operating a small transmitter to be used when necessary. None of that, however, materialised.

One more point in which I want to elaborate relates to... I knew this officer when he was staff officer at the Ministry of Defence in 1969. We went together once to Cairo and another time to Amman in connection with the conference of ministers of defence, as I remember. On our return, I was posted to the Air Force Command while he stayed where he was. We met again Fahem Jalal

when he became ... and I the Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base. We often met at al-Furouzi Club. Occasionally, he dropped in at my office and I at his. A number of days later, he called me on the telephone and asked me to go and see him, which I did as his office was near to mine. He asked me about a specific matter and said that the Military Bureau knew nothing. Some days later we met again at al-Furouzi Club. Flying then in the air was a rumour that... He said that such a thing was likely and the matter was in the hands of the civilian leadership, and that some of the officers were against the matter. Some of those officers, including ... were removed. He asked me where I stood on the subject but I did not commit myself and simply told him that I am attached to the Commander of the Air Force. Things did not develop into cell-forming of anything of the sort.

I should also point out here that the name of ... was never mentioned by the British Air Attache.

One more thing I forgot to mention was that, in my last meeting with the British Air Attache, when he asked me about flights, I, for my part, inquired of him as to the units which would carry out the movement; where and when. I wanted to get details from him concerning this. Obviously, when he wanted to inquire about flights, I should inquire about another aspect related to the same subject.

His reply, however, was that the matter did not fall in his competence. He was merely concerned in matters related to the air force. He wanted to make sure that the air force shall not cripple any attempt to carry out a coup d'etat in the future. As to the army, there are others dealing with its affairs. At any rate, it was premature to discuss the matter.

That is all I have to say about the whole subject.

Sd. Sahhaf: "Thanks, Lt. Col. Fahem. Have you anything else to add?"

Lt. Col. Fahem: "No thanks I think I have dealt with all aspects of the subject".

Sd. Sahhaf: "Fellow countrymen, this brings to an end this interview with Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal."

**IRAQI STATE COMPANY FOR TEXTILE  
(INVITATION FOR TENDER)**




**Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal**  
on TV screen, Friday night

often joined aircraft into operation, as that ... What the needed fuel, motor oils, oxygen, ammunition, rockets, etc. This is a long operation that can easily be detected. Beside

and how deep-trenched. He sure they were the air force the case was not. He concluded: Whether piloted by others. That, of the point were piloted the Soviet aircrafts. He also mentioned of co-operation with other relevant further, he in the question force Command was under Soviet ex-

clear to him options were and only one at a Soviet Commander were all was transferred Force Command. He seemed to appreciate this reasoning and made another question. He wanted to know whether in that case it was possible to prevent from taking to air aircraft which might otherwise attack the units carrying out the coup d'etat. I told him that it was quite easy to prevent planes from taking off simply by placing obstructions in the runway or orders of the Wing Commander who was directly under my command. But then there was the question of party officers at the base who would surely prevent such action from being taken unless



**George Rolleston**

des, the rockets were kept in special depots opened only on orders from the Air Force Command. He seemed to appreciate this reasoning and made another question. He wanted to know whether in that case it was possible to prevent from taking to air aircraft which might otherwise attack the units carrying out the coup d'etat. I told him that it was quite easy to prevent planes from taking off simply by placing obstructions in the runway or orders of the Wing Commander who was directly under my command. But then there was the question of party officers at the base who would surely prevent such action from being taken unless



Intelligence said it was conclusively established that the British diplomat, were associated with a spy and plotting ring operating inside Iraq to bring about the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.

Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal gave an account of his relations with the British Air Attache. He said those relations began some two years ago but he was formally and conclusively associated with the British intelligence early in March. He went on to say that he came to be associated with the British intelligence through the British Press Attache who presented him with a form to be filled with all necessary particulars. The Press Attache further told him his remunerations would be paid by the British intelligence to his account at one of the London Banks.

The officer in question further said that the inquiries of the British Air Attache centred mainly on whether there were in Iraq Soviet experts actually piloting war aircraft, number of such experts, the combat capabilities of Iraqi pilots, the extent of the Arab Baath Socialist Party's control of the air force and whether he (Lt. Col. Jalal) could order air force units to back up a coup d'etat in the country.

Lt. Col. Jalal said that at one meeting, the British Press Attache presented him with a set of questions on whether Iraq played a role

in the overthrow of the Iraqi regime and for joining on the latest techniques used by the British intelligence.

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Roderick Clube

the heart and conscience of our people and representing the great hope of the Arabs, will ever remain faithful to its progressive principles and will never disappoint the masses of the people and the broad masses of the Arab nation as a whole which have placed high hopes in it. It will ever remain on the watch for all greedy elements and agents and work assiduously for building a progressive powerful society."

"Fellow countrymen, we now invite you to listen to this recording":

The Director-General of Broadcasting and Television: "Brother Fahem, please introduce yourself.

Lt. Col. Fahem: "My name is Fahem Jalal, 35, a Lt. Col. in the air force, the last post I held being the command of the Baghdad Air Base.

D.G. of Broadcasting and Television: "Lt. Col. Fahem could you give us an account of your connections with the British intelligence, how did they begin and how did you become entangled?"

Lt. Col. Fahem: "My relations with the British Air Attache in Baghdad began just less than two years ago when I was posted to the Headquarters of the Air Force. I used to receive invitations to diplomatic receptions where I often met with the British Air Attache. At our first meeting, he made a number of questions on diverse subjects and demanded to know information about Soviet experts in the air force. I was disposed to supply him with such information for two main reasons: my intense aversion to the Communists and everything Communist — the 1959 event and other things still in my memory and the fact that I have had a number of courses in British where I stayed for quite a lot of time and, also for a brief period, as Air Attache. Most of the receptions I attended took place at the residence of the British Air Attache, the British Military Attache, the British Embassy, the Baghdad Hotel, the Turkish Embassy. From the nature of brief receptions, from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. it followed that conversations were brief particularly

in respect to Egypt. He concentrated on one point: Whether aircraft were piloted by Soviet or Iraqi flyers. That, of course, was beside the point as the aircraft were piloted by Iraqis while the Soviet acted only as trainers. He also dwelt on the question of combat abilities and other relevant matters. Further, he showed concern in the question of the Air Force Command and whether it was under the control of the Soviet experts. I made it clear to him that such assumptions were groundless. We had only one flight safety expert a Soviet expert while the Commander and staff officers were all Iraqis. After I was transferred from the Air Force Command to the post of Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base, I met him again I noticed that his attention has now shifted to a new subject. The question of Soviet experts became of secondary importance to him, especially as the majority of those experts began to return home replaced by Iraqi officers. He started asking me about the Party's control of the air force and the extent to which that control extended. I told him that the party was in complete control of the Baghdad Air Base which was under my command and that, by analogy other bases should be so judged.

In another meeting, he suddenly told me that what happened in a certain Arab country on November 13, 1970, must also happen in Iraq. The British Air Attache, Lt. Commander Harrison whom so far I have forgotten to mention by name said to me that the coup d'etat which occurred in Syria and which was carried out by Hafedh al-Assad must be repeated in Iraq. He said that the purpose was to replace the group leadership system by a military dictatorship through which they could carry out their designs whether in respect to the liquidationist solutions or the acceptance of the Rogers' plan or restricting or paralysing the commando activities. As a matter of fact I told him that Gen. Hardan was gone at that period, Gen. Hardan was outside the country, in Algeria.

At another meeting at a reception party he asked me point blank whether as Officer Commanding the Air Base I could order armed aircraft to fly missions. Surprised with the question, I enquired about what he had in mind. He then put it in a different way as such: "Supposing a coup d'etat got underway, could armed planes take off from your base to support the units carrying out the coup?" I replied in the negative and told him that in the event such an order were issued, the party flight officers will not carry it out unless they have checked



George

des, the rocket special depots on orders from Command. He received this realisation another question to know why case it was prevented from taking off which might check the units carrying up d'etat. I told quite easy to from taking off causing obstructions or orders of the commander who was under my command there was the Party officers at would surely action from being the order came Force Command. Next, he asked and wondered attending diplomats as you do. I no invitations him from the I was however in subsequent dinner residence of the Attache. A number and foreign guests party. He also counted with... with three-year course the same air from which the Attache had graduated.

They began reminiscences of so I left them her guests. At reception, while ing hands with Air Attache, I me that... was pronounced progress. He also and I replied Thereupon he officer in quended many cohis feelings British, he lo wanted to take in Britain. We ve the place was over

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## The Baghdad Observer

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George Rolleston

the Commander acers, were all er I was transfe- the Air Force Co- the post of Officer the Baghdad Air him again I no- is attention has to a new subject, of Soviet experts secondary impo- m, especially as of those experts turn home repla- officers. He star- ne about the Pa- of the air force- nt to which that ded. I told him ty was in comp- of the Baghdad ch was under my d that, by analogy should be so jud-

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des, the rockets were kept in special depots opened only on orders from the Air Force Command. He seemed to appreciate this reasoning and made another question. He wanted to know whether in that case it was possible to prevent from taking to air aircraft which might otherwise attack the units carrying out the coup d'etat. I told him that it was quite easy to prevent planes from taking off simply by placing obstructions in the runway or orders of the Wing Commander who was directly under my command. But then there was the question of par- ty officers at the base who would surely prevent such action from being taken unless the order came from the Air Force Command.

Next, he asked me about... and wondered why, he is not attending diplomatic reception as you do. I told him that no invitations were reaching him from the Intelligence. He was however invited to a subsequent dinner party at the residence of the British Air Attache. A number of Iraqi and foreign guests were at the party. He also became acquainted with... who was on a three-year course in Britain in the same air force college from which the British Air Attache had graduated.

They began talking of their reminiscences of college days, so I left them and joined to her guests. At the end of the reception, while I was shaking hands with the British Air Attache, the Attache told me that... was just fine, with pronounced pro-British feelings. He also asked me about... and I replied in the positive. Thereupon he said that the officer in question had attended many courses in British, his feelings were with the British, he loved Britain and wanted to take another course in Britain. We began to leave the place and the meeting was over.

"..... he sat next me and sipped his coffee. When I got him to the plane, I asked him how were things with him. Fine, he said, but we did not go into details.

"I was supposed to meet the British Air Attache at the reception of the birthday of the Queen of Britain. But as I received no invitation from the Intelligence, I did not go. However, I went to see him at his home one afternoon

with the British Press Attache to go to Britain, taking with which would carry out the described to me how to see me, as a camouflage, my family and children, ostensibly on I wanted to get details from him.

Here I must retrace my steps and say that in February or early in March this year I formally joined the British Intelligence through the British Press Attache in Baghdad. That took place at the attache's home. The Attache was newly appointed and spoke Arabic. I think he was a graduate of the Shamlian Institute, as he told me. He furnished me with a two-page form for filling. The form contained particulars including age, rank, post, marital status, number of children, the post occupied and hobbies.

He referred to ... and said that 'anyone joining us in the intelligence must be paid. We do not wish to make payments to you here in Baghdad lest you be detected. The money will be paid in your name in London. I gave him the address of the bank in London where the payments may be made. He took note of that and the matter of joining the British intelligence was put in final shape.

Now I come back to the British Air Attache directing me to the residence of the Press Attache. He said the residence was in Masbah, the fourth house in a locality. He told me to wait for the Press Attache near Strand Restaurant from 9:30 to 9:45 in the evening. The Attache would pick me up in a Volkswagen carrying an Iraqi plate number. If he failed to show up, I should go myself to his home. Concerning that, he said to me: 'get your car parked in a side-street and make sure that the upstairs room was lit. If it was not lit, that meant the house was under surveillance. Take no risks. Make sure that the house was not watched and get into the house through the back door. Should there be cause for suspicion, don't go at all'.

When the British Press Attache took up his appointment in Baghdad he was interested in a number of things such as the Arab Gulf and our policy on that. I met him in April and I found with him a paper which contained three questions on which he wanted information. The first question was: 'Have you seen or heard of the existence in south Iraq of training camps for the commandos of Oman? The second question: 'The British government wanted to know whether the Iraqi government was sending arms and explosives to the Sultanate of Oman and to the Liberation Front via Basrah'.

As regards his question, I said to him: "The Democratic People's Republic of Yemen was quite near to Oman and arms could be despatched from there rather than from Basrah'. He remarked that a British naval patrol had intercepted a vessel loaded with

My guess was that they were uneasy about rendezvous made at homes and they might have in mind training me on operating a small transmitter to be used when necessary. None of that, however, materialised.

One more point in which I want to elaborate relates to... I knew this officer when he was staff officer at the Ministry of Defence in 1969. We went together once to Cairo and another time to Amman in connection with the conference of ministers of defence, as I remember. On our return, I was posted to the Air Force Command while he stayed where he was. We met again Fahem Jalal.

That is all I have to say about the whole subject". Sd. Sahhaf: "Thanks, Lt. Col. Fahem. Have you anything else to add?" Lt. Col. Fahem: "No thanks I think I have dealt with all aspects of the subject". Sd. Sahhaf: "Fellow countrymen, this brings to an end this interview with Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal.

## IRAQI STATE COMPANY FOR TEXTILE

### (INVITATION FOR TENDER)

The Iraqi State Company for Textile, Al-Nawab Street, Kadhimain, Baghdad invites tenderers to participate in submitting their tenders in sealed envelopes clearly marked (TENDER FOR RING AND SPINNING TUBES/725) at or before 12:00 noon on Thursday, 28th October 1971.

Full specifications and conditions relating to the above tender could be obtained from Purchase Dept. at the Company's factory against ID. 1/- (One Dinar) for each copy which is unrefundable.

Also tenderers are not allowed to participate in this or any future tenders unless they are admitted in the Agencies and Trading Registration at the Directorate General of Registration and Supervision of Companies in which a certificate is to be attached confirming same.

Any offer reaches this office after the tender's closing date and without certificate as well as not indicating on the envelope the marks stipulated in the tender form will entirely be rejected.

This company is not bound to accept the lowest prices.

Actg. Director General

Baghdad Observer No. 1109, Dated 17/9/1971.



# HOW TO PROVIDE USEFUL WORLD'S UNEMPLOYED

Jobs needed for 300 million more people

**WORK FOR EVERYONE.** Far easier said than done, if we mean that everyone should have a satisfying job and one which is useful for society. It is an unending struggle in every country of the world. In industrialised countries, economic stresses, as well as changes in production methods and in consumer needs, constantly bring about adjustments in the labour force. Large-scale unemployment sometimes follows, of short or long duration.

In the developing world the situation is far WORSE. Hands and brains are in abundance, but there is not nearly enough work to go round. Increased production is not always accompanied by parallel increases in employment. Exports come up against tariff barriers erected by the richer countries. Further, it is usually the richer countries which fix the prices of poor country exports according to market trends.

In the developing world the farmer and the artisan more often than not lack the necessary knowledge, the credit and the organisation to advance their interests. The employers often don't know how to get the best out of their enterprises, the workers lack adequate opportunity for broadening their skills and the educated youth find no jobs in which to apply what they have learned.

When everything needs to be done at once, HOW CAN the resources of a poor country be developed, particularly the vital resource of manpower?

## GRIM OUTLOOK

It is a bleak picture, ranging from grey to black, depending upon the degree of development reached, and the scale of the population explosion in the various regions of the world.

Here is what Dr. Abbas Ammar, Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Office has to say on the matter:

"At the end of this decade, there will be over 300 million additional people of working age in the world. To put their hands and brains to productive work, to enlist them in the march towards development, progress and peace, this is the great challenge of our time."

The situation is particularly alarming in developing countries.



Office include the World Employment Programme. What is its purpose?

"The World Employment Programme has been launched by the International Labour Organisation as a major contribution to the United Nations Second Development Decade. It is seeking to create a wider awareness of the urgent need to find full, productive and freely chosen employment for the increasing millions seeking work. It is a gigantic task, requiring tremendous effort primarily at national levels, supported by co-ordinated international effort.

"It is now recognised that to concentrate on economic growth and to expect the employment problem to solve itself is insufficient. The creation of productive employment must be a central feature of economic planning as a whole. More and more countries are coming to realise the validity of this policy.

Comprehensive employment strategy missions, sponsored by the ILO, have already studied the situation intensively in Colombia and Ceylon. They included economists, sociologists and experts in industrial relations, labour legislation, trade and agriculture, drawn from the ILO and other international organisations and from universities. Their recommendations are designed to help reorient overall development planning in directions which will create higher levels of productive employment. The outline far-reaching proposals for rural development and agrarian reform, new systems of education and training, population policy, income distribution, fiscal policy and industrial development.

But Dr. Ammar goes on to say: "The limited resources available mean that the number of countries to which such special employment missions can be sent will remain fairly small. The ILO



phic, economic and cultural diversity, AFRICA cannot be dealt with by a single regional team. Other methods are being explored, such as seminars on employment policy, bringing together high officials of ministries responsible for planning, education, training, labour and agriculture. Two such seminars on employment policy have already been held, one in Dakar for French-speaking African countries, and the other in Kenya, for English-speaking African states.

The ILO is also seeking to

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# USEFUL WORK TO EMPLOYED MILLIONS

## TAKING STOCK

Dr. Ammar guided the work of the recent International Labour Conference which took stock of the World Employment Programme. Representatives of governments, workers and employers from about 100 countries took part in these discussions. Here is how Dr. Ammar sees some of the conclusions drawn from this review.

"Everybody was impressed by the magnitude of the problem and alarmed by the situation in his own country. Governments are under great pressure to do something about the unemployment problem, not only from the economic and social points of view but perhaps even more from the political angle. As a result, they are asking for the help of the ILO and other organisations, without perhaps being alert to the complexity of the problem and the time required to find a solution. While they agree that the main responsibility rests with the countries themselves, they nevertheless look to the ILO and to other international organisations to do more to help them. . ."

## ROLE OF EMPLOYERS' AND WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS

These efforts aimed at development and employment are not merely the concern of governments, as Dr. Ammar says:

"We are living in an age of participation. In the process of development, every member of society must play his part. Employers and workers are key groups and the involvement of their organisations is essential.

"The most important issue is the interest of the community as a whole. Workers' organisations in developing countries should not only defend the rights and privileges of organised labour but should give equal attention to the interests and the future of the majority of workers who are not organised, 'the voiceless'."

"On the other hand, employers have a large responsibility in the industrialisation of their countries. But in developing industrial strategy, one must make choices in technology, to ensure that industrialisation not only increases production but that it also absorbs a larger number of people in the labour market. That is why we in the ILO urge that employers' and workers' organisations be fully associated and closely involved in

## PRIORITIES

"In developing countries, the rural sector needs most urgent attention. It has been seriously neglected. The gap between the rural and the urban communities grows wider and there are grave social, economic and political problems as a result.

"This is the sector where one finds most of the unemployed. The highest priority must therefore be given to the rural sector for many years to come. Another sector in developing countries requiring immediate attention is that of youth.

"Unemployment among youth in these countries tends to be much higher than among adults. It breeds DISCONTENT in a group which is particularly open to political unrest. In the developing countries, twenty young people are already knocking at the door for the jobs of every ten workers who have reached the end of their working life and the numbers will continue to increase."

Dr. Ammar emphasises that the government of each country has primary responsibility for finding solutions but that other countries have their part to play.

"To create more jobs, you need capital. WHERE can it be obtained? First of all you have to rely on the countries themselves to find capital for the creation of increasing employment. These countries produce certain commodities and sell most of them in the international market. If you want to help them in building up capital to expand employment creation, you have to increase their income from the export of the commodities. In doing so you have to give them a fair deal for what they produce.

"This is what the developing countries are asking for. Trade is preferable to aid, but for some countries trade is not sufficient. They need aid in addition. Aid-giving countries should, however, persuade the receiving governments to direct that aid towards employment-creating projects."

The World Employment Programme is still in its early stages seeking solutions to one of the most intractable problems of our time — a problem continuously aggravated by the world population explosion. There is NO MAGIC FORMULA — only persistent HARD WORK to create more jobs and skills for the world's idle

## PARIS -- City of the "drugstore" FROM AIR TICKETS TO HOT FOOD

By Charlotte RIX

The Americans have had drugstores for a long time, so there is nothing particularly attractive about them and nobody pays them any particular attention. Americans go there just for a quick snack or to buy medical products.

France has recreated the American drugstore, firstly in Paris and then in certain provincial cities. But although they have taken the name of "drugstore" there is little if any resemblance to those in America. Ironically, they have been so successful in France that the Americans have started building the French version of a drugstore.

The French drugstore offers a permanent service so that the customer finds it an ideal spot to spend his spare time as well as buying what he wants. It is a new commercial formula, brought in to replace street shopping, now no longer so convenient because of heavy traffic and crowds of people.

ONE ADVANTAGE of drugstores in France is that they remain open after normal shopping hours. One can obtain a meal there at all hours and buy train and air tickets.

The largest drugstore in France is in Paris in the very heart of the capital, opposite the Saint-Lazare Station, which is considered the busiest in Europe. The drugstore covers an area of 3,400 meters — which is a record. It has a staff of 230 working from seven in the morning until two hours after midnight. Although it resembles other shopping centres of this kind, it has some additional attractions.

There is for example the bookshop and newspaper kiosk

visited by thousands of people to buy newspapers from the entire world on the same day as publication. A specially chartered plane, a rare privilege, provides this extraordinary delivery of foreign newspapers.

The bookshop is circular to help the reader and the books are classified by subjects, all of which are represented.

The drugstore has an immense food department with a wide range of French and foreign products including a hundred different kinds of jam, as many kinds of biscuits and cakes, 15 kinds of bread and 50 different cheeses.

There is another department selling food and toilet articles for animals, and a large department for wines, spirits and alcohol.

Thousands of meals are served day and night in the drugstores for restaurants. An enormous kitchen in the basement supplies all hot meals, delicatessen food and pastries.

The size of the kitchen and its installations are worth seeing. The kitchen's giant's deep-freezers and many ovens turn out daily 15,000 hamburgers, 54,000 cakes and pastries, 6 tons of meat and poultry, 8 tons of fried potatoes and over one ton of ham.

A special coffee machine serves the customer with Italian, French or American-styled coffee.

The drugstore has a bank and travel agency which are open until late at night.

Like all the French drugstores, the largest in Europe has changed the face of its neighbourhood. Before it was built facing the Saint-Lazare Station the streets which were so lively by day were dead and empty by night. Now the streets in the evening are once again crowded as the largest drugstore in Europe has become a centre of attraction and you can enter without paying.

— (AFP)

## NOTICE FOR TENDER

No. (52/71)

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the organization to advance the interests of the employers. The employers often don't know how to get the best out of their enterprises, the workers lack adequate opportunity for broadening their skills and the educated youth find no jobs in which to apply what they have learned. When everything needs to be done at once, HOW CAN the resources of a poor country be developed, particularly the vital resource of manpower?

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"At the end of this decade, there will be over 300 million additional people of working age in the world. To put their hands and brains to productive work, to enlist them in the march towards development, progress and peace, this is the great challenge of our time."

The situation is particularly alarming in developing countries, where there will be a total labour force of some 1,280 million in 1980, equal to the labour force of the entire world in 1960. Many millions of them will swell the already large ranks of the unemployed — unless vigorous action is taken to reverse the trend.

The alternative could be, in the words of President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, "a Third World War in which the proletarian countries, reduced to despair, would have nothing to lose because they would have nothing to hope for."

### WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

Dr. Ammar's responsibilities in the International Labour

international effort. "It is now recognised that to concentrate on economic growth and to expect the employment problem to solve itself is insufficient. The creation of productive employment must be a central feature of economic planning as a whole. More and more countries are coming to realise the validity of this policy.

Comprehensive employment strategy missions, sponsored by the ILO, have already studied the situation intensively in Colombia and Ceylon. They included economists, sociologists and experts in industrial relations, labour legislation, trade and agriculture, drawn from the ILO and other international organisations and from universities. Their recommendations are designed to help reorient over-all development planning in directions which will create higher levels of productive employment. The outline far-reaching proposals for rural development and agrarian reform, new systems of education and training, population policy, income distribution, fiscal policy and industrial development.

But Dr. Ammar goes on to say: "The limited resources available mean that the number of countries to which such special employment missions can be sent will remain fairly small. The ILO is therefore also employing other methods of stimulating the reorientation of national development policies aimed at employment growth."

Regional employment promotion teams have been set up in Santiago for Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Bangkok for Asia, the latter with substantial financial assistance from the United Nations Development Programme. The experts on these teams provide national authorities with assistance in employment planning and policy methods, in rural and industrial development, education, fiscal policy and other aspects of the employment problem.

Because of its wide geogra-



phic, economic and cultural diversity, AFRICA cannot be dealt with by a single regional team. Other methods are being explored, such as seminars on employment policy, bringing together high officials of ministries responsible for planning, education, training, labour and agriculture. Two such seminars on employment policy have already been held, one in Dakar for French-speaking African countries, and the other in Kenya, for English-speaking African states.

The ILO is also seeking to strengthen the technical aspects of its regional structure in

Africa, to enable it to provide more help to countries in diagnosing their employment problems and in formulating national programmes for employment creation.

Too little is still known about many aspects of employment promotion, about the economic, social, political and other obstacles in the way of employment expansion and the ways of overcoming them. Under its World Employment Programme, the ILO is therefore engaged in an extensive research programme seeking guidelines for the solution of these problems.

## FUMES OF CIVILIZATION ARE DESTROYING MONUMENTS

Irreplaceable monuments are rotting away, eaten into by the exhaust fumes from vehicles, from heating fumes and harmful industrial residue. Irreplaceable damage has already been done in many highly industrialized countries.

The first steps by West European scientists to discover new and effective means of preservation has been reported on in detail in the German magazine "Akut".

At the Institute for the Science of Work Materials at Erlangen/Nuremberg University, a team of experts, headed by Professor Herbert Oel, are conducting research into the chemical-physical processes in stone decay, caused by the continual increase in air pollution.

The long-term aim of the investigation is to find new and effective methods for the conservation of irreplaceable monuments.

The Erlangen researchers have set up a mini-weather centre in their laboratory. Here thousands of stone samples

are exposed to every type of inclemency of weather — above all, downpours impregnated with poisons from polluted air.

The manner and degree of destruction to the individual stone samples, caused by the varying poisonous weather conditions, are recorded. Only through a study of this type will it be possible, at a later date, to work out effectual "therapy" for any form of weather conditions. Naturally, the protective methods will not be available till the mid-seventies, at the earliest; the Erlangen survey will, in all probability, take four years.

So far, only the general principles of stone decomposition are known to research; smoke stacks and exhaust gases eject sulphuric acid and other components into the atmosphere. Rainwater, dew and mist are imbued with these poisons; they penetrate the outer stone layers of monuments and begin to loosen various components, e.g. chalk, magnesite and clay. In rain-free periods, however, the stone dries out

## NOTICE FOR TENDERS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The Ministry of Defence invites all interested tenderers to participate in the following confidential tenders in accordance to the general conditions and specifications which may be obtained from the Directorate of Contracts & Purchases, at this Ministry.

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Director of Contracts & Purchases

Baghdad Observer No. 1110, Dated 19/9/1971.



...to the ILO and to other international organisations to do more to help them. . .

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### NOTICE FOR TENDER

No. (52/71)

1. Tenderers are invited for the supply of Supply & Installation of Fixed & Mobile Wireless Station, Battery Chargers & Complete Workshop Equipment for the D.G. of Customs with the previous terms and specifications which may be obtained from Secretary of the Central Foreign Purchasing Board in the Ministry of Finance against payment of (1/- One Dinar) per copy.

2. Offers will be accepted up to 14/11/1971 and will be closed at (12) O'clock noon of that day.

Ag. President,

Central Foreign Purchasing Board  
RAGHIB FAHMI

Baghdad Observer No. 1110, Dated 19/9/1971.

### EXTENSION OF ADVERTISEMENT

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF IRRIGATION  
AND DRAINAGE, PROJECTS SUWIRA  
GOVERNMENT FARM — Contract No. 1

Further to our advertisement about the above mentioned contract. This directorate decided to accept the tenders not later than noon (local time) on Sunday 28th November 1971 instead of 12th September 1971.

Director General of

Irrigation and Drainage Project

Baghdad Observer No. 1110, Dated 19/9/1971.

## OF CIVILIZATION ROYING HISTORIC NTS

to every type of weather — also, impregnated from polluted

ner and degree of to the individual es, caused by the sonous weather co e recorded. Only tudy of this type ossible, at a later rk out effectual or any form of ditions. Naturally, ve methods will lable till the mid- the earliest; the rvey will, in all take four years.

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and the chalk which has been dissolved in water, turns to plaster. Since plaster crystals need much more room than chalk, the stone is burst open from the inside.

### CULTURAL CATASTROPHES

Since the beginning of industrialization, stone works of art throughout the world have been suffering from polluted air. The marble temple of the Acropolis in Athens and the over three hundred year old palaces in Venice; stone sculptures in Warsaw and the irreplaceable frescoes in Pisa are all threatened with deadly decomposition. Five years of fumes from civilization are today just as destructive as a hundred years of decay caused by weathering.

Cologne Cathedral — over 700 years old — is crumbling so rapidly that the men from the Cathedral Works Office, who are busy replacing damaged stones, can hardly keep pace.

The so-called "Igeler Saule" near Trier, a Roman sepulchre nearly 80 feet high and dating from the third century, is rotting away at an ever increasing rate. Eaten away by black

soot flakes, the faces of the centuries old cherubs in Munich are turning into a pock-marked crater-like landscape, stained glass windows are fading and the sandstone facades of old churches are crumbling away.

This cultural catastrophe has been announcing itself for many years now, under the eyes of the conservators. But no effective counter measures have been introduced so far. No expert has yet systematically examined what effect the over 300 "elixirs of salvation", offered by different firms, will have on stone. The preservatives so far used to conserve medieval buildings and sculptures, have frequently been proved as ineffective and, indeed, in some cases, as positively harmful.

Professor Oel stresses: "The most perfect of conservation methods will only slow down stone decay, but not stop it. It is impossible to provide stone facades and sculptures with hermetical screening from poisonous gases. The castles and palaces can be saved by one thing only — keeping the air clean."

— Dinah Stok



# Serious confessions by

## British manoeuvrings to stage a coup in Iraq similar to that in Syria exposed

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### IMPLEMENTATION OF ROGERS' PLAN & LIQUIDATION OF COMMANDO MOVEMENT

An air force officer, associated with the British intelligence, revealed over the Baghdad TV screen on Friday evening that the British Air Attache in Baghdad wanted to have carried out in Iraq a coup d'etat similar to that which took place in Syria in November last.

The officer, Flt. Lt-Col. Fahem Jalal, former Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base, made his confessions in a radio and TV interview broadcast over the Baghdad Radio and TV network and the TV stations of Mosul, Basrah and Kirkuk.

The officer said that the Air Attache at the British Embassy, Hugh Harrison, once told him that what happened in Syria under the leadership of Hafeedh al-Assad on November 13, 1970, must also happen in Iraq. Harrison also told him that the purpose of the prospective coup in Iraq was to overthrow Iraq's group leadership replacing it with a dictatorial regime by which the Palestine issue could be liquidated through the Rogers' plan and the commando movement utterly paralysed.

It will be recalled that early in July the Iraqi Foreign Ministry asked each of Harrison, Roderick Clube, First Secretary at the British Embassy and George Rolleston, the British press Attache, to leave Iraq for engaging in activities which lay outside their diplomatic duties. At the time, a spokesman of the Iraqi intelligence said it was conclusively established that the British diplomats were associated with a spy and plotting ring operating inside Iraq to bring about the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.

Flt. Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal gave an account of his relations with the British Air Attache. He said those relations began some two years ago but he was formally and conclusively associated with the British intelligence early in March. He went on to say that he came to be associated with the British intelligence through the British Press Attache who presented him with a form to be filled with all necessary particulars. The Press Attache further told him his remunerations would be paid by the British intelligence to his account at one of the London Banks.

The officer in question further said that the inquiries of the British Air Attache centred mainly on whether there were in Iraq Soviet experts actually piloting war aircraft, number of such experts, the combat capabilities of Iraqi pi-


the training and arming of the commandos of Oman in the Arab Gulf. The British Press Attache also wanted immediate information to be communicated to him in the event of any "acts of aggression on Kuwait". The British attache also asked him to arrange for going to Britain for a meeting with intelligence chief and for joining on the latest techniques used by the British intelligence.

The interview subject matter, as broadcast by the Iraqi Broadcasting and TV networks, was marked with gaps resulting from the competent authorities deeming it necessary to blot out some of the names occurring in the confessions in the interest of interrogation.

Following is an account of the interview as directed by Sd. Mohammed Saed al-Sahhaf, Director General of the State Organisation of Broadcasting and Television:

"Fellow countrymen! The person who is about to appear on the TV screen to make his confessions is one of the agents of imperialism, a spy of the odious British colonialism and one of the plotters on the mighty revolution of our people the progressive nationalist July 17 revolution. This agent was not the only one engaged in the conspiracy against the people and the revolution. With him were other persons who took treason as

"To these despicable plotters and to the odious imperialists behind them, we say this: 'This revolution, the great July 17 revolution, enshrined in



Roderick Clube

the heart and conscience of our people and representing the aspirations of the Arabs, will ever remain faithful to its progressive principles and will never disappoint the masses of the people and the broad masses of the Arab nation as a whole which have placed high hopes in it. It will ever remain on the watch for all greedy elements and agents and work assiduously for building a progressive powerful society.

"Fellow countrymen, we

as other guests often joined aircraft in the conversation. What the British Air Attache wanted to know was the number of Soviet experts serving with us in the Air Force and how deeply they were entrenched. He wanted to make sure they were not directing the air force as he presumed the case was in respect to Egypt. He concentrated on one point: Whether aircraft were piloted by Soviet or Iraqi flyers. That, of course, was beside the point as the aircraft were piloted by Iraqis while the Soviet acted only as trainers. He also dwelt on the question of combat abilities and other relevant matters. Further, he showed concern in the question of the Air Force Command and whether it was under the control of the Soviet experts. I made it clear to him that such assumptions were groundless. We had only one flight safety expert a Soviet expert while the Commander and staff officers were all Iraqis. After I was transferred from the Air Force Command to the post of Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base, I met him again I noticed that his attention has now shifted to a new subject. The question of Soviet experts became of secondary importance to him, especially as the majority of those experts began to return home replaced by Iraqi officers. He started asking me about the Party's control of the air force there v



Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal seen on TV screen, Friday



# by a British stooge

the matter with higher party authorities. Without doubt, they will check with the Air Force Command as to whether the order emanated from there. Besides, it was by no means easy to put an armed



Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal on TV screen, Friday night

ten joined aircraft into operation, as that What the needed fuel, motor oils, oxygen, ammunition, rockets, etc. This is a long operation that can easily be detected. Besi-

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George Rolleston

des, the rockets were kept in special depots opened only on orders from the Air Force Command. He seemed to appreciate this reasoning and made another question. He wanted to know whether in that case it was possible to prevent from taking to air aircraft which might otherwise attack the units carrying out the coup d'etat. I told him that it was quite easy to prevent planes from taking off simply by placing obstructions in the runway or orders of the Wing Commander who was directly under my command. But then there was the question of party officers at the base who would surely prevent such action from being taken unless the order came from the Air Force Command. Next, he asked me about

number of days later. There I found a number of Englishmen having tea. I joined them and we discussed some subjects of a general character. Later, we went out for a stroll in the garden. The question of the Air Command was in his mind and, starting off the conversation, he said that mention was made of the name of... The British Attache, stating that they had no contacts with the Habbaniya Base, wanted to know whether that person was in control of the command and whether he could prevent Habbaniyah-based planes from taking off to attack any attempt made by ground forces to carry out a coup d'etat.

As a matter of fact I did not agree with him on the subject. This is because ... was a person known to take no risks and could not be expected to carry out such acts. Earlier in the same conversation I told him that the Commander of the Air Force and party officers were easily in control of the Air Force Command. I also remember that mention was made of ... as an officer experienced in the subject. That was the end of the conversation and he told me that the next meeting would have to be made at the latter's residence. He with the British Press Attache described to me how to see him.

Here I must retrace my steps and say that in February or early in March (this year) I formally joined the British intelligence through the British Press Attache in Baghdad. That took place at the attache's home. The Attache was newly appointed and spoke Arabic. I think he was a graduate of the Shamian Institute, as he told me. He furnished me with a two-page form for filling. The form contained particulars including age, rank, post, marital status, number of children, the post occupied and hobbies.

He referred to ... and said that 'anyone joining us in the intelligence must be paid. We do not wish to make payments to you here in Baghdad lest you be detected. The money will be paid in your name in London. I gave him the address of the bank in London where the payments may be made. He took note of that and the matter of joining the British intelligence was put in final shape.

Now I come back to the British Air Attache directing me to the residence of the Press Attache. He said the residence was in Masbah, the fourth house in a locality. He told me

dates near coast of the Sultanate of Oman. A search revealed Russian-made mines and explosives. When the skipper was questioned, he said that the consignment originated from Basrah. Accordingly, British quarters in the Sultanate of Oman wanted to be advised of any vessel sailing from Basrah lest it be loaded with explosives.

As regards the above-mentioned two questions, I told him that they were outside my competence. He, however, said: 'Just keep this in mind; if ever you hear of anything on the subject I want you to let me know.'

The third question related to Kuwait. He said: 'I want to know as quickly as possible of any military moves or military aggression on Kuwait'. I replied that I may or may not know of matters related to the subject. If anything of this sort came to my knowledge I would let you know.

As regards the North, he made little mention except saying that he visited the North with his fiancée for one week and stayed as the guest of a journalist serving in ... newspaper. He stayed with him for two or three days.

At another meeting with the Press Attache, he told me that I should take a month's leave to go to Britain, taking with me, as a camouflage, my family and children, ostensibly on a restful holiday. He would then join me in London. When I wanted to know why, he said: 'We want you to get acquainted with the chief in London and at the same time join a course on the latest techniques employed by the British intelligence'.

My guess was that they were uneasy about rendezvous made at homes and they might have in mind training me on operating a small transmitter to be used when necessary. None of that, however, materialised.

One more point in which I want to elaborate relates to... I knew this officer when he was staff officer at the Ministry of Defence in 1969. We went together once to Cairo and another time to Amman in connection with the conference of ministers of defence, as I remember. On our return, I was posted to the Air Force Command while he stayed where he was. We met again Fahem Jalal.

when he became ... and I the Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base. We often met at al-Furoussid Club. Occasionally, he dropped in at my office and I at his. A number of days later, he called me on the telephone and asked me to go and see him, which I did as his office was near to mine. He asked me about a specific matter and said that the Military Bureau knew nothing. Some days later we met again at al-Furoussid Club. Flying then in the air was a rumour that... He said that such a thing was likely and the matter was in the hands of the civilian leadership, and that some of the officers were against the matter. Some of those officers, including ... were removed. He asked me where I stood on the subject but I did not commit myself and simply told him that I am attached to the Commander of the Air Force. Things did not develop into cell-forming of anything of the sort.

I should also point out here that the name of ... was never mentioned by the British Air Attache.

One more thing I forgot to mention was that, in my last meeting with the British Air Attache, when he asked me about flights, I, for my part, inquired of him as to the units which would carry out the movement: where and when. I wanted to get details from him concerning this. Obviously, when he wanted to inquire about flights, I should inquire about another aspect related to the same subject.

His reply, however, was that the matter did not fall in his competence. He was merely concerned in matters related to the air force. He wanted to make sure that the air force shall not cripple any attempt to carry out a coup d'etat in the future. As to the army, there are others dealing with its affairs. At any rate, it was premature to discuss the matter.

That is all I have to say about the whole subject".

Sd. Sahhaf: "Thanks, Lt. Col. Fahem. Have you anything else to add?"

Lt. Col. Fahem: "No thanks. I think I have dealt with all aspects of the subject".

Sd. Sahhaf: "Fellow countrymen, this brings to an end this interview with Lt. Col. Fahem Jalal."

## IRAQI STATE COMPANY FOR TEXTILE

### (INVITATION FOR TENDER)

The Iraqi State Company for Textile, Al-Na-



tic duties. At the time, a spokesman of the Iraqi intelligence said it was conclusively established that the British diplomats were associated with a spy and plotting ring operating inside Iraq to bring about the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.

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The officer in question further said that the inquiries of the British Air Attache centred mainly on whether there were in Iraq Soviet experts actually piloting war aircraft, number of such experts, the combat capabilities of Iraqi pilots, the extent of the Arab Baath Socialist Party's control of the air force and whether he (Lt. Col. Jalal) could order air force units to back up a coup d'etat in the country.

Lt. Col. Jalal said that at one meeting, the British Press Attache presented him with a set of questions on whether Iraq played a role in revolutionary regime.

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Roderick Clube

the heart and conscience of our people and representing the aspirations of the Arabs, will ever remain faithful to its progressive principles and will never disappoint the masses of the people and the broad masses of the Arab nation as a whole which have placed high hopes in it. It will ever remain on the watch for all greedy elements and agents and work assiduously for building a progressive powerful society.

"Fellow countrymen, we now invite you to listen to this recording":

The Director-General of Broadcasting and Television: "Brother Fahem, please introduce yourself.

Lt. Col. Fahem: "My name is Fahem Jalal, 35, a Lt. Col. in the air force, the last post I held being the command of the Baghdad Air Base.

D.G. of Broadcasting and Television: "Lt. Col. Fahem could you give us an account of your connections with the British intelligence, how did they begin and how did you become entangled?"

Lt. Col. Fahem: "My relations with the British Air Attache in Baghdad began just less than two years ago when I was posted to the Headquarters of the Air Force. I used to receive invitations to diplomatic receptions where I often met with the British Air Attache. At our first meeting, he made a number of questions on diverse subjects and demanded to know information about Soviet experts in the air force. I was disposed to supply him with such information for two main reasons: my intense aversion to the Communists and everything Communist — the 1959 event and other things still in my memory and the fact that I have had a number of courses in British where I stayed for quite a lot of time and, also for a brief period, as Air Attache. Most of the receptions I attended took place at the residence of the British Air Attache, the British Military Attache, the British Embassy, the Baghdad Hotel, the Turkish Embassy. From the nature of brief receptions, from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. it followed that conversations were brief particularly

re not directing the air force as he presumed the case was in respect to Egypt. He concentrated on one point: Whether aircraft were piloted by Soviet or Iraqi flyers. That, of course, was beside the point as the aircraft were piloted by Iraqis while the Soviet acted only as trainers. He also dwelt on the question of combat abilities and other relevant matters. Further, he showed concern in the question of the Air Force Command and whether it was under the control of the Soviet experts. I made it clear to him that such assumptions were groundless. We had only one flight safety expert a Soviet expert while the Commander and staff officers were all Iraqis. After I was transferred from the Air Force Command to the post of Officer Commanding the Baghdad Air Base, I met him again I noticed that his attention has now shifted to a new subject. The question of Soviet experts became of secondary importance to him, especially as the majority of those experts began to return home replaced by Iraqi officers. He started asking me about the Party's control of the air force and the extent to which that control extended. I told him that the party was in complete control of the Baghdad Air Base which was under my command and that, by analogy other bases should be so judged.

In another meeting, he suddenly told me that what happened in a certain Arab country on November 13, 1970, must also happen in Iraq. The British Air Attache, Lt. Commander Harrison whom so far I have forgotten to mention by name said to me that the coup d'etat which occurred in Syria and which was carried out by Hafez al-Assad must be repeated in Iraq. He said that the purpose was to replace the group leadership system by a military dictatorial regime through which they could carry out their designs whether in respect to the liquidationist solutions or the acceptance of the Rogers' plan or restricting or paralysing the commando activities. As a matter of fact I told him that Gen. Hardan was gone at that period, Gen. Hardan was outside the country, in Algeria.

At another meeting at a reception party he asked me point blank whether as Officer Commanding the Air Base I could order armed aircraft to fly missions. Surprised with the question, I enquired about what he had in mind. He then put it in a different way as such: "Supposing a coup d'etat got underway, could armed planes take off from your base to support the units carrying out the coup?" I replied in the negative and told him that in the event such an order were issued, the party system at the base and the flight officers will not carry it out unless they have checked

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## The Baghdad Observer

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George Rolleston

des, the rockets were kept in special depots opened only on orders from the Air Force Command. He seemed to appreciate this reasoning and made another question. He wanted to know whether in that case it was possible to prevent from taking to air aircraft which might otherwise attack the units carrying out the coup d'état. I told him that it was quite easy to prevent planes from taking off simply by placing obstructions in the runway or orders of the Wing Commander who was directly under my command. But then there was the question of party officers at the base who would surely prevent such action from being taken unless the order came from the Air Force Command.

Next, he asked me about... and wondered why, he is not attending diplomatic receptions as you do. I told him that no invitations were reaching him from the intelligence. He was however invited to a subsequent dinner party at the residence of the British Air Attache. A number of Iraqi and foreign guests were at the party. He also became acquainted with... who was on a three-year course in Britain in the same air force college from which the British Air Attache had graduated.

They began talking of their reminiscences of college days, so I left them and joined to her guests. At the end of the reception, while I was shaking hands with the British Air Attache, the Attache told me that... was just fine, with pronounced pro-British feelings. He also asked me about... and I replied in the positive. Thereupon he said that the officer in question had attended many courses in British, his feelings were with the British, he loved Britain and wanted to take another course in Britain. We began to leave the place and the meeting was over.

"..... he sat next me and sipped his coffee. When I got him to the plane, I asked him how were things with him. Fine, he said, but we did not go into details.

"I was supposed to meet the British Air Attache at the reception of the birthday of the Queen of Britain. But as I received no invitation from the intelligence, I did not go. However, I went to see him at his home one afternoon a

with the British Press Attache to go to Britain, taking with which would carry out the described to me how to see me, as a camouflage, my family and children, ostensibly on I wanted to get details from him.

Here I must retrace my steps a restful holiday. He would and say that in February or then join me in London. We early in March this year I en I wanted to know why, he formally joined the British intelligence through the British Press Attache in Baghdad. Thadon and at the same time join at took place at the attache's a course on the latest techniques employed by the British intelligence.

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Now I come back to the British Air Attache directing me to the residence of the Press Attache. He said the residence was in Masbah, the fourth house in a locality. He told me to wait for the Press Attache near Strand Restaurant from 9:30 to 9:45 in the evening. The Attache would pick me up in a Volkswagen carrying an Iraqi plate number. If he failed to show up, I should go myself to his home. Concerning that, he said to me: 'get your car parked in a side-street and make sure that the upstairs room was lit. If it was not lit, that meant the house was under surveillance. Take no risks. Make sure that the house was not watched and get into the house through the back door. Should there be cause for suspicion, don't go at all'.

When the British Press Attache took up his appointment in Baghdad he was interested in a number of things such as the Arab Gulf and our policy on that. I met him in April and I found with him a paper which contained three questions on which he wanted information. The first question was: 'Have you seen or heard of the existence in south Iraq of training camps for the commandos of Oman? The second question: 'The British government wanted to know whether the Iraqi government was sending arms and explosives to the Sultanate of Oman and to the Liberation Front via Basrah'.

As regards his question, I said to him: "The Democratic People's Republic of Yemen was quite near to Oman and arms could be despatched from there rather than from Basrah'. He remarked that a British naval patrol had intercepted a vessel loaded with

## IRAQI STATE COMPANY FOR TEXTILE

### (INVITATION FOR TENDER)

The Iraqi State Company for Textile, Al-Nawar Street, Kadhimain, Baghdad invites tenderers to participate in submitting their tenders in sealed envelopes clearly marked (TENDER FOR RING AND SPINNING TUBES/725) at or before 12:00 noon on Thursday, 28th October 1971.

Full specifications and conditions relating to the above tender could be obtained from Purchase Dept. at the Company's factory against ID. 1/- (One Dinar) for each copy which is unrefundable.

Also tenderers are not allowed to participate in this or any future tenders unless they are admitted in the Agencies and Trading Registration at the Directorate General of Registration and Supervision of Companies in which a certificate is to be attached confirming same.

Any offer reaches this office after the tender's closing date and without certificate as well as not indicating on the envelope the marks stipulated in the tender form will entirely be rejected.

This company is not bound to accept the lowest prices.

Actg. Director General

Baghdad Observer No. 1109, Dated 17/9/1971.



# HOW TO PROVIDE USEFUL WORK FOR THE WORLD'S UNEMPLOYED

Jobs needed for 300 million more people

**WORK FOR EVERYONE.** Far easier said than done, if we mean that everyone should have a satisfying job and one which is useful for society. It is an unending struggle in every country of the world. In industrialised countries, economic stresses, as well as changes in production methods and in consumer needs, constantly bring about adjustments in the labour force. Large-scale unemployment sometimes follows, of short or long duration.

In the developing world the situation is far worse. Hands and brains are in abundance, but there is not nearly enough work to go round. Increased production is not always accompanied by parallel increases in employment. Exports come up against tariff barriers erected by the richer countries. Further, it is usually the richer countries which fix the prices of poor country exports according to market trends.

In the developing world the farmer and the artisan more often than not lack the necessary knowledge, the credit and the organisation to advance their interests. The employers often don't know how to get the best out of their enterprises, the workers lack adequate opportunity for broadening their skills and the educated youth find no jobs in which to apply what they have learned. When everything needs to be done at once, how can the resources of a poor country be developed, particularly the vital resource of manpower?

## GRIM OUTLOOK

It is a bleak picture, ranging from grey to black, depending upon the degree of development reached, and the scale of the population explosion in the various regions of the world.

Here is what Dr. Abbas Ammar, Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Office has to say on the matter:

"At the end of this decade, there will be over 300 million additional people of working age in the world. To put their hands and brains to productive work, to enlist them in the march towards development, progress and peace, this is the great challenge of our time."

The situation is particularly alarming in developing coun-


tries. The Office include the World Employment Programme. What is its purpose?

"The World Employment Programme has been launched by the International Labour Organisation as a major contribution to the United Nations Second Development Decade. It is seeking to create a wider awareness of the urgent need to find full, productive and freely chosen employment for the increasing millions seeking work. It is a gigantic task, requiring tremendous effort primarily at national levels, supported by co-ordinated international effort.

"It is now recognised that to concentrate on economic growth and to expect the employment problem to solve itself is insufficient. The creation of productive employment must be a central feature of economic planning as a whole. More and more countries are coming to realise the validity of this policy.

Comprehensive employment strategy missions, sponsored by the ILO, have already studied the situation intensively in Colombia and Ceylon. They included economists, sociologists and experts in industrial relations, labour legislation, trade and agriculture, drawn from the ILO and other international organisations and from universities. Their recommendations are designed to help reorient over-all development planning in directions which will create higher levels of productive employment. The outline far-reaching proposals for rural development and agrarian reform, new systems of education and training, population policy, income distribution, fiscal policy and industrial development.

But Dr. Ammar goes on to say: "The limited resources available mean that the number of countries to which such special employment missions can be sent will remain fairly small. The ILO



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The ILO is also seeking to Africa, to enable it to provide more help to countries in diagnosing their employment problems and in formulating national programmes for employment creation. Too little is still known about many aspects of employment promotion, about the economic, social, political and other obstacles in the way of employment expansion and the ways of overcoming them. Under its World Employment Programme, the ILO is therefore engaged in an extensive research programme seeking wide-

Dr. of the hour stock ment tives of and em country discuss Ammar lusions ew.

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# USEFUL WORK TO EMPLOYED MILLIONS

## TAKING STOCK

Dr. Ammar guided the work of the recent International Labour Conference which took stock of the World Employment Programme. Representatives of governments, workers and employers from about 100 countries took part in these discussions. Here is how Dr. Ammar sees some of the conclusions drawn from this review.

"Everybody was impressed by the magnitude of the problem and alarmed by the situation in his own country. Governments are under great pressure to do something about the unemployment problem, not only from the economic and social points of view but perhaps even more from the political angle. As a result, they are asking for the help of the ILO and other organisations, without perhaps being alert to the complexity of the problem and the time required to find a solution. While they agree that the main responsibility rests with the countries themselves, they nevertheless look to the ILO and to other international organisations to do more to help them. . ."

## ROLE OF EMPLOYERS' AND WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS

These efforts aimed at development and employment are not merely the concern of governments, as Dr. Ammar says:

"We are living in an age of participation. In the process of development, every member of society must play his part. Employers and workers are key groups and the involvement of their organisations is essential.

"The most important issue is the interest of the community as a whole. Workers' organisations in developing countries should not only defend the rights and privileges of organised labour but should give equal attention to the interests and the future of the majority of workers who are not organised, 'the voiceless'.

"On the other hand, employers have a large responsibility in the industrialisation of their countries. But in developing industrial strategy, one must make choices in technology, to ensure that industrialisation not only increases production but that it also absorbs a larger number of people in the labour market. That is

## PRIORITIES

"In developing countries, the rural sector needs most urgent attention. It has been seriously neglected. The gap between the rural and the urban communities grows wider and there are grave social, economic and political problems as a result.

"This is the sector where one finds most of the unemployed. The highest priority must therefore be given to the rural sector for many years to come. Another sector in developing countries requiring immediate attention is that of youth.

"Unemployment among youth in these countries tends to be much higher than among adults. It breeds DISCONTENT in a group which is particularly open to political unrest. In the developing countries, twenty young people are already knocking at the door for the jobs of every ten workers who have reached the end of their working life and the numbers will continue to increase."

Dr. Ammar emphasises that the government of each country has primary responsibility for finding solutions but that other countries have their part to play.

"To create more jobs, you need capital. WHERE can it be obtained? First of all you have to rely on the countries themselves to find capital for the creation of increasing employment. These countries produce certain commodities and sell most of them in the international market. If you want to help them in building up capital to expand employment creation, you have to increase their income from the export of the commodities. In doing so you have to give them a fair deal for what they produce.

"This is what the developing countries are asking for. Trade is preferable to aid, but for some countries trade is not sufficient. They need aid in addition. Aid-giving countries should, however, persuade the receiving governments to direct that aid towards employment-creating projects."

The World Employment Programme is still in its early stages seeking solutions to one of the most intractable problems of our time — a problem continuously aggravated by the world population explosion.

## PARIS -- City of the "drugstore" FROM AIR TICKETS TO HOT FOOD

By Charlotte RIX

The Americans have had drugstores for a long time, so there is nothing particularly attractive about them and nobody pays them any particular attention. Americans go there just for a quick snack or to buy medical products.

France has recreated the American drugstore, firstly in Paris and then in certain provincial cities. But although they have taken the name of "drugstore" there is little if any resemblance to those in America. Ironically, they have been so successful in France that the Americans have started building the French version of a drugstore.

The French drugstore offers a permanent service so that the customer finds it an ideal spot to spend his spare time as well as buying what he wants. It is a new commercial formula, brought in to replace street shopping, now no longer so convenient because of heavy traffic and crowds of people.

ONE ADVANTAGE of drugstores in France is that they remain open after normal shopping hours. One can obtain a meal there at all hours and buy train and air tickets.

The largest drugstore in France is in Paris in the very heart of the capital, opposite the Saint-Lazare Station, which is considered the busiest in Europe. The drugstore covers an area of 3,400 meters — which is a record. It has a staff of 230 working from seven in the morning until two hours after midnight. Although it resembles other shopping centres of this kind, it has some additional attractions.

There is for example the bookshop and newspaper kiosk

visited by thousands of people to buy newspapers from the entire world on the same day as publication. A specially chartered plane, a rare privilege, provides this extraordinary delivery of foreign newspapers.

The bookshop is circular to help the reader and the books are classified by subjects, all of which are represented.

The drugstore has an immense food department with a wide range of French and foreign products including a hundred different kinds of jam, as many kinds of biscuits and cakes, 15 kinds of bread and 50 different cheeses.

There is another department selling food and toilet articles for animals, and a large department for wines, spirits and alcohol.

Thousands of meals are served day and night in the drugstores for restaurants. An enormous kitchen in the basement supplies all hot meals, delicatessen food and pastries.

The size of the kitchen and its installations are worth seeing. The kitchen's giant deep-freezers and many ovens turn out daily 15,000 hamburgers, 54,000 cakes and pastries, 6 tons of meat and poultry, 3 tons of fried potatoes and over one ton of ham.

A special coffee machine serves the customer with Italian, French or American-styled coffee.

The drugstore has a bank and travel agency which are open until late at night.

Like all the French drugstores, the largest in Europe has changed the face of its neighbourhood. Before it was built facing the Saint-Lazare Station the streets which were so lively by day were dead and empty by night. Now the streets in the evening are once again crowded as the largest drugstore in Europe has become a centre of attraction and you can enter without paying.

— (AFP)

## NOTICE FOR TENDER

No. (52/71)

1. Tenderers are invited for the supply of Supply & Installation of Fixed & Mobile Wireless Station, Battery Chargers & Complete Workshop Equipment for the D.G. of Customs with the previous terms and specifications which may be obtained from Secretary of the Central Foreign Purchasing Board in the Ministry of Finance against payment of (1/- One Dinar)



farmer and the artisan more often than not lack the necessary knowledge, the credit and the organisation to advance their interests. The employers often don't know how to get the best out of their enterprises, the workers lack adequate opportunity for broadening their skills and the educated youth find no jobs in which to apply what they have learned. When everything needs to be done at once, HOW CAN the resources of a poor country be developed, particularly the vital resource of manpower?

### GRIM OUTLOOK

It is a bleak picture, ranging from grey to black, depending upon the degree of development reached, and the scale of the population explosion in the various regions of the world.

Here is what Dr. Abbas Ammar, Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Office has to say on the matter:

"At the end of this decade, there will be over 300 million additional people of working age in the world. To put their hands and brains to productive work, to enlist them in the march towards development, progress and peace, this is the great challenge of our time."

The situation is particularly alarming in developing countries, where there will be a total labour force of some 1,280 million in 1980, equal to the labour force of the entire world in 1960. Many millions of them will swell the already large ranks of the unemployed — unless vigorous action is taken to reverse the trend.

The alternative could be, in the words of President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, "a Third World War in which the proletarian countries, reduced to despair, would have nothing to lose because they would have nothing to hope for."

### WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

Dr. Ammar's responsibilities in the International Labour

Office are enormous, requiring tremendous effort primarily at national levels, supported by co-ordinated international effort.

"It is now recognised that to concentrate on economic growth and to expect the employment problem to solve itself is insufficient. The creation of productive employment must be a central feature of economic planning as a whole. More and more countries are coming to realise the validity of this policy."

Comprehensive employment strategy missions, sponsored by the ILO, have already studied the situation intensively in Colombia and Ceylon. They included economists, sociologists and experts in industrial relations, labour legislation, trade and agriculture, drawn from the ILO and other international organisations and from universities. Their recommendations are designed to help reorient over-all development planning in directions which will create higher levels of productive employment. The outline far-reaching proposals for rural development and agrarian reform, new systems of education and training, population policy, income distribution, fiscal policy and industrial development.

But Dr. Ammar goes on to say: "The limited resources available mean that the number of countries to which such special employment missions can be sent will remain fairly small. The ILO is therefore also employing other methods of stimulating the reorientation of national development policies aimed at employment growth."

Regional employment promotion teams have been set up in Santiago for Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Bangkok for Asia, the latter with substantial financial assistance from the United Nations Development Programme. The experts on these teams provide national authorities with assistance in employment planning and policy methods, in rural and industrial development, education, fiscal policy and other aspects of the employment problem.

Because of its wide geogra-



phic, economic and cultural diversity, AFRICA cannot be dealt with by a single regional team. Other methods are being explored, such as seminars on employment policy, bringing together high officials of ministries responsible for planning, education, training, labour and agriculture. Two such seminars on employment policy have already been held, one in Dakar for French-speaking African countries, and the other in Kenya, for English-speaking African states.

The ILO is also seeking to strengthen the technical aspects of its regional structure in

Africa, to enable it to provide more help to countries in diagnosing their employment problems and in formulating national programmes for employment creation.

Too little is still known about many aspects of employment promotion, about the economic, social, political and other obstacles in the way of employment expansion and the ways of overcoming them. Under its World Employment Programme, the ILO is therefore engaged in an extensive research programme seeking guidelines for the solution of these problems.

## FUMES OF CARE DESTROY MONUMENTS

Irreplaceable monuments are rotting away, eaten into by the exhaust fumes from vehicles, from heating fumes and harmful industrial residue. Irreplaceable damage has already been done in many highly industrialized countries.

The first steps by West European scientists to discover new and effective means of preservation has been reported on in detail in the German magazine "Akut".

At the Institute for the Science of Work Materials at Erlangen/Nuremberg University, a team of experts, headed by Professor Heribert Oel, are conducting research into the physico-chemical processes in stone decay, caused by the continual increase in air pollution.

The long-term aim of the investigation is to find new and effective methods for the conservation of irreplaceable monuments.

The Erlangen researchers have set up a mini-weather centre in their laboratory. Here thousands of stone samples

are exposed to every type of inclemency of weather — above all, downpours impregnated with poisons from polluted air.

The manner and degree of destruction to the individual stone samples, caused by the varying poisonous weather conditions, are recorded. Only through a study of this type will it be possible, at a later date, to work out effective "therapy" for any form of weather conditions. Naturally, the protective methods will not be available till the mid-seventies, at the earliest; the Erlangen survey will, in all probability, take four years.

So far, only the general principles of stone decomposition are known to research; smoke stacks and exhaust gases eject sulphuric acid and other components into the atmosphere. Rainwater, dew and mist are imbued with these poisons; they penetrate the outer stone layers of monuments and begin to loosen various components, e.g. chalk, magnesite and clay. In rain-free periods, however, the stone dries out

## NOTICE FOR TENDERS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The Ministry of Defence invites all interested tenderers to participate in the following confidential tenders in accordance to the general conditions and specifications which may be obtained from the Directorate of Contracts & Purchases, at this Ministry.

| Tender No.                    | Closing Date | Materials needed             |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------|
| MISC/17/71<br>Notice No. 176. | 27/10/1971   | Two Mechanical Laboratories. |

Director of Contracts & Purchases

Baghdad Observer No. 1110, Dated 19/9/1971.



to the ILO and other international organisations to do more to help them. . .

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"On the other hand, employers have a large responsibility in the industrialisation of their countries. But in developing industrial strategy, one must make choices in technology, to ensure that industrialisation not only increases production but that it also absorbs a larger number of people in the labour market. That is why we in the ILO urge that employers' and workers' organisations be fully associated and very closely involved in what is done in this field."

Dr. Ammar emphasises that the government of each country has primary responsibility for finding solutions but that other countries have their part to play.

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The World Employment Programme is still in its early stages seeking solutions to one of the most intractable problems of our time — a problem continuously aggravated by the world population explosion. There is NO MAGIC FORMULA — only persistent HARD WORK to create more jobs and skills for the world's idle hands

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— (AFP)

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2. Offers will be accepted up to 14/11/1971 and will be closed at (12) O'clock noon of that day.

Ag. President,

Central Foreign Purchasing Board  
RAGHIB FAHMI

Baghdad Observer No. 1110, Dated 19/9/1971.

### EXTENSION OF ADVERTISEMENT

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF IRRIGATION  
AND DRAINAGE, PROJECTS SUWIRA  
GOVERNMENT FARM — Contract No. 1

Further to our advertisement about the above mentioned contract. This directorate decided to accept the tenders not later than noon (local time) on Sunday 28th November 1971 instead of 12th September 1971.

Director General of

Irrigation and Drainage Project

Baghdad Observer No. 1110, Dated 19/9/1971.

## OF CIVILIZATION ROYING HISTORIC NTS

to every type of of weather — abo. mpours impregnated s from polluted

er and degree of to the individual es, caused by the monous weather co e recorded. Only study of this type possible, at a later ork out effectual or any form of nditions. Naturally, ve methods will able: till the mid- the earliest: the rvey will, in all take four years. ly the general pri- stone decomposit- wn to research; sm- and exhaust gases ric acid and other into the atmos- water, dew and m- ed with these poi- penetrate the outer of monuments and sen various compo- chalk, magnesite rain-free periods, e stone dries out

and the chalk which has been dissolved in water, turns to plaster. Since plaster crystals need much more room than chalk, the stone is burst open from the inside.

### CULTURAL CATASTROPHES

Since the beginning of industrialization, stone works of art throughout the world have been suffering from polluted air. The marble temple of the Acropolis in Athens and the over three hundred year old palaces in Venice; stone sculptures in Warsaw and the irreplaceable frescoes in Pisa are all threatened with deadly decomposition. Five years of fumes from civilization are today just as destructive as a hundred years of decay caused by weathering.

Cologne Cathedral — over 700 years old — is crumbling so rapidly that the men from the Cathedral Works Office, who are busy replacing damaged stones, can hardly keep pace.

The so-called "Igeler Saule" near Trier, a Roman sepulchre nearly 80 feet high and dating from the third century, is rotting away at an ever increasing rate. Eaten away by black

soot flakes, the faces of the centuries old cherubs in Munich are turning into a pock-marked crater-like landscape, stained glass windows are fading and the sandstone facades of old churches are crumbling away.

This cultural catastrophe has been announcing itself for many years now, under the eyes of the conservators. But no effective counter measures have been introduced so far. No expert has yet systematically examined what effect the over 300 "elixirs of salvation", offered by different firms, will have on stone. The preservatives so far used to conserve medieval buildings and sculptures, have frequently been proved as ineffective and, indeed, in some cases, as positively harmful.

Professor Oel stresses: "The most perfect of conservation methods will only slow down stone decay, but not stop it. It is impossible to provide stone facades and sculptures with hermetical screening from poisonous gases. The castles and palaces can be saved by one thing only — keeping the air

— Dina Stoh



RESTRICTED & PERSONAL

25/9




BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

70

30 September 1971

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO  
London



p/w

*Dear Veronica,*

A PS ON EXPULSIONS

- 60
1. When I called on you on 1 September you asked if I could elucidate the sentence in the Ambassador's letter 25/9 of 6 August to Richard Evans in which he mentioned that Ni'ma al Ni'ma had secured the rescindment at the last minute of yet another British expulsion.
  2. I have consulted the Ambassador about this and he says that the reference was not to a member of this Embassy but to an elderly member of the British community. We did not report this case to you at the time, though we were in touch with Consular Department about it. But briefly, the Security authorities in Basra were apparently behind a move to expel from Iraq a 76-year-old British subject, Howard by name. Mr Howard had lived in Basra since World War 1, having married an Iraqi and settled down there. Ni'ma bestirred himself, under sustained pressure, to get this senseless and inhumane decision reversed in the nick of time. He has mentioned this achievement several times to the Ambassador since then, as a demonstration of the Ministry's desire to be helpful.

*Yours ever,*

*Christopher.*

A C D S MacRae

*Mr Gorton 7/1x*

*pa 16 7/16*

RESTRICTED & PERSONAL



CONFIDENTIAL

88-9 of particular  
British Embassy interest.

BAGHDAD

25 September 1974

72

25/9

NEQ 25/2

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO

Mr. Egey I must  
Xina Beureau apologise  
for having held this up.  
Ough we do it  
M.O. I know about what

Dear Richard

Enter.

COLONEL FAHIM JALAL'S CONFESSIONS

1. You may care to have a few afterthoughts on the "confessions" and their handling by the Iraqi authorities.

P.O. Dept. P.O. Dept. or Defence Dept?

2. One of the things about the confessions which will strike the careful reader is that the conversations relating to the alleged plot were all with the Air Attaché, whereas the enquiries attributed to the Press Attaché (represented as the real representative of British Intelligence) related solely to Iraq's intentions towards Kuwait and the Gulf States (a fairly understandable field of enquiry for any diplomat). This strikes me as curious. What seems to be the key phrase in the whole confession - as well as the most transparent of its inventions - is similarly attributed to the Air Attaché. The sentence may be worth reproducing textually, as it appeared in the Baghdad Observer:

"The Air Attaché said to me that the coup d'état which occurred in Syria and which was carried out by Hafez al Assad, must be repeated in Iraq. He said that the purpose was to replace the group leadership system by a military dictatorial régime through which they could carry out their designs whether in respect to the liquidationist solution or to the acceptance of the Roger's plan by restricting or paralysing commando activity. As a matter of fact I told him that General Hardan (Tikriti) was gone at that period".

3. It was this sentence, however ludicrous it sounds in the mouth of Hugh Harrison, which the Press picked out for headlining and for special emphasis both in its introductory remarks on the confessions and in its subsequent editorial comment. In the series of four editorials under the title "Crime and Punishment" to which the Party newspaper Al Thawra proceeded to treat its readers, this bit of the story is a fairly constant theme. It figures more vividly in an article by Abu Bashir (whoever he may be) in the same paper on 19 September, so heavy with sarcasm that even its devoted readers may have been perplexed. Abu Bashir's theme was that Iraq's isolation in the Arab world was due to the fact that she is the only one in step on Palestine; the whole area was complaining about Iraq; and this was why the British sought to replace its much criticised régime with something on the new Syrian model.

CONFIDENTIAL

Minute  
public





4. I deduce from this treatment, coupled with the original splash headlines, that the régime's basic purpose was as follows. In addition to reinforcing the belief (now widespread, though not shared by me) that a wicked military coup was going to be staged on 17 July, they were seeking to vindicate to the man in the street their lonely stand against peaceful solutions; to discredit the rival Ba'athist régime in Damascus; to justify their unpopular assassination of Hardan Tikriti; and to display themselves as the only truly progressive, anti-Zionist government around, fighting a single-handed but of course successful battle against Zionist/Imperialist intrigue - on this particular occasion, British intrigue.

5. I have no reason to suppose that the régime itself believes its own story of British involvement in an attempted coup - though the man in the street, or at least some men in some streets, may well swallow it. Such diplomatic colleagues as I have spoken to have needed little disabusing. Several of them have gone out of their way to compliment me with great hilarity on having an Intelligence Service which gets its agents to fill in forms about their wives, children, hobbies etc (an aspect of the confessions the Iraqi press has fastened on as a bull point, thereby adding to the hilarity). I ought perhaps to explain, with reference to your telegram No 1063, that the line you suggested my taking with outsiders (that anyone reading the text of the confessions must surely find them very hard to credit) was just what I meant by the formula I had proposed but had evidently expressed too obliquely.

6. This brings me to my conversation on 19 September - the only serious one I have so far had on the subject with a senior official - with Jamali, the Director-General designate in the Ministry. I had had to call on him, in his additional temporary hat as Chief of Protocol, about Agreement for Dr Da'oud; but I took the opportunity to raise the subject of the "confessions". I said I had too much respect for him as an individual to ask him for his views on them. He knew as well as I did that my Embassy was entirely innocent of any plotting to overthrow the régime. What I wanted from him was an assurance, if he could give me one, that this was the end of the charade and its ludicrous imputations on my country. His answer was quite interesting. He said he had been surprised that they made the confessions public and believed that they had only done so in response to pressure put upon them to explain the statements made by the Iraqi Intelligence authorities at the time of the expulsions. (This somewhat strengthens the idea that they might have been goaded into it by Kamel Mahmoud's letter in the Times of 11 September.) As for my specific question, he could not give me an official answer but his personal view, he said, was that this was the end of it.

7. It is unlikely that I shall see Jamali's immediate superior, the Minister, before he sets-off for the General Assembly; he has just got married in addition to other preoccupations. I might in due course try to have a go at





Saddam Hussain, though he has become in 1971 almost totally inaccessible to the Diplomatic Corps, however constant his public appearances. My guess is that the Iraqis may well strike again if another situation soon arises in which they will want to hold Britain up to public execration - and the approaching crunch over the Gulf may well present them with just such a situation. A few timely revelations about our treasonable dealings with the Shah over the Islands might not come amiss.

8. None of this, as I say, means that they take the story about our involvement seriously themselves or even that they want us to take it seriously. The extraordinary decision of their Military Intelligence Department (mentioned in my telegram No 999) to throw a large dinner party at a few hours notice for my new Defence Attaché, the night before the confessions were televised, cannot have been pure coincidence. An arrival (as opposed to a farewell) party for Service Attachés is believed to be without precedent. Their desire for more and more military courses and training facilities in England is unabated. They have invited no less than 35 British medical experts to come out at Iraqi expense and help them in the next few months. Visa applications this summer have been an all time high. For that matter all Iraqi officials I have met since the confessions have been almost more affable than ever. None of this, however, will stop them repeating the exercise, if it suits them, in the interests of the Higher Truth. Moreover they have still got to decide whether or not to stage some trials - assuming that a quota of those accused are still alive to try.

9. I have not given much distribution to previous reports to you on this subject, but posts in the area may possibly be interested in these afterthoughts.

*Yours ever*  
*H G*  
H G Balfour Paul

Copied to:

Chanceries: AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
JEDDA  
KUWAIT  
TEHRAN  
WASHINGTON  
BAHRAIN RESIDENCY



71



Interesting and perhaps  
reassuring. I remember H. Khong  
well; he always detested  
British Embassy

30 September 1971

25/9

S L Egerton Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
-7 OCT 1971  
ent  
NEQ 25/2

the British, so I wd. not rule  
out a few side-swipes at us.

1. Enter R.E. 8/10
2. M- ~~Exam~~
3. M- ~~Passing~~ (for w(-?))
4. PSD, (M- ~~Exam~~ M, w, att).

Dear Stephen,

## MORE CONFESSIONS?

1. In my letter 25/9 of 25 September to Richard Evans I<sup>1</sup>/<sub>x</sub> speculated briefly on the likelihood of further "confessions" involving us being televised by the Iraqis.

2. Dépis, the French Chargé d'Affaires, told me privily two night's ago of some information given to him by "a top-level Ba'athist friend", whom he eventually identified as Abdul Majid al Rafi'i, the doctor from Tripoli and the Lebanese member of the Iraqi Ba'ath's International Command, who is given considerable prominence on his frequent visits here. Dépis evidently got to know him during his last posting (in Beirut) and describes him as a very close friend.

3. Al Rafi'i had just told Dépis that further confessions were shortly to be televised here, the protagonist on this occasion being retired Colonel Hadi Khammas (who figures as No 9 amongst the probables on our list of those arrested in connexion with the alleged coup attempt in July, enclosed with my letter 25/9 of 6 August to Richard Evans).

4. As far as I am aware, no member of the Embassy has ever met Khammas. This, of course, would not necessarily be a bar to "confessions" being extracted from him to incriminate us further. But it seems not improbable that, if the target is external, it is not us but Egypt.

5. According to our records, Khammas was once DMI here and a leading member of the pro-Nasser Arab Socialist Movement. He is also believed to have been in Cairo as MA. He took part in the successful coup which ousted the Ba'ath in November 1963 and in the abortive coup which failed to oust the Ba'ath in November 1968, for which he was arrested but was subsequently released. He was exiled to Egypt in July 1970 but reportedly returned here earlier this year.

6. Relations between Iraq and Egypt are at as low an ebb as ever, and a complete clear-out of the principal members of the Egyptian Embassy here has been under-way. Brigadier Shawqat, who left shortly after our three were expelled, is now known to have been

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formerly in  
New York

privately PNG'd. The Political Officer of the Embassy, Nabil al Arabi, left almost immediately after. The transfer of the Ambassador, Lutfi Metwalli, to Beirut was recently announced in the Egyptian and Lebanese press while he was out of Iraq. The Charge d'Affaires, Safwat Baraka, told me two day's ago that he too would be leaving, since he had only come here on the understanding that Metwalli would be his Chief. He added that relations with Iraq were now of no interest to his government, since all attempts to reach an understanding with the Iraqis were futile.

7. If, therefore, Khammas is to be televised making his confession it seems likely that we shall not be in the line of fire and not impossible that Egypt will.

8. The information given by Rafi'i to Dépis may, of course, be nonsense. If it is true, it may be made public before this letter reaches you; but I have thought it worth sending.

*Yours ever*

*Glen*

H G Balfour Paul

cc Chanceries: CAIRO AND BEIRUT

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Note for file

Confessions.

I have discussed Jalal's confessions with both PUSD (Mr Ritchie) and MOD (Air Vice Marshal Campbell, DMSI). Book said there was no truth whatsoever in the allegations made by Jalal about members of HM Embassy at Baghdad.

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BAGHDAD


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**(LAST PAPER)**

21 October 1971

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
F C O



Enter

Dear Veronica,

CONFESSIONS (cont.)

- 72
1. Please refer to the Ambassador's letter to Richard Evans 25/9 of 25 September.
  2. It was announced in the Arabic press yesterday (and, as you will see, copied this morning in the Baghdad Observer, under the banner headline "BRITISH STOOGE SENTENCED TO DEATH") that the Revolutionary Court had, on 18 October, sentenced Lt Col Fahim Jalal to execution by firing squad for his alleged espionage on behalf of "British intelligence". This bald announcement was followed by a brief re-hash of the charges against him described in our telno 1001 and in the Ambassador's letter under reference.
  3. The Court was under the chairmanship of Judge Abdul Karim Ibrahim al Najjar; and its other two members were Col Yunis Marouf al Douri and Lt Col Raghieb Fakhri. The last two have served on the Revolutionary Court before - in fact, Raghieb Fakhri has been the Court's Public Prosecutor for the last 2 years; the judge is unknown to us. The proceedings of the Revolutionary Court (which is appointed, supposedly by the RCC, to deal with major cases affecting the security of the state) are secret; so we are unlikely to learn any more about the trial.

Yours ever,  
Christopher

A C D S MacRae

c.c. Chanceries:

AMMAN, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, KUWAIT  
TEHRAN, WASHINGTON.

**(LAST PAPER)**

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Mr Gorton 29  
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Expulsion Of Three British Diplomats From Iraq; Press Coverage. Diplomatic Representation Of UK In Iraq: Expulsion Of 3 British Diplomats Accused Of Encouraging A Coup Against Baath Regime. 5 July 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1551. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477353/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=ac1195a8&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477353/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=ac1195a8&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.